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Abstract 
More than sixteen years have passed since the launch of the Qatar-based Al Jazeera 
news channel. Looking back, the state of Arab media and its relationship with the 
political sphere was different from what we see nowadays. The launch of Al Jazeera in 
1996 was a significant event that led to subsequent changes both in the media and 
politics. Among these changes, the Arab spring, which started in Tunisia in December 
2010, is certainly the most remarkable one. This ongoing event has already resulted in 
the fall of four dictatorships and is expected to unleash a democratization wave and 
reshape the face of the Arab region. 
This research analyzes the Al Jazeera democratizing effect and looks at the political 
implications of the new Arab public sphere. In doing so, it seeks to fill a gap in the 
existing literature, which tends to ignore the Arab world that remains largely under-
researched. Contrary to the top-down approach inherent in the dominant narratives on 
democratization, that pay almost no attention to the growing role of the media in 
political change, I adopted a bottom-up approach arguing that, particularly in the Arab 
setting, it has become almost impossible to separate changes in the media landscape 
from those in the political field. The Arab spring provides us with a telling empirical 
example where this interplay is remarkably manifest. In this context, Arab 
democratization is no longer an abstract; it is rather a developing process that needs our 
attention and requires concerted scholarly efforts. 
To develop an original approach to understanding Arab democratization and analyze its 
complex dynamics, I used grounded theory and its powerful tools in theory building. 
Based on this theoretical framework I opted for qualitative methodology to elaborate the 
empirical part of this research, which consists primarily of analyzing and interpreting 
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in-depth interviews conducted with a sample of Al Jazeera’s staff in various managerial 
and editorial positions. 
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Chapter 1:  
Literature Review 
 
1. Research question and rationale  
 
What is the impact of Al Jazeera's paradigmatic change in the media-politics relationship 
on Arab democratization? How has Al Jazeera contributed to the creation of an Arab 
public sphere? These key questions articulate my research analytical agenda and will be 
examined in the following context.    
 
The successive democratization waves that swept across the globe during the last four 
decades generated a rich body of literature exploring and comparing processes, attitudes 
and outcomes. In the context of these phenomenal changes, many transitions to 
democratic governance took place in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa; the one region that seemed to be lagging behind is the Middle East in general and 
the Arab world in particular. Accordingly, very few scholarly works focused on this 
region to explore the dynamics of social and political change and question the seemingly 
resistance of Arab political systems to democratization. Looking at the situation through 
the lens of the top-down dominating narratives can only capture segments of the scene 
but not the whole picture. The apparent stalled democratic change in the Arab world 
should not obscure the deep, long-term and open-ended processes involving a widening 
circle of non-state, non-institutionalized and non-elite actors. In this respect, the struggle 
for Arab democratization is better understood when local realities and specific contexts 
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are taken into account. Among these realities is the growing influence of previously 
marginalized, excluded and unheard voices. Besides, there is the noticeable growing role 
of transnational satellite television and online media, with all that it offers in terms of 
connectivity and flow of uncensored information.   
 
As the media have always played a significant role in facilitating change in certain 
circumstances and reinforcing the status-quo in others, and since the Arab world has seen 
an unprecedented surge of media activity in the last fifteen years led by the Qatar-based 
Al Jazeera network, there is a need to rethink the democratizing role of the media in the 
Arab setting. This research is a contribution to the ongoing debate over the nature and 
scope of the Al Jazeera effect in a region where democratic politics seems to be going 
nowhere, at least until before the Arab spring. It is not my aim here to prove or disprove 
whether Al Jazeera is a democratizing agent. I will rather explore the ways in which this 
new phenomenon has redefined the spheres of public communication and how these 
emerging spheres are reshaping peoples' relations to their political systems and affecting 
the power relations between the rulers and the ruled. My aim therefore, is to fill the gap 
in the existing literature on Arab democratization, which either neglected or placed very 
little emphasis on the role of the media and the non-political elites.  
 
By giving those actors a platform for public discussion and providing its cross-sectional 
audiences with unprecedented access to information, Al Jazeera has created a new media 
paradigm that is increasingly affecting both democratic and anti-democratic discourses in 
the region. The political dimension of this platform, where government officials, 
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opposition figures, civil society activists, academics and professionals from different 
backgrounds interact freely and show their agreements and disagreements on issues of 
general concern is what characterizes the debate mediated by this new media paradigm 
that is Al Jazeera. The more this debate assumes clear political functions and includes 
wider social strata, the weaker the stronghold of Arab autocratic regimes over public 
opinion and choices will be. It is through this complex and dialectical relation of 
intertwined advancements and drawbacks that democratic struggles in the region will be 
analyzed. Addressing Arab democratization from this perspective is therefore, never 
straightforward or unproblematic.  
 
Drawing on the existing literature on democratization theory, media-politics relationship, 
the public sphere, and Al Jazeera, I propose to break down my research key questions 
into the following set of sub-questions which will articulate my analysis and guide my 
research agenda: 
 
1. To what extent are the dynamics of social and political change in the Arab world 
"specific" and "particular" in a way that requires the development of an 
alternative theoretical approach to Arab democratization? 
 
2. Can we build on the intellectual tradition of critical theory, especially the 
formulations of Habermas on the communicative action, the public sphere, and 
deliberative democracy to understand the impact of Al Jazeera on the changing 
relations between Arab media and politics? 
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3. In the last few years, there has been a number of writings about the emergence of 
an "Arab public sphere" linked to, and influenced by Al Jazeera. What are the 
characteristics of this Arab public sphere? And how is it contributing to the 
democratizing process in the Arab world? 
 
4. Is there a normative agenda behind Al Jazeera's journalistic practice that 
distinguishes it from other news networks by mediating the struggle for 
democracy and constructing an intellectual framework for plurality, diversity, and 
mutual recognition? 
 
5. On the other hand, if the existence of a real “public sphere” is often regarded as a 
key factor in the democratic change, is the emergence of a virtual “public sphere” 
not providing an illusion of participation, which encourages citizens to feel as 
though their democratic rights are being exercised? Is Al Jazeera not contributing 
to the displacement of the democratic protest away from its real battleground? 
 
6. By acting as representative of the views of its transnational audience and giving 
platform to different social and political groups regardless of their commitment to 
democracy, is Al Jazeera not adding further obstacles to the seemingly stalled 
democratic change? Where does that leave us with the advancement of Arab 
democracy? 
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2. Literature Review: a critical assessment 
 
There is no such thing as a long piece of work, except one that you dare not start 
Charles Baudelaire 
 
In the following section I present a literature review in four areas pertaining to my 
research topic. The distinction I made between democratization theory, politics-media 
relations, the public sphere, and Al Jazeera is thematically driven; in essence they all 
complement each other and intersect in many areas. Choosing to arrange my literature 
review in this way helps me organize my ideas, prioritize my research themes, and figure 
out the contours of my study. I start with investigating democratization theories with 
special focus on the three main approaches:  the modernization approach, the transition 
approach and the structural approach.  
 
For decades, the debate on democratization has been framed by the interaction between 
those three competing theories. The different explanations they offer to the story of 
democratization by focusing on different variables and emphasizing certain elements 
rather than others complement each other and consolidate the same theoretical framework 
within which they all operate. They all share and make up the same Euro-American, 
ethno-centric, top-down approach to democratization. This section concludes with critical 
remarks outlining the weaknesses of existing narratives when applied to the Arab context. 
Among these weaknesses is the near complete silence on the role of the media in 
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fostering political change in a region where information has, until recently, been entirely 
monopolized by authoritarian governments in place.  
 
The media-politics relationship and the possible avenues for democratic change is the 
second area of my literature review. In this section I explore the major analytical 
approaches to the relation between these two domains. Among the theoretic models 
included in the review are Siebert’s four theories of the Press: the authoritarian theory, 
the libertarian theory, the social responsibility theory, and the Soviet Communist theory. 
Developments in the field of comparative study of media and politics gave birth to a 
number of subsequent formulations of this changing relation.  
 
Hallin and Mancini present us with three models: the polarized pluralist model, the 
democratic corporatist model, and the liberal model. With the rise of new communication 
technologies in mediating politics and the human experience in general, new frameworks 
have emerged. Here we talk about the growing influence of the media over politics and 
the kind of issues and tensions the new phenomenon has created to democratic societies. 
Some of tensions are identified by Bennett and Entman: the tension between 
commonality, the tension between the free information choice and the necessary citizen 
education, and the tension between treating people as consumers of media products or as 
citizens. This debate takes another dimension in the next section of my literature review: 
the public sphere.  
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Revolving around Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, most of 
the literature in this section is either a critique of the original formulation or an attempt to 
apply the concept onto new social and political settings. Feminist studies emphasize the 
rise of women public sphere while Habermas’s version of the bourgeois public sphere 
was declining. Marxist literature draws our attention to the existence of non-bourgeois, 
proletariat, plebian public spheres. New and transnational media created new forms of 
communications leading to the emergence of what some prefer to call virtual or online 
public sphere. This plurality of public spheres and the role of the media in creating or 
consolidating existing platforms for public discussion bring me to the last section of my 
literature review: Al Jazeera and its contribution to the dynamics of social and political 
change in the Arab world.  
 
Literature on Al Jazeera is organized in this review into three categories. The first 
category is more descriptive and tends to present the network with the maximum of 
information, sometimes at the expense of the quality of analysis. The second category 
includes a number of comparative studies where Al Jazeera figures along with other news 
networks like the BBC, CNN, Telesur, Al Arabiya etc. The third and last category looks 
at the impact of Al Jazeera in different Areas. Some of the literature in this category 
devoted individual chapters to particular aspects of the Al Jazeera’s impact, while others 
devoted whole volumes to investigate the scope of this impact at the regional and global 
levels like Philip Seib’s “The Al Jazeera Effect”. Regardless of how each of these three 
categories approached Al Jazeera; there remains a real need to further explore the impact 
of this media paradigm shift on Arab Democratization. 
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Theories of Democratization 
 
It is evident to all alike that a great democratic revolution is going on among us,  
but all do not look at it in the same light. To some it appears to be novel but accidental; 
to others it seems irresistible, because it is the most uniform, the most ancient, 
 and the most permanent tendency that is to be found in history. 
Alexis De Tocqueville   
 
Democratization has been a major global political phenomenon in the twentieth century. 
Starting from the 1970s, a large number of authoritarian regimes gave way to democratic 
forms of government almost everywhere across the globe. The literature on 
democratization has also seen a phenomenal surge, trying to explain this phenomenon 
from different perspectives and different theoretical approaches. Theories, views, 
concepts and understandings of democratization will be examined in the course of the 
following section. 
 
In simple and general terms, democratization refers to “political changes moving in a 
democratic direction.”1 It is a composite process by which governments, states and 
societies move away from some form of authoritarianism towards some form of 
democracy.
2
 But, democracy has no clear core meaning that is timeless, objective and 
                                                           
1
 Potter, David., Goldblatt, David., Kiloh, Margaret. and Lewis, Paul. Democratization: Democracy - From 
Classical Times to the Present (Polity Press, 2005), p. 3 
2
 Grugel, Jean. Democratization: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan 2002), p. 12 
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universally applicable. Even if scholars agree on some sort of idealized concepts or 
models of democracy (Held, 2008), or minimal requirements, in Robert Dahl's terms 
(Dahl, 1971), existing democracies do not always conform to these conceptual standards 
and conditions. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl provided a more 
comprehensive definition of democracy where they distinguish between "concepts", 
"procedures" and "operative principles."
3
  
 
At the procedural level, they build on Dahl's seven "conditions" and add two extra 
elements in an effort to make their definition as inclusive and all-encompassing as 
possible.
4
 However, according to these standards, many real existing polities including a 
number of well-established western democracies fail to qualify for the label. Switzerland 
before 1971 for instance fails the test on the "universal adult suffrage" as only then 
women gained the right to vote. Similarly, the “Westminster” model, with its over-riding 
legislative power of the unelected House of Lords in Britain fails to fit Schmitter and 
Karl’s eighth criteria. 
 
Since the meaning of democracy remains unsettled, fundamentally contested and marked 
by conflicting interpretations, defining democratization is also problematic and cannot be 
objective or straightforward. It is a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended 
process as described by Laurence Whitehead. It consists of progress towards a more rule-
                                                           
3
 Schmitter, Philippe C. and Karl, Terry L. 'What Democracy is… and is Not' in Larry Diamond and Marc 
F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (John Hopkins University Press 1993), p. 45 
4
 The eighth element is popularly elected officials able to exercise their power without being subjected to 
over-riding opposition from unelected officials. The ninth is that the polity must be self-governing and able 
to operate independently from the interference of external political systems. 
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based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics.
5
 To explain this process, 
a number of theoretic approaches had emerged. Much of the literature on democratization 
focuses on three main theories. David Potter lists the following three approaches: the 
modernization approach, the transition approach and the structural approach. 
  
As Potter himself points out, there is no categorical distinction between these three 
approaches. None of them offers a totally separate and different type of explanation, but 
the emphasis of each one is certainly different.
6
 They share ideas, concepts and analytical 
procedures. They also group a number of sub-categories and authors with different 
perspectives, explanations and sets of arguments. Sometimes the distinction is simply 
made between structure and agency approaches because of their different positions 
regarding the role of structure or agency in driving the change. Even this distinction may 
seem arbitrary if we consider that a varying degree of structuralism is embedded in all 
approaches. In what follows, I adopt Potter's three-approach categorization. I present a 
critical review of all three approaches, highlighting their theoretic frameworks, their main 
theorists and their key concepts and arguments. 
 
- Modernization approach: 
 
It has been true in Western societies and it seems to be true elsewhere that you do not 
find democratic systems apart from capitalism, or apart from a market economy, if you 
prefer that term. 
                                                           
5
 Whitehead, Laurence. Democratization: Theory and Experience (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 27   
6
 Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, Paul, Democratization, p. 11 
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Peter L. Berger 
 
In his seminal article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy", Seymour Martin Lipset sought to relate democratization to 
socio-economic development or level of modernization. His study, which focused on 
European, English speaking and Latin American nations demonstrates that, in the first 
two regions we find stable democracies, unstable democracies and unstable dictatorships 
while in Latin America we find democracies, unstable dictatorships and stable 
dictatorships. After comparing these countries according to their average wealth, degree 
of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education, he found that, in each case, 
these indices of economic development were much higher for the more democratic 
countries. He then concluded, "democracy is related to the state of economic 
development. Concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy.
7
 In other terms, "most countries which lack an 
enduring tradition of political democracy in its clearest forms lie in the traditionally 
underdeveloped sections of the world."
8
 Lipset’s direct causality between capitalism and 
democracy has been subject to criticism even from within the modernization perspective. 
Larry Diamond presents quite a different view of this relationship: "the more well-to-do 
the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve, and 
maintain a democratic system for their country."
9
 On his part, Walter Rostow identified 
                                                           
7
 Lipset, Seymour M. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy (The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, March 1959) p. 75 
8
 Ibid. p. 73 
9
 Diamond, Larry. Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered (American Behavioral Scientist, 
Vol. 35 no. 4/5, (March 1992) pp. 468 
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four stages leading societies from traditionalism to modernity where democracy can 
prevail. In a strictly lineal path, the universal route to capitalism starts with "traditional 
societies" through "pre-take-off societies" which in turn "take-off" before "maturing" and 
transforming into "mass consumption societies.
10
 
 
According to modernization theory, economic development is at the heart of 
democratization because it brings higher level of income, which in turn leads to the 
diminution of class distinction, struggle and conflict. It also brings higher level of 
education where citizens come to value democracy by becoming more tolerant, less 
radical, moderate and rational with regard to different views and other social groups. 
Although these socio-economic factors may well explain democratic transitions in certain 
parts of the world, they become problematic when used to analyze the situation in the 
Middle East. Compared to other developing countries argues Tim Niblock, a number of 
Middle Eastern countries score relatively highly on indices as education, 
industrialization, social mobility, urbanization and standard of living, yet they have been 
surpassed on the road to democratization by countries with lower scores.
11
  
 
The importance of education in developing a particular culture that favors democracy 
over other forms of government led to the emergence of what has become to be known as 
the political culture approach within modernization theory. Political culture theorists 
argue that education creates civic culture without which democracy cannot be stable or 
                                                           
10
 See Walter W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (Clarendon Press, 1960). 
11
 Niblock, Tim. Democratization: A Theoretical and Practical Debate (British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 25, Issue 2, Nov. 1998), p. 225 
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durable. The link between democracy and a particular political culture is clear in Almond 
and Verba's "The Civic Culture". The basic thesis underlying their work is that a 
democratic form of participatory political system requires as well a political culture 
consistent with it. It is "a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a 
culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it."
12
 
The relationship between political culture and democratization has also been highlighted 
by Pye and Verba in “Political culture and political development”13 and Larry Diamond 
who argued that long-term democratic consolidation must encompass a shift in political 
culture.
14
 On his part, Michael Hudson stresses the importance of political culture and 
argues for the case of bringing it back in to better understand Arab politics, especially 
with regard to civil society, political liberalization and democratization. While advocating 
the political culture approach, Hudson is clear about the necessity of avoiding "the 
excessive generalizations that marked political culture studies in their heyday: artificial 
dichotomization between "traditional" and "modern", the oversimplification of "subject-
parochial-participant" classifications, and the application of a single "culture" to a whole 
nation."
15
   
 
                                                           
12
 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 8 
13
 See Pye, Lucian and Verba, Sidney. Political culture and political development (Princeton University 
Press, 1965). 
14
 See Diamond , Larry. Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered (American Behavioral 
Scientist, Vol. 35 no. 4/5, March, 1992) pp. 450-99 
15
 Hudson, Michael. "The Political Culture Approach to Arab Democratization: The Case for Bringing It 
Back-In, Carefully", in Rex Brynen and Bahgat Korany (eds.), Political Liberalization & Democratization 
in the Arab World: Vol.1, Theoretical Perspectives (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 64 
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Subsequent studies on democratization brought into light a number of weaknesses of 
modernization theory, whether in its economist or culturalist forms. The following 
critical remarks summarize these weaknesses: 
 
Modernization theory is widely viewed by its critics as linear and causal with very 
limited solid empirical evidence that supports any claim to universal applicability. There 
is certainly a positive correlation between economic development and democracy, but not 
in a law-like fashion. Other variables like political institutions, social norms, ethnic 
cleavages etc. should also be considered. Its ethnocentrism and culture specificity caused 
it to ignore a range of other forms of socio-economic development including that of the 
third world and the Middle East in particular.  
 
Lessons and rules drawn from the Western experience cannot always apply to non-
Western societies without falling in the trap of unsubstantiated generalization. In this 
respect, modernization theory is seen as ahistorical in that it does not recognize the 
fundamental differences between societies and their different historical experiences. It 
presumes that all societies can replicate a transition, which actually occurred at a 
particular moment in space and time.
16
 From a transitional perspective, Dankwart Rustow 
criticizes modernization theorists describing “their key propositions” as “couched in the 
present tense” and only concerned with preserving and enhancing the stability and health 
of existing democracies.
17
 He adopts a historical approach where he compares the 
histories of Turkey and Sweden and concludes that the road to democratization is marked 
                                                           
16
 Grugel, Democratization, p. 49 
17
 Rustow, Dankwart. Transitions to Democracy (Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, 1970), p. 339 
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by social conflict rather than the timeless social requisites. According to Rustow, 
societies in general tend to establish their “national unity” first, then they enter into a 
prolonged “political struggle” before they reach a “historical decision” whereby the 
conflicting parties choose to compromise and adopt democracy. The last phase in this 
historical process is “habituation”. This stage is achieved when democratic rules become 
a habit. The “decision” and “habituation” phases will subsequently be incorporated into 
the transitional approach, which will be considered later in this review. 
 
Considering the structure/agency debate, critics view the modernization approach as 
simplistic and reductionist. It ignores the human factor or agency as it overemphasizes 
structure effects. Relying on economic structures (capitalism) to explain complex 
situations like political change plays down the role of other factors including the human 
factor, the role of groups, classes.
18
 
 
As for the political culture approach, criticism comes from both the structural and 
transition schools. Democratic culture for structuralists is more likely to result from 
democratization than to cause it. On their part, transition theorists pay no much attention 
to the political culture factor. Democratization for them comes as a result of rational 
calculations, mutual compromises, and negotiations between political elites. It is the 
common interest that drives change not the pro-democratic ideas, beliefs, or shared 
values. 
                                                           
18
 Schmitz, Hans P. and Sell, Katrin. "International Factors in Processes of Political Democratization: 
Towards a Theoretical Integration" in Jean Grugel (eds.), Democracy without Borders: 
Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies (Routledge, 1999), p. 24 
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If political culture cannot explain democratic transition, it cannot explain the failure to 
democratize either. Here, the Arab world seems more concerned than any other region 
since cultural explanations traverse most literature on Arab democratization. Resorting to 
psychosocial or cultural explanations to account for the absence of democracy in the 
Arab world shows the failure of social scientists "to distinguish their normative biases 
from their analytical frameworks" says Lisa Anderson. Anderson opposes this 
sociological trend because it "treats the Arab world as congenitally defective, 
'democratically challenged' as it were, and seeks to find biological, cultural, and/or 
religious causes for this disability."
19
 Besides this normative bias, Anderson points out to 
the lack of survey research through which the impact of political culture on politics could 
be established. Most analysts who use political culture to explain the absence of 
democracy in the Arab world “either draw their data from general (and usually 
unsystematic) observations of political behavior, or extrapolate from other realms of 
belief and behavior – notably religion- to ascertain values and habits that might bear on 
politics."
20
  
 
This arbitrary connection between Arab culture, with Islam as the main component, and 
the lack of democracy is part of a long-standing orientalist tradition advocating the thesis 
of Middle East/Arab ‘exceptionalism’. The trouble with this thesis says Beetham, is that 
it treats religions as monolithic, when their core doctrines are typically subject to a 
                                                           
19
 Anderson, Lisa. "Critique of the Political Culture Approach" in Rex Brynen and Bahgat Korany (eds.), 
Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World: Vol.1, Theoretical Perspectives (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995). p. 78 
20
 Ibid. p. 79 
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variety of schools of interpretations."
21
 The historic experience shows that a number of 
Muslim countries moved to democracy. Along these lines, Tim Niblock argues that the 
flexibility of the Islamic framework allows for a wide range of different interpretations, 
“many of which have no problem in accommodating liberal parliamentary institutions”. 
Furthermore, “some elements in Islam are specifically favorable to democratic values 
(e.g. the emphasis placed on extending full participation in the sacred community to all, 
and on universalism, the 'rational systematization of social life' and spiritual 
egalitarianism.”22 Azmi Beshara distinguishes between Islamic culture and Arab culture 
when it comes to democracy. He asserts that "serious empirical investigation confirms 
that there is no Islamic exceptionalism with regard to democratization, but there is an 
Arab exceptionalism."
23
 
 
As we shall see with the other two approaches, modernization theory remains almost 
completely silent on the role of the media in democratization, especially in its socio-
economist form. The political culture approach though, addresses this issue but in an 
implicit way. Media is only needed as a platform to circulate and propagate the civic 
culture that is required for the stability and endurance of democracy.            
 
- Transition approach 
 
                                                           
21
 Beetham, David. Conditions for Democratic Consolidation, (Review of African Political Economy, No. 
60, 1994b), p. 168 
22
 Niblock, Democratization, p. 223 
23
 Beshara, Azmi. Fil-Masa’la Al-Arabiya: Prelude to an Arab Democratic Manifesto (Markaz Dirasat Al-
Wihda Al-Arabiya, 2007), p. 9 
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Transition is the interval between one political regime and another  
in which domestic factors play a predominant role  
O’Donnell and Schmitter 
 
Instead of focusing on the socio-political factors and therefore, waiting for economic 
conditions to mature and become favorable to democracy, transitional theorists 
emphasize the role of committed actors in bringing about a democratic change 
independently from the structural context. It was Dankwart Rustow's critique of 
modernization theory that marked the transitional turn. Rustow's focus on “how a 
democracy comes into being" in the first place, and “What conditions make it thrive” 
shifted the debate over democratization away from modernization theory and laid the 
ground for the transitional approach to elaborate its theses. 
 
Rustow's third and fourth phases (decision and habituation) were later transformed into 
the two axes around which, revolves the whole corps of the transitional approach 
(transition and consolidation). The “decision” phase according to Rustow is characterized 
by a deliberate “compromise” on the part of “political leaders to accept the existence of 
diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic 
procedure.”24 At the final phase (habituation) "the population at large will become firmly 
fitted into the new structure by the forging of effective links of party organization that 
connect the politicians in the capital with the mass electorate throughout the country."
25
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These ideas were later elaborated by Guillermo O’Donnell and his colleagues in their 
collective work “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule”, which has become a key 
reference for transition studies. Democratization according to the editors of this path-
breaking work is a process of interaction between the democratic elites and authoritarian 
leaders. It is a combination of “overlapping moments” of conflict and political 
negotiations undertaken separately from economic circumstances. Democracy in political 
reality, argues Adam Przeworski, has historically co-existed with exploitation and 
oppression at the workplace, within the schools, within bureaucracies and within 
families.
26
 Crucial to the transition approach is the division within the authoritarian 
regime, which creates openings for other political actors to become involved. “There is 
no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important 
divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage 
between hard-liners and soft-liners.
27
  
 
The next major theoretic contribution to the transition approach since the work of 
O’Donnell/Schmitter/Whitehead is the “path dependence” developed by Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan. The key strength of the path dependency approach lies in contextualizing 
the strategic choices made by the elites within the structural constraints of the legacy of 
the past. The type of authoritarian regime in place at the time of transition is one of the 
main structural elements and components of this legacy that political elites have to deal 
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with. As Richard Snyder explains in his examination of non-revolutionary transition, the 
form and contours of the non-democratic regime affect both the process of transition and 
to a lesser degree, the structure of the post-transition regime.
28
 Later, Linz and Stepan 
expanded the debate on democratization beyond the “uncertainty” of the transition phase. 
They make a clear distinction between "transition" which does not always lead to a 
democratic outcome, and "consolidation". Consolidation is what makes a democratic 
transition come to a successful completion. A consolidated democracy is "a political 
situation in which democracy has become the only game in town."
29
 To endure and 
become the only game in town, this situation has to incorporate three combined 
conditions: Behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional. In the face of these conditions, 
Samuel Huntington identifies three types of challenges: 1) transition challenges, 
stemming from the phenomenon of regime change and including problems of 
establishing new constitutional and electoral systems. 2) contextual challenges, stemming 
from the nature of the society, its economy, culture and history. 3) systemic challenges 
stemming from the way democracy works. These problems would include: stalemate, the 
inability to reach decisions, susceptibility of demagoguery, and the domination by vested 
economic interests.
30
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From a critical perspective, the transition approach is too simplistic as it reduces a 
complex process such as democratization to the contingent choice and tentative 
arrangements of political elites. The dynamics of elite interaction is necessary but 
insufficient to create democracy; the experience shows that in some transitions, the 
popular struggles played a determining role in democratization. Jean Grugel rightly 
describes the transition approach as being excessively elitist to the extent that it stripes 
the democratic process from its popular base and contradicts the spirit of democracy 
when it “consigns the mass of the people to a bystander role in the creation of new 
regimes.”31 In addition to ignoring the role of the masses, the transition approach also 
downplays the role of non-political elites. Civil society is either completely ignored or 
reduced to a purely instrumental tool. 
 
Another weakness of the transition approach is its overwhelming focus on immediacy 
and short-term changes. This hinders its ability to explain deep-rooted obstacles to the 
process of democratization. By not paying attention to the long-term course of socio-
historical development of the concerned society, transition studies fail to adequately 
explain why the outcomes of transitions are different in different circumstances. As noted 
by Graeme Gill, the short-term perspective tends to obscure to operation of long-term 
trends and therefore only brings into focus “the tactical maneuvering which fills the 
canvas, the sound and fury of elite conflict and compromise, and the political posturing of 
the main actors.”32  
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Finally, the overwhelming majority of the literature on transition was produced to 
account for, and explain the successful experiences of transition to democracy in 
Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America. This makes it difficult to apply 
these theories onto other parts of the world i.e. Africa, the Middle East, or to understand 
the cases of non-transition as shown by Darren Hawkins in his study of the Cuban 
example. 
 
- Structural Approach 
 
Structure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes; the 
structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically 
implicated in its production and reproduction. 
Anthony Giddens 
 
Unlike the transition approach which focus on contingency, the explanatory focus of 
structuralism or historical sociology as is sometimes called is on long-term processes of 
socio-historical change. Another point of disagreement between the two approaches: 
democratization is not explained in the structuralist literature by the agency of political 
elites, but rather by the changing structures of power (state/social classes). The third 
dimension of structuralism is its state-centric view, which sees democratization as a 
31 
 
process of state transformation. This view came partly as a reaction to "the excessively 
society-based accounts of political change implicit in behaviouralism in the 1960s."
33
 
 
Barrington Moor's comparative study of eight countries (Britain, France, the US, 
Germany, Russia, Japan, China and India) represents a reference point in the literature on 
democratization from a structural perspective. After analyzing the historical trajectories 
of these countries, Moor came to the conclusion that different patterns of structural 
interrelationships in different countries produced different political outcomes. His 
comparative analysis showed that, among the eight selected countries, only Britain, 
France and the US moved towards the political form of liberal democracy. The changing 
structures of power in the other five countries led to fascism (Germany and Japan) and 
communism (Russia and China), while India remained a "special case". 
 
Democratization according to Moor's study can only take place if the long-term changing 
relationship between peasants, landowners, urban bourgeoisie and the state functions in a 
certain way that leads to the creation of the following five conditions: 1) the development 
of a balance to avoid too strong a state or too independent a landed aristocracy. 2) a turn 
towards an appropriate form of commercial agriculture. 3) the weakening of the landed 
aristocracy. 4) the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants 
and workers. 5) a revolutionary break from the past led by the bourgeoisie
.34
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Moor’s analysis of the first democracies was later complemented by the work of Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer et al. who extended the comparative historical sociology approach a step 
further by considering more democratic cases and incorporating new analytical elements. 
Their “new comparative political economy” as they call it, rests on the interaction 
between three power structures: class conflict, the role of the state and the impact of the 
transnational context.
35
 
 
They borrow from Marxism the view that class conflict is the driving force behind social 
and political change. They add to Moor's three-class model (the peasantry, the landed 
upper class, the bourgeoisie) a number of other subordinate classes with a special 
emphasis on the urban working class. "The organized working class appeared everywhere 
as a key actor in the development of full democracy."
36
 However, taken alone, the role of 
the working class is not sufficient in introducing a working democracy. A stable 
democracy is only possible if a) landlords were an insignificant force, or b) they were not 
dependent on a large supply of cheap labor, or c) they did not control the state.
37
 The 
state is the second key factor in fostering democratization. The role of the state in 
bringing about democracy is conditioned by the reforms imposed upon it by the 
organized working class on the one hand and by the interstate context on the other hand. 
In this respect, democratization in a capitalist state does not result automatically from the 
development of the capitalist relations of production. There has to be a reformist strategy 
on the part of the subordinate classes and the organized working class in particular. In 
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addition to the class and state factors, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens stress the 
role of geopolitics as a third element in the democratization process. The configurations 
of transnational power affect the nature of the state and class alignments alike especially 
in the under-developed and dependent countries.  
 
The structural approach has been subject to criticism from different angles. The most 
apparent weakness of the structural approach is its failure to explain the short-term and 
sometimes sudden transitions to democracy. Its emphasis on long-term historical change 
does help in understanding such clearly empirical cases as those transitions of East and 
Central Europe. Advocates of agency theory, point to the failure of the structural 
approach to recognize the role of individuals and elites in the process of democratization. 
Social structures cannot by themselves explain political change. There has to be a 
conscious political leadership able to make decisions and lead the change to its desired 
end. 
 
Relying on Marxism in explaining politics by class struggle alone has become out 
fashioned. Marxist class analysis has largely been challenged by the post-modern 
understanding of power as too diffuse a concept to be analyzed in any static way. 
 
As for the geo-politics factor, the problem with is that transnational powers are not 
always favorable to democracy. In certain cases the economic dependence of one country 
on another can affects the growth of the urban working class and therefore contributes to 
the delay of democratization. In other cases, economic and military aid can strengthen the 
33 
 
state apparatus unduly and therefore hinders the class struggle for democracy. History 
shows us that, especially in the Middle East, transnational powers have in many cases 
supported established dictatorships at the expense of democratic change. 
 
Larbi Sadiki’s Rethinking Arab Democratization addresses democratization in the Arab 
setting from a different perspective. It critically engages with the dominating ethno-
centric, Euro-American narrative on democratization and the applicability of its 
‘transitolgy’ approach to the Arab world. Besides questioning the four underpinning 
problems of this ‘grand narrative’ (ahistoricity, exceptionalism, foundationalism and 
essentialism/Orientalism), Sadiki presents his own understanding and analysis of the 
problems of transition to democracy in the Arab Middle East. Familiar with the long-
standing struggle for democracy in a region where experiments of written constitutions, 
elections and parliaments date back to the mid-nineteenth century, the author offers what 
he calls an indigenous perspective on Arab democratization that is “historically situated, 
flexible, contingent, fragmented, nuanced, non-linear, and variable”. Along these lines, 
he analyses the Arab electoralism phenomenon or “the election fetishism” to use his own 
terms, noting that electoral activities in much of the Arab world seem to coexist with 
authoritarianism rather than reversing political singularity and loosening the tightly 
excessive executive power of the regimes in place. Arab elections which “prolong 
autocrats’ stronghold over polity as in the case of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, 
Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, Al-Bashir in the Sudan.”38 fail not only Huntington’s third 
wave theory, but also the whole top-down structuralist approach to democratization. Arab 
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democratization is better understood through a bottom-up lens, placing more emphasis on 
societal dynamics. Here we are presented with a reinterpretation of the rise of Arab 
electoralism of the late 1980s and 1990s that challenges Lipset’s well-established and 
rarely contested thesis on the relationship between economic prosperity and democracy. 
Sadiki argues that social events like the bread riots, which took place in a number of Arab 
countries in the mid-1980s and later (Sudan, Algeria and Jordan) were at the roots of the 
rise of electoralism in these countries. Similar pressures in other countries (like Tunisia 
and Egypt) helped consolidate or, at least, place political reform on the agenda of de-
legitimized ruling elites.
39
 
 
By including a chapter on Al Jazeera and the Internet as sites of democratic struggle, 
Rethinking Arab Democratization fills the gap in the literature on democratization, which 
to a large degree neglects the role of the media in the transition to democracy. The 
importance of Al Jazeera in particular and the new media phenomenon in general to Arab 
democratization is crucial as a platform supporting the bottom-up struggle against 
authoritarianism, says Sadiki. In doing so, these new means of mass communication 
participate in fostering other forms of protest politics that are not confined to bread 
riots.
40
   
 
The significance of Sadiki’s work consists not only of the indigenous and contextualized 
account of Arab democratization, but also and more importantly, of opening the path to 
new and different narratives contesting and challenging the Euro-American paradigmatic 
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authoritative approaches to democratization. It is this spirit of plurality of understandings 
and interpretations that stands in the face of the imposition of any singular approach to 
democratization that informs my research and gives it more relevance. 
 
Three critical remarks: First, most of the literature focused on successful transitions to 
democracy in Europe, Asia, Latin America, but failed to account for non-transition cases. 
The Arab world, where authoritarian governance is still largely the rule, has almost been 
left out except for a very few studies. Second, the state-centric, top-down approach 
shared by the dominating narratives does not seem to capture the essence of Arab 
democratization which is better explained by placing more emphasis on societal 
dynamics rather than on the state apparatus Third, in view of the massive body of 
literature on democratization, the role of the media has been neglected and attracted very 
little attention. 
 
Media, Politics and Democratization 
 
The first problem of the media is posed by what does not get translated, or even 
published in the dominant political languages 
Jacques Derrida 
 
The literature on political communication has grown dramatically since the publication of 
"Four Theories of the Press" in 1956. The fundamental transformation in the field of 
communication and its technologies is undoubtedly at the roots of this unprecedented 
36 
 
rapid growth. This section of literature review will focus on the main theoretical 
approaches on the relations between media and politics and how the interaction between 
the two domains relates to democratization. 
 
Perhaps the first and most influential work on media and politics was "Four Theories of 
the Press" (1956) by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm. This comparative analysis of media 
systems was an attempt to answer very basic questions: "Why is the press as it is? Why 
does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in widely different forms in 
different countries? Why, for example, is the press of the Soviet Union so different from 
our own, and the press of Argentina, so different from that of Great Britain?"
41
 It is not so 
wrong to suggest that subsequent studies that tried to theorize the relationship between 
media and politics still revolve around these key issues raised by the authors of "Four 
Theories of the Press". Each of the four chapters of the book deals with a particular 
theory of media-politics relationship. In what follows I will briefly introduce these 
theories: the authoritarian theory, the libertarian theory, the social responsibility theory, 
and the soviet communist theory.  
 
1. Frederic Siebert defines the authoritarian theory of communication as "a theory under 
which the press, as an institution, is controlled in its functions and operation by organized 
society through another institution, government."
42
 The roots of authoritarianism inherent 
in this theory go back to the early days when the press and other forms of mass 
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communication were first introduced into the highly organized and controlled Western 
European societies such as those of Britain, France and Germany. Since most 
governments of Western Europe were operating on authoritarian principles when the 
popular press emerged, these same principles became the basis for a system of press 
control.
43
 
 
2. The libertarian theory of the press as conceived by Siebert is a development of the 
philosophical principles underlying the basis for the liberal social and political system. It 
only applies to societies, which adhere to the principles of liberalism. The basic 
characteristic of the function of the press in a liberal democratic society is "the right and 
duty of the press to serve as an extralegal check on government."
44
 In a democratic 
political system, the press acts a watchdog over the working of democracy to expose any 
arbitrary or authoritarian practice. And to fulfill this function adequately, the press had to 
be completely free from control or domination by those elements which it was to guard 
against."
45
 Libertarian theorists advocate the view that the public at large should be 
exposed to a multiplicity of voices of the press without restriction or censorship by the 
government. It is through what they called the "self-righting" process that the public 
distinguishes between what serves its interests and what goes against. 
 
3. In a way, the social responsibility theory of the press comes as a development of the 
libertarian theory. It establishes the “public’s right to know” and the public responsibility 
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of the press” as conditions for “good practice” on the part of the publishers who had no 
such obligation from a libertarian perspective.
46
 It is worth noting that the climate of 
criticism of the liberal press contributed a great deal to the birth of the social 
responsibility theory. The general themes of criticism can be summarized as follows: 1) 
The press has wielded its enormous power for its own ends. 2) The owners have 
propagated their own opinions. 3) The press is controlled by one socioeconomic class and 
has been subservient of big business and at times has let advertisers control editorial 
policies and content. 4) The press has resisted social change. 5) The press has invaded the 
privacy of individuals. Against this background the new theory developed a culture of 
ethical codes. The earliest of these codes, “the Canons of Journalism” was adopted by the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1923 and called for “the responsibility for the 
general welfare, sincerity, truthfulness, impartiality, fair play, decency, and respect for 
the individual’s privacy.47 The key principle underpinning the social responsibility theory 
is that “freedom carries concomitant obligations”. Freedom under social responsibility 
theory is defined in positive terms: “freedom for” as opposed to the negative concept of 
freedom under libertarian theory: “freedom from external restraint”. This understanding 
of freedom is reflected in the media-government relations. Social responsibility holds that 
“the government must not merely allow freedom; it must also actively promote it.”48      
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4. In the last chapter, Wilbur Schramm draws a theoretic outlook for the Soviet 
Communist theory of mass communication. He traces the roots of the Soviet 
understanding and practice of the media back to the Marxist tradition and the 
transformations it has gone through with Lenin and Stalin. He draws a sharp contrast 
between the liberal democratic system which "defends the rights of men to disagree with 
each other, with their government, with religions" and the Soviet system which inherited 
much of its views from Marx including "authoritarianism, fixedness, a tendency to make 
hard and sharp distinction between right and wrong, an amazing confidence in explaining 
great areas of human behavior on the basis of a small set of economic facts."
49
 
 
Schramm emphasizes the fact that the Soviet mass communication developed as an 
integral part of the Soviet state where the mass must submit to the dictatorship of the 
Party, and the Party must submit to its central bureaucracy and leaders. In such a political 
and organizational setting, the basic responsibility for all mass communications is put in 
the hands of a small circle of top Party leaders. “All the mass media in the Soviet Union 
become speaking trumpets for these leaders, and the editors and directors listen anxiously 
for the latest Olympian rumblings of ‘the truth’.”50 
 
To summarize, the main characteristics of the Soviet Communist theory of mass 
communication are: 1) mass communications are used as an instrument of the state and 
the Party. 2) They are closely integrated with other instruments power and Party 
influence. 3) They are used almost exclusively as instruments of propaganda, 
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mobilization and agitation. 4) They operate strictly under the tight control of the Party 
and are supposed to follow the Party line, tell the truth, and preserve the unity of the 
Party and the state.   
 
Subsequent comparative works on the media-politics relations included that of Jeffery 
Alexander whose study focused on the analysis of the development of news media in the 
Western society with particular emphasis on the United States and France. In his essay 
"The Mass News Media in Systemic, Historic and Comparative Perspective" Alexander 
tried to explain the strength of the autonomous journalistic professionalism in the United 
States. His basic assumption is that the media system follows a path parallel to that of the 
state. They both struggle for their freedom movement vis-à-vis other social institutions. 
According to Alexander, three major forces drive the progressive autonomy of news 
media: 1. The growing demand for more universalistic information raised by new social 
groups against the kind of advocacy journalism of preexisting social system; 2. The 
process of professionalization leading to the development of journalistic autonomy; 3. 
The degree of universalism in national civil cultures which, in turn, are connected with 
rational-legal authorities. 
 
In his comparative analysis of media systems in the US and France, Alexander suggests 
that the absence of a labor press in the United States explains the emergence of 
autonomous professionalism. He finds it "extremely significant that no labor papers tied 
41 
 
to working class parties emerged on a mass scale in the United States."
51
 Following the 
tradition of differentiation theory which goes back to Emil Durkheim (1983) and the 
functional division of professions that characterizes modern societies, Alexander believes 
that what distinguishes modern societies is the degree of autonomy of their journalistic 
field. It is this separation from other social, political and economic systems that gives the 
media its significance and makes it more important. The more modern a society is, the 
more important its media, says Alexander. By adopting the concepts and theoretical 
framework of differentiation theory, Alexander's comparative analysis of media and 
politics cannot avoid the inclusion of normative elements, which led him to explicitly 
favor the liberal model and its American form in particular. The liberal model, from this 
perspective, is the most "modern" and the closest to the ideal form of differentiation 
between the media and the political system. Moving towards the liberal model means a 
higher degree of progress, more autonomy of the press, and more journalistic 
professionalization. 
 
Drawing from the same differentiation theory, with more functionalist tendency, Niklas 
Luhmann distinguishes between three forms of social differentiation: 1) Segmentation, 
where the society is divided into equal subsystems. Equality here refers to the principles 
of self-selective system building. 2) Stratification, where the society is divided into 
unequal subsystems. Equality here becomes a norm for internal communication and 
inequality becomes a norm for communication with the environment. 3) Functional 
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differentiation, which is the latest outcome of socio-cultural evolution.
52
 Functions in a 
functionally differentiated society have to be unequal, but the access to them has to be 
equal. It is only in this kind of societies that new forms of system autonomy can be 
attained. In a highly differentiated society the relations between media and politics as two 
distinct and autonomous systems is arranged in a way that media operates with what 
Luhmann calls "attention rules" while politics operates with "decision rules". The media 
develop communication themes, discuss them publicly and bring them to the attention of 
the political system, which is responsible for making decisions. The media are 
"autonomous in the regulation of their own selectivity" of communication themes and 
function independently from the pressure of political institutions for which they prepare a 
thematic agenda to act upon.
53
 
 
Although the number of comparative studies in the field of political communication has 
seen a substantial increase since Blumler and Gurevitch wrote The Crisis of Public 
Communication in 1975), the need to develop theoretical frameworks based on solid 
comparative data still hinders the ability of researchers to come up with firm conclusions 
about the relations between the domains of media and politics. The last comparative 
study to be considered in this review is Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini's Comparing 
Media Systems (2004). In this study, the authors propose another framework for 
comparing media systems in different political settings in Western Europe and North 
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America. They identify four major dimensions according to which the relations between 
media systems and political systems can be compared: 
- The structure and development of media markets with a particular emphasis on 
the circulation of mass press.  
- Political parallelism: the extent to which the media system reflects the major 
political divisions in society 
- The development of journalistic professionalism 
- The degree and nature of state intervention in the media system. 
 
These four dimensions coincide with those defined by Blumler and Gurevitch, with very 
minor differences
54
, but the importance of Hallin and Mancini's work lies in the authors' 
effort to build an analytical synthesis consisting of three theoretic models: 1) The 
Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model. 2) The North/Central European or democratic 
corporatist model. 3) The North Atlantic or liberal model.
55
 Each of these three models 
exposes a distinct form of relationship between media and politics in a particular area. 
 
- The Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model shows that, during the transition to 
democracy in the Mediterranean countries of Western Europe, the mass media were 
"intimately involved in the political conflicts that mark the history of this region, and 
there is a strong tradition of regarding them as means of ideological expression and 
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political mobilization."
56
 The main characteristics of the polarized pluralist system are the 
tendency of the media to be dominated by the political sphere and the emergence of elite-
oriented press with relatively small circulation. 
 
- The democratic corporatist model applies to Northern and Central Europe. Media 
systems in this region share a number of common characteristics summarized by the 
authors in the following three "coexistences": a) a high degree of political partisanship 
coexisted with a strongly developed mass-circulation press. b) a high level of political 
parallelism coexisted with a high level of journalistic professionalism along with a strong 
commitment to press freedom and common public interest. c) a strong tradition of limits 
on state power coexisted with strong welfare state policies and other forms of active 
public-sector involvement in the media sphere.
57
 
 
- The North Atlantic (Anglo-American) or liberal model applies to the US, Britain, 
Ireland and Canada. The common features of the media systems operating in these 
countries include: a) early development of commercial newspapers with relatively little 
state involvement. b) marginalization of party, trade union, religious and other kinds of 
non-commercial media. c) the emergence of an informational style of journalism with a 
strong tradition of political neutrality. d) political insulation of public broadcasters and 
regulatory authorities.
58
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In 2000 Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan published Democracy and the Media 
where they combined macro and microanalysis in their study of the reciprocal 
relationship between media and politics. This combination of analytical approaches fills a 
long standing void in the research agenda of political communication traditionally 
dominated by two scholarly approaches: The macro-level perspective focusing on the 
structure of the media systems and how these systems affect politics, and the micro-level 
perspective, which restricts the study of political communication to investigating the 
individual level effects of the mass media, usually during the times of election 
campaigns.
59
 
 
By comparatively examining the impact of politics on the media, and of the media on 
politics in ten different countries with varying political settings (Spain, Russia, Hungary, 
Chile, Italy, the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Germany), 
Gunther and Mughan present us with a complex picture of the mutual influence and 
interaction between the media and the politics of democracy and democratization. Among 
the many conclusions of this study, two are of particular relevance to my research area: 1) 
The contradiction between the image of the media in a an authoritarian/totalitarian system 
as an all-powerful vehicles of manipulation that enable politicians to shape public 
attitudes and behaviors, and the "minimal effects" thesis that emerged from the 
individual-level studies of media impact.
60
 2) Although media liberalization is generally a 
necessary prerequisite for successful democratization, it is not always the case that the 
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freer the media from government regulation the stronger their contribution to the quality 
of democracy.
61
 
 
The debate on the relationship between political communication and democratization 
takes a new turn in Mediated Politics by Lance Bennett and Robert Entman (2001). 
Informed by the radical transformations within the media environment and the shifting 
patterns of participation in contemporary democracy, this volume challenges much of our 
existing knowledge in the field of political communication. The emergence of an 
electronically networked society, the decline in the domination of traditional network 
news and daily newspapers in informing the public, the blurring lines between news and 
entertainment, the rising trends of consumerism including in the field of media products, 
are increasingly affecting our personal lives and reconstructing politics and relations 
among individuals and social groups. 
 
As the role of new communication technologies in mediating the human political 
experience is growing, the authors of Mediated Politics identified three core issues facing 
democratic societies. These issues or tensions in the Editors' term are discussed at length 
in different sections of the book: 1) The tension between commonality (required for 
living together) and diversity emphasized by the ongoing process of 
segmentation/fragmentation of the public.
62
 2) The tension between the free information 
choice and the necessary citizen education (should the media give the audience what they 
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want or rather should also give them what they need to be good citizens?) 3) The tension 
between treating people as consumers of media products or as citizens who need more 
political involvement and increased public engagement.
63
 The book also presents a 
significant contribution to the debate on the public sphere, which will be discussed in the 
next section of this review. 
 
The changing nature of the media-politics relationship and its implications on democracy 
is also discussed in John Street's Mass Media, Politics and Democracy, but from a 
different angle. Street's approach starts with emphasizing the notion of "power" in the 
relation between media and politics: The relationship between politics and the media is a 
power one.
64
 Based on this premise he analyses the transformations that both politics and 
the media have undergone. The consequences of these transformations look very 
damaging to the content and character of political discourse, which he describes as 
"central concerns for democracy."
65
 In this state of affairs, Street claims, political 
arguments are trivialized, appearances matter more than reality, personalities more than 
policies, the superficial more than the profound. The responsibility for this degradation in 
the function of politics and the media is shared between politician and their spin-doctors 
on the one hand, and the "supplicant media, which conspires in the erosion of 
democracy."
66
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Much of the literature reviewed in this section shares the same perspective of the 
"communications" studies and reproduces in different versions the liberal systemic 
conception of the relations between media and politics. From this perspective, it is 
difficult to understand the current situation of the relationship between media and politics 
in other parts of world, especially in the Arab world where the media structure, practice, 
and ownership have gone through significant transformation during the last decade. 
These transformations have to be seen in the broader context of social and political 
dynamics in the region of which the current literature shows very little understanding. 
 
The Arabic literature does not seem to offer a better understanding either. The general 
tendency of the Arabic debate on media and politics favors the same systemic approach 
that links the media to the political system in a mechanical way. It is an inconclusive 
debate that failed to develop a different theoretic framework to understand and explain 
the changing relationship between the Arab authoritarian political systems and the liberal 
or semi-liberal media operations that emerged in mid-1990s. In her study of the dynamics 
of democratic change in the Arab world (reprinted in 2004), Thana'a F. Abdullah includes 
a chapter on the democratizing role of the Arab media. Although she tried to distinguish 
between three Arab political systems to show how the media performs differently in each 
setting, her approach remains largely state-centric and could not spot the real differences. 
"The functions that the media should carry out have been grouped and concentrated in a 
way that they all, whether in shape or content, serve one single purpose: mobilization and 
propaganda in favor of the regimes in place and their political and ideological 
49 
 
orientations."
67
 It is obvious here that the significant developments which changed the 
Arab media landscape and reshaped its relationship with governments since the coming 
of Al Jazeera have not been accounted for. Among these developments is the opening up 
of an Arab communicative space involving a growing number of people from across the 
social spectrum. Since its launch in 1996, Al Jazeera managed to engage Arab elites and 
ordinary citizens alike in uncensored public debates that remind us of Habermas's public 
sphere. 
        
The Public Sphere and Democratization 
 
The emergence of society from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the 
public sphere, has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it 
has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms. 
Hannah Arendt 
 
- The oeuvre of Habermas 
Since the publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962 the 
concept of public sphere appeared in the writings of a number of authors, but Habermas's 
particular version remains the point of reference. This early work by one of the leading 
figures of the Frankfurt School's second generation theorists combines materials and 
methods from a variety of disciplines i.e. sociology, social cultural and social history, 
political science, economics, law. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere has 
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been discussed in many different fields and continues, almost four decades after its initial 
publication, to generate productive controversy and informed debate. The central 
question Habermas asks in this book is "What are the conditions for rational critical 
debate about public issues conducted by private individuals willing to let arguments not 
social statuses or traditions determine decisions?" His answer is an essential contribution 
to democratic theory and the role of the public sphere in conceptualizing, generating and 
maintaining a genuine democracy  
 
Habermas's focus on the public sphere comes as part of his broader concern with 
democratization and particularly with political participation and representation as the core 
of a democratic society. As he states in the author's preface to the book, his investigation 
"presents a stylized picture of the liberal elements of the bourgeois public sphere and of 
their transformation in the social-welfare state."
68
 Before going into detail with the 
analysis of the historical genesis of the bourgeois public sphere, the book presents us with 
a brief though very interesting account of the etymological origins of the term "public 
sphere". Notions concerning what is "public" and what is "private" can be traced much 
further back into the past, says Habermas, “we are dealing here with categories of Greek 
origin transmitted to us bearing a Roman stamp."
69
  
 
- The two phases in the development of the public sphere: 
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The two major themes of the book correspond with two structural transformative phases 
in the modern and contemporary history of Europe. The first theme accounts for the 
historical genesis of liberal bourgeois public sphere in the context of the monarchical 
feudal society. The second theme traces the structural transformations leading to the 
disintegration and decline of the bourgeois public sphere with the rise of the modern mass 
social welfare state. 
 
The first transformative phase took place over almost one and a half-century, from the 
late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century. Combined developments in 
social, political and philosophical fields, first in Britain and later in France followed by 
Germany, moved Europe from one social system to another; from a monarchical and 
feudal society, where no distinction between state and society, public and private is made, 
to a bourgeois liberal constitutional system that distinguishes between these areas. The 
bourgeois public sphere emerged within the private realm to accommodate rational-
critical public debate over the general rules governing relations in the sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor. The bourgeois public sphere at this stage "may be 
conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public" and is 
characterized by the "people's public use of their reason."
70
 It was in the tension-charged 
relations between state and society that the public sphere originated and assumed political 
functions. But, the training ground where the bourgeoisie learned the art of critical 
reasoning on political issues was provided by the literary public sphere that had already 
been operative in apolitical form in the salons, reading rooms, theaters, museums and 
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concerts. The public sphere in 'the world of letters' embraced the wider strata of the 
middle class and made access to an unprecedented mixture of circles including craftsmen 
and shopkeepers. It is a significant shift in the social, economic and intellectual life of the 
bourgeois society where "the mind was no longer in the service of a patron and the 
opinion became emancipated from the bonds of economic dependence."
71
 In these public 
spaces, a new form of communication and understanding between persons of diverse 
backgrounds begun to take shape transcending the barriers of social hierarchy. What 
makes these socially "unequal" persons come together is their "common quality as human 
beings, and nothing more than human beings" making use of their reason. Staring as a 
platform for apolitical debate completely removed from politics, the literary public space 
gradually developed into a sphere of criticism of public authority and became deeply 
involved in political discussion. As the influence of political discussions on the decisions 
of state authorities increased, a new form of public sphere came to existence:  "A public 
sphere that functioned in the political realm arose first in Great Britain at the turn of the 
eighteenth century."
72
 The first continental variant of politically-oriented public sphere 
developed nearly half a century later in France "In France too, although not before 
roughly the middle of the eighteenth century, arose a public that critically debated 
political issues."
73
 This major shift occurred alongside the rise of early pre-industrial, 
mercantilist form of capitalism and the philosophical articulation of liberal ideas 
concerning politics (from Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu to Rousseau and, above all, 
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Kant). Hegel's critique of Kant's problematic liberal philosophy and especially its 
classical doctrine of right laid the ground for the next phase. 
 
The second phase marks the end of the public sphere in its liberal bourgeois form and the 
rise of state capitalism, mass society, culture industries, and the increasingly powerful 
role of corporations and big business in public life. This transition started around the mid-
1800s and lasted until the twentieth century. It is in this “hundred years that followed the 
heyday of liberalism, during which capitalism became "organized", [that] the original 
relationship of public and private sphere in fact dissolved, the contours of the bourgeois 
public sphere eroded."
74
 Developments during this period resulted in a new constellation 
of social, economic, cultural and political developments, which succeeded and replaced 
the earlier constellation that facilitated and accompanied the birth of the liberal bourgeois 
public sphere. Philosophically, this shift was clearly articulated in Marx's diagnosis of the 
inherent contradictions in the liberal constitutional social order. The modified liberalism 
of Mill and Tocqueville, with its ambivalent view of the public sphere was, according to 
Habermas, superior to the socialist critique and manifested these presuppositions 
common to both the classic model of the bourgeois public sphere and its dialectically 
projected counter-model.”75 Corresponding to this philosophical debate were major 
socio-economic transformations marked by an increasing re-integration and entwining of 
state and society. It was a two-way process where, on the one hand, “state intervention in 
the sphere of society found its counterpart in the transfer of public functions to private 
corporate bodies” and on the other hand, “the substitution of state authority by the power 
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of society was connected to the extension of public authority over sectors of the private 
realm.”76 Seen from the perspective of Frankfurt school critical theory, this historical 
transformation is grounded, in Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis of the culture industry 
in which giant corporations take over the public sphere and transform it from a sphere of 
critical rational debate into one of manipulative consumption and passivity. "Along the 
path from a public critically reflect on its culture to one that merely consumes it”77 even 
the literary public sphere, which first emerged separately from the political realm lost its 
specific character. As a result, "public opinion" shifts from rational consensus on matters 
of general concern to a manufactured opinion of polls or media experts, administered by 
a managed discussion and manipulated by the machination of advertising and political 
consulting agencies. With the arrival of the new mass media (radio, film, television), the 
form of communication has changed and, under the pressure of the "don't talk back" rule, 
the reaction of the public shrinks in a peculiar way. The new mass media, argues 
Habermas, "draw the eyes and ears of the public under their spell and place it under 
'tutelage', which is to say they deprive it of the opportunity to say something and to 
disagree."
78
 In short, they create a public sphere "in appearance only", a sphere that is 
primarily used as a platform for advertising. 
 
- The changing function of the media and its impact on the public sphere  
For Habermas, the mass media changed from being 'the public sphere's pre-eminent 
institution' facilitating rational critical debate and generating enlightened public opinion 
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into a vehicle which shapes tastes and preferences, manufactures public consensus, and 
restricts public discussions to themes validated and approved by advertising agencies, big 
business enterprises, and the industrial capitalist state apparatus. In this atmosphere arose 
what Habermas calls 'public rostrum', a distorted form of parliament which is no longer 
an 'assembly of wise men' chosen as individual personalities whose subsequent decisions 
reached by the majority through rational arguments in public discussion would be what 
was true and right for the national welfare. By transmitting these discussions through 
radio and television, the public participates passively in this 'expanded sphere of 
publicity' where "the transactions themselves are stylized into a show, and publicity loses 
its critical function in favor of a staged display; even arguments are transmuted into 
symbols to which again one cannot respond by arguing but only by identifying with 
them."
79
 The changing function of the media affected the notion of citizenry, democracy 
and participation profoundly. Citizens become spectators of media presentations and 
mere consumers of a stylized discourse aimed at molding and managing public opinion. 
As consumers of commercialized mass culture, their status is reduced to objects of news, 
information, and public relations. In Habermas's terms: "Inasmuch as the mass media 
today strip away the literary husks from that kind of bourgeois self-interpretation and 
utilize them as marketable forms for the public services provided in a culture of 
consumers, the original meaning is reversed.
80
 
 
- The public sphere: an ongoing debate 
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Since the publication of Structural Transformation the debate about the public sphere as 
a necessary condition for a genuine working democracy has been dominated by 
Haberma’s theoretical framework. Habermas himself returned to issues of the public 
sphere and democratic theory in his later works and provided revisions and further 
commentary on the subject especially in his monumental works: Between Facts and 
Norms and the Theory of Communicative Action. 
  
Habermas's presentation of the bourgeois public sphere as a universally accessible space 
of rational discussion and consensus has been sharply criticized by many commentators. 
Craig Calhoun remarks that "the early bourgeois public spheres were composed of 
narrow segments of the European population, mainly educated, propertied men, and they 
conducted a discourse not only exclusive of others but prejudicial to the interests of those 
excluded.”81 On the normative dimension of Habermas's concept of the public sphere, 
Douglas Kellner casts doubt on the extent to which norms of rationality or public opinion 
formed by rational debate contribute to democratic politics. In real terms, "politics 
throughout the modern era have been subject to the play of interests and power as well as 
discussion and debate."
82
 From a feminist perspective, Mary Ryan sketches what she 
calls "a counter-narrative" to Habermas's portrayal of the historical decline of the 
bourgeois public sphere. She notes, "at approximately the same time and place where 
Habermas commences his story of the eviscerating transformation of the public sphere, 
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feminist historians plot out the ascension of women into politics."
83
 While Habermas 
seems to have neglected women's access to the public, Ryan stresses the idea that 
women's groups were extremely active not only in the political realm, but also in their 
own women's public sphere. She believes that Habermas's account of the decline of the 
bourgeois public sphere coincides with the moment when women were beginning to get 
political power and become influential as they increasingly "injected considerable 
feminist substance into public discourse” and articulated concerns which were vital to 
matters of public interest.”84 In his "further reflections" Habermas replies back: "the 
exclusion of women from this world dominated by men now looks different than it 
appeared to me at the time.”85 As with the idealization of the public sphere, he explains 
that his aim in Structural Transformation was "to derive the ideal type of the bourgeois 
public sphere from the historical context of British, French and German developments". 
Conceptualizing these complex social realities, he argues, required "stylizing to give 
prominence to its peculiar characteristics."
86
 However, he realizes that his focus on the 
bourgeois public sphere led him to "underestimate" the significance of oppositional and 
non-bourgeois public spheres. He admits that "from the beginning, a dominant bourgeois 
public collides with a plebeian one."
87
 
 
Not only does this lively debate indicate that Habermas's work remains topical, but it also 
pushes the boundaries of the discussion to new areas. Rather than conceiving of "one" 
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public sphere (the bourgeois public sphere), it is more productive to theorize a 
multiplicity of public spheres, sometimes overlapping but also conflicting, comments 
Kellner.
88
 Combining this "horizontal" genesis of the public sphere to its "historical" 
genesis provided by Habermas in Structural Transformation paved the way for new 
perspectives on the subject. In a chapter on the public sphere in the age of Internet, James 
Bohman provides a revision of the ideal type classical face-to-face public sphere. He 
argues that electronic and computer-mediated network communication is creating a 
transnational public sphere through the expansion of the scope of certain features of 
communicative interaction across space and time. This electronic variant of the public 
sphere is removed from that of Habermas, which “is too often taken to be a town meeting 
or perhaps a discussion in a salon, coffee shop or union hall, in which participants are 
physically present to each other in face-to-face interaction.”89 Applying these ideas onto 
the Muslim world, Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson find that new media are 
increasingly shaping beliefs, discourses and authority throughout Muslim-majority states 
and Muslim communities elsewhere. Their study focuses on the relationship between the 
rise of new forms of communication technologies including the unprecedented growth of 
satellite broadcasters and the formation of a global Muslim public sphere “situated 
outside formal state control and exists at the intersections of religious, political and social 
life.”90 Anchored in a very long and rich tradition of public dialogue between learned 
scholars and representatives of different schools of interpretation and jurisprudence, a 
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religious public sphere existed and functioned often independently from the official 
sphere of rulers since the early Islamic centuries, remark Eickelman and Anderson. The 
new and increasingly accessible modes of communication reformulated this religious 
public space and reinforced its “discursive, performative and participative” 
characteristics. A key feature of the new public sphere highlighted by Eickelman and 
Anderson is what they call the “re-intellectualization” of Islamic discourse, which they 
define as “presenting Islamic doctrine and discourse in accessible and vernacular terms”. 
On his part, Marc Lynch focuses his analysis on the Arab world. He contends that Al-
Jazeera and other television stations in the region have transformed Arab politics and 
revolutionized the formation of public opinion over the last decade. By circumventing 
state control over information, encouraging open debate on vital political and social 
issues and giving a platform to long-muted and marginalized voices across the Arab 
world, these emerging media have created what Lynch calls "the new Arab public 
sphere" which he defines as follows: 1) What makes it “new” is the omnipresent political 
talk shows, which transform the satellite television stations into a genuinely 
unprecedented carrier of public argument. 2) What makes it “Arab” is a shared collective 
identity through which speakers and listeners conceive of themselves as participating in a 
single, common political project. 3) What makes it a “public sphere” is the existence of 
contentious debates oriented toward defining these shared interests.
91
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... The president looked up. "How'd Al-Jazeera play the story, Jerry?" he asked. 
Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq 
 
The phenomenal arrival of Al Jazeera satellite channel in the Arab media scene in 1996 
generated an unprecedented amount of public debate; unprecedented both in scope and 
quality. The huge interest in its content, reach and quality of journalism is reflected in the 
increasing number of publications either for the general public or in the academic sphere. 
Dozens of PhD theses have been written and many others are currently undertaken in 
universities across the world on this subject. In what follows I shall present a review of 
the main literature on Al Jazeera and the impact it has had on the media and politics of 
the Middle East and globally. 
 
Literature on Al Jazeera covers a variety of facets of this "Arab giant" as Mohamed 
Zayani calls it in the sub-title of his last book on the Qatar-based news channel. 
Generally, what has been written on Al Jazeera so far can be broadly ordered into three 
distinct categories: The first and earliest category is more of an introduction of Al Jazeera 
as a new player in the media field. The second category comprises of a number of 
comparative works, mainly from a media studies perspective. The third is more 
politically driven and focuses on the regional and global impact of the network. 
 
- Introductory and descriptive literature 
Works belonging to the first category are by and large descriptive and provide a 
massively large amount of details, which sometimes weaken the analytical side. Hugh 
61 
 
Miles's Al Jazeera typifies this sort of literature. From the introduction through to the last 
chapter, we are presented with a detailed historical account of how the channel started as 
"a seed planted in the desert" and how it became the news channel that "made a splash in 
the Arab world". Al Jazeera, as introduced by Miles, built its unique brand and gained 
unparalleled popularity not only because it was "run, staffed and financed by Arabs and 
broadcast from an Arab country" which is an unprecedented development in the Arab 
media, but also, and more importantly, due to the quality of uncensored talk shows and 
live debates broadcast on a regular basis. "What made Al Jazeera's name in the Arab 
world first, long before it became famous in the West, was its talk shows" where 
"political, social, economic and religious topics are all regularly tackled."
92
 What 
distinguishes Al Jazeera from the rest of its competitors, in addition to the talk shows, is 
its groundbreaking field reporting. The capacity of the channel to report from almost 
anywhere in the world enabled it to scoop other networks on major events. As early as 
1998 Al Jazeera had its first international scoop when Britain and America launched their 
"operation Desert Fox" campaign against Iraq. During that military campaign "Al Jazeera 
was the only news network to bear witness to the successive waves of laser-guided 
bombs and cruise missiles as they landed in Bagdad… Fifteen minutes after the 
explosions appeared on Al Jazeera, they were on other networks all over the world, as the 
exclusive footage was sold."
93
 Coverage of subsequent events expanded the reach and 
influence of the network that soon became an inevitable challenge to the status quo and a 
source nuisance for most of the Arab regimes. Al Jazeera’s reporting of the second 
Palestinian uprising (intifada) in 2000 “had social and political consequences not just in 
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Israel and the Occupied Territories but also in the rest of the Middle East.”94 The 
network’s coverage of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing war in Afghanistan, the war in 
Iraq and its aftermath, only added to the sweeping popularity of Al Jazeera which, in a 
record time “had broken the hegemony of the Western networks and, for the first time in 
hundreds of years, reversed the flow of information, historically from West to East.”95 
These and other similar events, which Al Jazeera covered during its first few years, were 
the focus of another introductory work by Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar. Al 
Jazeera: the Story of the Network that is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern 
Journalism is also structured around events such as the war in Afghanistan, where "Al 
Jazeera was the only network with correspondents reporting live from the besieged 
Afghan capital, Kabul, and the city of Kandahar, the Taliban's religious center."
96
 The 
fact that no other network was present on the Afghan soil during the campaign made Al 
Jazeera the sole provider of footage on what was going on. International news networks 
around the world had to rely on the Arab station's reporting and "simply showed Al 
Jazeera broadcasts live during their own programming."
97
 With near complete monopoly 
in covering the war in Afghanistan, and comprehensive but controversial coverage of 
succeeding events in a number of hotspots, Al Jazeera's influence extended beyond the 
Arab world and became a major player in the global media system. These successes 
represented a major challenge to state-controlled media organizations across the region. 
The other Arab TV news stations, remarks the authors, had to find either another niche 
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market or compete with Al Jazeera, a challenge for which few are prepared.
98
 After more 
than a decade though, it seems that even those few were not prepared enough for this 
tough competition. Besides its resounding success, Al Jazeera was criticized from 
different sides and for different reasons. The Authors of this volume dedicated a 
significant part of their study to account for these criticisms. Arab governments who 
govern predominantly by tribal and religious guidelines did not welcome the airing of 
programs open to all opinions especially those expressed by political opponents. Several 
governments, including Egypt and Jordan, stated that Al Jazeera's coverage "threatened 
the stability of their regimes and exposed them to criticism by their own people."
99
 The 
West in general, and the US in particular were skeptic about the way the network covers 
events. Western politicians often describe it as the channel which "spreads inflammatory 
rhetoric and incites violence". The US army went to the extent of bombing Al Jazeera's 
broadcast centers in Kabul (2001) and Baghdad (2003).    
 
Mohamed Zayani's Al Jazeera Phenomenon takes another angle in introducing the 
channel. The major events that the channel has covered still figure in the book 
(Afghanistan: chapter 8 and the Intifada: chapter 9). However, the contributors to this 
edited volume present a more complex image of Al Jazeera that just describing it. Zayani 
takes the criticism leveled against the network a step further. He questions the degree of 
the freedom of speech this channel enjoys, noting that "Al Jazeera is suspiciously silent 
on Qatar; it offers a sparing coverage of its host country and is careful not to criticize 
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it."
100
 But the relationship between the channel and Qatar seems to be more complex than 
how Al Jazeera covers the country's affairs. Trying to reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory perceptions that, on the one hand Al Jazeera operates according to strictly 
journalistic standards independently from Qatar, and on the other hand, it is a subservient 
instrument of its foreign policy, Olivier Da Lage argues that "while in the long run Al 
Jazeera serves the diplomatic interests of Qatar well, in the short run the channel's 
freedom and jarring tone often complicate the task of diplomats of this small emirate."
101
 
This is an explanation that Mohammed El Oifi does not seem to agree with. He considers 
that seeing this relationship according to the classical categories of foreign policy 
analysis does not make much sense. Regardless of how Al Jazeera is related to its host 
country, what matters to El Oifi is its considerable impact on the Arab media landscape 
and public. That is the dimension he emphasizes to complement this image that the Al 
Jazeera Phenomenon tries to present. The major change that Al Jazeera made to the 
status of Arab media according to El Oifi, is the emergence of a media coverage of 
political events that is relatively free from government control. Al Jazeera channel, says 
El Oifi, has played a central role in liberalizing the Arab media discourse, creating and 
autonomous media narrative, and giving the nascent Arab public sphere a platform to 
develop.
102
 Here we re-connect with Mark Lynch, who expanded on the Arab public 
sphere thesis in his book, which I reviewed in the "public sphere" section.  
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- Comparative Works 
Besides these introductory and descriptive works, there is a number of studies that 
explored Al Jazeera phenomenon from a comparative perspective. The latest in this is 
Leon Barkho's Strategies of Power in Multilingual Global Broadcasters: How the BBC, 
CNN and Al Jazeera Shape their Middle East News Discourse. This study is critical of 
the current literature for underestimating "the significant role power holders, whether 
editorial or political, have in shaping the discourse of their institutions."
103
 It is also 
critical of the commonly held views that global media institutions like BBC, CNN and Al 
Jazeera are "neutral", "objective" and operate freely from the strings of power which in 
most cases affect and determine their choice of content, angle and even terminology. 
While all three case studies show similar findings indicating that "journalists and editors 
have to respond to the needs, whether political or economic, of those to whom they owe 
their existence regardless of their 'ideational' assumptions",
104
 historical, social and 
cultural contexts seem to have made a difference in favor of Al Jazeera which still lead 
the way in polls and ratings. It is arguably because the three networks operate in a region 
where culture, religion and history still play a pivotal role in driving the society that 
meeting international production standards is not enough for rivals "usually lacking Al 
Jazeera's warmth or cultural relevance."
105
 In another comparative study, James Painter 
examines Al Jazeera and the Latin American network, Telesur. What unites Al Jazeera 
and Telesur is primarily their intention to challenge the BBC/CNN approach to world 
events. But, challenging the dominating Western style and relaying a counter-hegemonic 
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discourse cannot on its own foster a unified coherent alternative. The differences between 
channels adopting this perspective such as Al Jazeera, Telesur, Russia Today, Press TV 
cast a profound doubt as to whether they are capable of generating new contra-flows of 
information reversing the dominant flow of news from ‘the West to the rest’106 while 
sticking to the universally known journalistic values of balance, fairness and impartiality. 
Describing it as Chavez’s public diplomacy tool, Painter observes that Telesur’s style and 
programs formats are essentially copied from traditional Western channels but not the 
journalistic values. In the author’s own terms, “Telesur is more in the Latin American 
tradition of state-funded channels acting as official megaphones than in the Western 
European tradition of public service channels aiming to offer impartiality, pluralism of 
view or a watchdog role holding sponsoring governments and powerful actors to 
account.”107 On the other hand, Al Jazeera is found to be “more balanced in its treatment 
of news”, “stays on the side of non-partisan coverage” and “does not act as an 
unchallenged spokesperson for any government”.  
 
- The Al Jazeera Effect phenomenon 
The third category of the literature on Al Jazeera addresses its social, cultural and 
political impact both at the regional and international levels. There is a general agreement 
among scholars who studied "Al Jazeera effect" that the network has contributed to the 
creation of an Arab public sphere. Some have even talked about political implications of 
this emerging public sphere. El Oifi notes that "Al Jazeera has triggered a profound shift 
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on the way the Arab mediascape functions which may potentially contribute to the 
reconfiguration of the political systems in the Middle East region."
108
 In a more assertive 
tone, and drawing upon a cross-national survey data collected in 2005 from six Arab 
countries, Erick Nisbet finds that higher exposure to Al-Jazeera's media agenda 
contributes to promoting political reform and advancing democracy. Compared to other 
media outlets which "may be employed by established elites to retard democratization as 
in the case of (its main competitor) Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera appears to be a positive force 
for developing a mass constituency for democracy in the Arab world by increasing the 
salience of democracy and political/civil liberties."
109
 The impact of Al Jazeera and the 
new Arab public sphere on Arab and regional politics is not necessarily in favor of 
democracy remarks Marc Lynch, especially with the "structural weakness" of this 
emerging public sphere and the lack of institutionalized mechanisms to transform public 
opinion into concrete policies. However, the new Arab public sphere, says Lynch, "sets 
the agenda for public debate across Arab countries, an agenda dominated by issues 
defined as core shared Arab concerns. All Arab – Leaders and ordinary citizens alike – 
were forced to adapt to this agenda."
110
 At the international level, Lynch suggests three 
ways in which the new Arab public sphere affects international politics: "by changing the 
strategic calculations of rational politicians, by shaping world views, and by transforming 
identities."
111
 Pushing this analysis to its maximal extent, Philip Seib dedicated a whole 
book to "the Al Jazeera Effect". He borrows the title from "the CNN Effect" which, over 
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a decade ago, developed a theory postulating that the development of the popular 24-hour 
international television news network (CNN) had a major impact on the conduct of states' 
foreign policy. Seib notes that Al Jazeera has taken that concept a significant step farther 
to encompass the use of new media as tools in every aspect of global affairs. In this 
respect, Al Jazeera has become “a paradigm of new media's influence”. Its impact on 
international politics is unprecedented as it is making traditional borders irrelevant by 
unifying peoples scattered across the globe. In doing so, “this phenomenon - the Al 
Jazeera effect - is reshaping the world."
112
 However, the power of the media has its limits 
when it comes to domestic political change. Media cannot force change says Seib, media 
can only inspire it and assist it since “media effects are just parts of a large political 
universe, the constituent of which must come into alignment if democratization is to take 
hold.”113 
 
For an Arab media network that has only been in operation for thirteen years, the amount 
of interest it has generated globally is by all means considerable. As a common 
characteristic, the literature on Al Jazeera generally overstates its role and exaggerates the 
impact it has had on media and politics in the Arab world. Needless to say that, against 
the backdrop of existing ideological, authoritarian and state-centric media systems, Al 
Jazeera has introduced a new communicative, interactive and pluralist paradigm. But, the 
nature and scope of its impact can only be assessed through a carefully conducted 
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investigation that goes beyond the descriptive aspect of the current literature and reads 
into the far-reaching political implications of this phenomenon.       
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Chapter 2: 
Research Methodology 
 
The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes,  
but in having new eyes. 
Marcel Proust 
 
In this research I chose a qualitative methodology because it is best suited to study, 
understand, and explain such a complex phenomenon like democratization in the Arab 
setting. I believe that the unique capacity of qualitative methodology does not only come 
from its disciplinary origins (social sciences whereas quantitative methodology originated 
from natural sciences), its philosophical and epistemological roots, or its inductive and 
flexible style in theory building, but also from enabling the researcher to see the multiple 
faces of reality through the subjects' eyes. That is, to better learn the social meanings that 
the subjects apply to the world they live in. Through in-depth interviews and observation 
one can share the interpretative lens those subjects/actors adopt and use to produce their 
own understanding of their social, political and cultural environment. By shifting from 
one subject/actor to another the researcher can understand and therefore identify the 
dominant powers and institutions that frame their views and tint their lenses. Contrary to 
quantitative methodology where researchers are distant outsider observers who treat 
people as silent objects, qualitative methodology avoids distance through participant 
observation and greater interaction between researchers and their subjects. Although such 
a close relation and identification between researchers and subjects often attracts 
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criticism regarding the reliability of collected data, protocols requiring researchers to 
provide full transcripts and records of interviews and group meetings reduce the effects 
of this apparent weakness. In addition, this method acknowledges the central role of the 
researcher and legitimizes his subjective interpretation rather than pretending objectivity 
and the ability of reaching scientific truth as positivists claim. 
 
Qualitative methodology gained prominence in social sciences since the publication of ` 
L. Strauss's "The Discovery of Grounded Theory" in 1967. The theoretical frameworks, 
the systematic strategies and the practical guidelines offered by Grounded theory 
provided solid ground for qualitative research and set a growing trend in constructing 
abstract theoretical explanations of social processes. The usefulness and analytical power 
of Grounded theory stems particularly from its systematic refinement of the conceptual 
level of analysis while maintaining a strong foundation in data. The simultaneous 
involvement of researchers in data collection and analysis guarantees: conceptual density, 
durability over time, modifiability, and explanatory power of grounded theory (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967). Unlike the founders of Grounded theory who talk about discovering 
theory as emerging from data, Kathy Charmaz assumes that neither data nor theories are 
discovered. As researchers, we are in constant and evolving engagement with the data we 
collect and the world we study. Thus, we become part of that world about which "we 
construct our grounded theories through our past and present involvements and 
interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices."
114
 Any theoretical 
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construction therefore, offers an interpretive depiction of the studied world, not an exact 
picture of it.     
 
The interpretive approach is based on epistemological considerations with regard to 
human knowledge and the construction of social reality. Objective truth is not something 
that resides somewhere awaiting us to discover it. It is rather constructed by gathering the 
meanings of objects when we interact and engage with them. The prime means for 
gathering meanings is language through conversation and writing. We resort to language 
to understand, make sense and convey what we construct as reality. Reality, in other 
words, is how we interpret it. 
 
As social reality is always complex due to the multiplicity of actors and the role of 
object/subject interplay in its formation, no single interpretation can convey the whole 
truth or capture the complete meaning. Different actors produce different meanings 
especially when other factors such as traditions, values, history, religion etc. are 
considered. In this case we are exposed to what Paul Ricœur calls "conflict of 
interpretations, or, to quote M. Crotty: "Meaning is not discovered, but constructed. In 
this understanding of knowledge, it is clear that different people may construct meaning 
in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon. Isn't this precisely what we 
find when we move from one culture to another?"
115
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Understanding is then, choosing between different and sometimes competing 
interpretations that enrich our knowledge with a plurality of meanings, opinions and 
views of the world around us. What distinguishes interpretivism is its ability to 
accommodate this plurality of meanings that are not inherent in the objects of our study. 
We import the meaning from "somewhere" as Crotty suggests, this somewhere may 
happen to be the objects themselves, traditions, values, religions etc. Interpretivism is by 
essence critical as it frees researchers from the shackles of one single authoritative 
approach and enables them to assess the existing narratives using their own perspective to 
develop their alternative account.         
 
Explaining Arab democratization, the emergence of indigenous public sphere, the role of 
the media in creating new dynamics for social and political change in the Arab setting, is 
better achieved following the guidelines of Grounded theory and using an interpretive 
approach which contextualizes struggles, forces, discourses within the history, the 
culture, and the social fabrics of the region. In addition to the theoretical framework 
Grounded theory offered qualitative researchers, it also offered practical strategies in 
directing, managing, and streamlining data collection and analysis. 
 
Data collection and analysis: 
The phenomenal interest in Al Jazeera since its launch in 1996 generated a huge amount 
of data in different formats and of varying degrees of importance for academic research. 
Much of this data has been collected and analyzed, but a lot remains unprocessed 
especially from a political science perspective. 
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Considering the amount of literature on Al Jazeera and its leading role in revolutionizing 
the Arab media landscape, very little has been written on the political implications of 
these changes. The fact that most of those who studied Al Jazeera come from media 
related disciplines like communication, journalism, and media studies, partly explains 
this trend. Due to the language barrier, even the small number of writings that endeavored 
to address the channel’s social and political effects in a scholarly manner remains highly 
theoretic. The weakness of the empirical side of these writings is apparent as direct 
access to the channel’s programming, viewers’ feedback and more importantly, the Arab 
street is very limited. Fortunately, this study will not be hindered by these difficulties and 
access to these sources is no problem. 
 
My research data will be collected primarily through interviews. Considering that 
interviewing is historically, politically, and contextually bound, the data gathered through 
this commonly used tool is not objective and will not be treated as neutral or irrefutable 
scientific truth. Interviewing is not merely the neutral exchange of asking questions and 
getting answers. The interactive nature of this process in which two (or more) people are 
involved, leads to the creation of a collaborative effort called interview.
116
 As 
interviewing includes a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of techniques, I chose to 
use semi-structured interviews. This serves best the purpose of my research topic and fits 
well with the qualitative methodology, especially within the framework of grounded 
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theory. The issue with structured interviews is that there is very limited room for 
flexibility in the way questions are asked or answered since all respondents are asked the 
same series of pre-established questions with a very limited set of response categories.
117
 
The qualitative nature of my inquiry needs rather a more in-depth data-gathering method. 
Semi-structured interviews allow for actors in different organizational positions and at 
varying levels of the decision making process to give their insights. In my case study I 
aim to interview members of senior management, editorial staff and journalists of Al 
Jazeera alike. A total of twenty in-depth interviews will be conducted with the following 
staff members: 
- Mostefa Souag, director of news 
- Ahmed Sheikh, former editor-in-chief 
- Aref Hijjawi, director of programmes 
- Jamil Azar, news presenter and member of editorial committee 
- Mohamed Krichen, news and programme presenter 
- Laila Chaieb, news and programme presenter 
- Nasreddine Louati, news producer 
- Mohamed Lamine, journalist and translator 
- Moeed Ahmed, head of new media 
- Ahmed Ashour, head of Al Jazeera Talk 
- Jamal el-Shayal, field reporter (during the Egyptian revolution) 
- Nabil Rihani, senior journalist, field reporter (during the Tunisian revolution) 
- Ahmed Val Ouldeddine, journalist, field reporter during the Libyan revolution 
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- Ghassan Abuhsein, journalist, field reporter from Bahrain  
- Samir Hijjawi, senior journalist, special coverage, Al Jazeera Mubasher (Live) 
- Mohamed Dahou, presenter, Al Jazeera Mubasher (Live). 
  
The above list of interviewees has been chosen randomly, it was carefully selected to 
cover the key positions in the news and programme production cycle within Al Jazeera. 
To get an insight into the channel’s handling of the Arab spring, I interviewed field 
reporters from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain. These interviews provide a firsthand 
and extremely detailed account of the media coverage at its operational level. 
From journalists and field reporters through to news and programme producers, up to the 
editorial and top management staff, these interviews will present us with a complete 
picture of Al Jazeera's own perception of its role in the Arab democratization processes. 
Building on my theoretical framework developed in the first three chapters of this 
research, my interpretation of these interviews contributes to building a fresh 
understanding of this perception. 
 
As the format of the semi-structured interview is essentially one of question-and-
discussion, I expect my encounters with Al Jazeera staff to be truly productive and 
insightful. The analysis of the data collected through interviews will be complemented 
and consolidated with data collected from a number of relevant programmes: Al-Ittijah 
Al-mu'akis (the opposite direction), Al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat (Sharia and life), Lin-Nisaa' 
Faqat" (For Women Only). 
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The knowledge I have gained about Al Jazeera as editor of the volume "The Al Jazeera 
Decade" (2007) prompted me to choose this widely influential network as a case study 
for my thesis. I have not picked Al Jazeera randomly among other similar networks; I 
chose it for the paradigmatic role it is playing in reshaping the relationship between 
media and politics in the Arab world. From this perspective, there is no better case, which 
could illustrate this changing relationship and explain how the media contributes to the 
process of Arab democratization than Al Jazeera. However, there remain a number of 
questions facing the single case study as a research strategy.  
 
Although it is commonly used across a variety of disciplines like "psychology, sociology, 
political science, anthropology, social work, business, education, nursing, and community 
planning",
118
 the reliability of the findings of case studies is often challenged. Critics of 
the case study method find it difficult to believe that the outcome of studying a limited 
number of cases can be generalizable or applicable to other cases. Others dismiss case 
study research as appropriate only for the exploratory phase of an investigation and 
cannot be used as an explanatory tool. Yet researchers continue to use the case study 
method with success in carefully planned and crafted qualitative analysis of real-life 
situations. The findings of case studies have undoubtedly contributed to our knowledge 
of complex social, political, and related phenomena. In my particular case study, 
generalizability is not a prime concern; understanding the role of Al Jazeera as a 
communicative tool, and explaining how this network contributes to the creation of a 
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pluralistic public sphere and the advancement of democracy in the Arab region is what 
drives this research agenda in the first place. 
 
Chapter synopsis: 
The first chapter begins with the research questions and provides and explanation of the 
rationale and significance of this study, followed by a literature review as explained 
below. 
The successive waves of democratization that swept the world especially in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century generated a vast amount of literature describing, 
analyzing and investigating the prospects of this global phenomenon. Different 
theoretical approaches emerged at different times to explain to us the dynamics and 
processes of democratization in most parts of the world. The little attention given by 
scholars to the Arab region is reflected in the modest contribution of democratization 
theories to understand and explain the complex processes of Arab democratization. 
In the first section I present a critical assessment of the major theories of democratization 
(modernization, structuralism, transition). The second section reviews the literature on 
the politics and media relationship with special emphasis on the changing aspects of this 
relationship in the Arab context after the arrival of Al Jazeera. Among the most visible 
phenomenon is the unprecedented communicative space created by Al Jazeera through 
the continuous flow of uncensored information and unprecedented live debates broadcast 
to millions of Arab viewers across the Middle East. The third section looks at the 
literature on the public sphere and engages with the debate on this topic which has come 
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to fore in the last few decades with the new waves of democratization. In the fourth and 
final section I turn to the literature on Al Jazeera, exploring the different angles, themes 
and methods used in these writings. My assessment of the literature on Al Jazeera comes 
in three sub-sections: Introductory and descriptive literature, comparative literature, and 
literature on the effect of Al Jazeera. 
The second chapter presents the research methodology and explains how data is collected 
and analyzed. As argued above, qualitative methodology serves best the purpose of 
theory building and constructing social meaning through interpretation. In-depth 
interviews and close engagement with the case study allows the researcher to come up 
with a fresh understanding and develop an original narrative concerning Arab 
democratization and the role played by Al Jazeera in this regard. 
Chapter three engages with the main democratization approaches and analyses their 
theoretical frameworks, their dominant narratives and their claim to universal 
applicability, especially when it comes to understanding the Arab dilemma. 
Democracy has always been praised as the best form of organizing social and political 
disputes. With the waning of democratic institutions after the fall of the Greek city-state 
model, the discourse of democracy and political participation has, for centuries, lost its 
relevance. The gradual re-emergence of democracies since the beginning of the twentieth 
century renewed the interest in democracy and set democratic governance as a global 
trend. By the turn of the century, there were democratic states in every continent and in 
every region across the globe. More than a hundred polities in Europe, Latin America and 
parts of Asia and Africa transformed into democratic systems over three consecutive 
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“waves”, in Huntington's term. This massive transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy expanded the debate over democratization and generated competing theories 
and explanatory models. In this chapter I will provide a critical assessment of the three 
leading approaches to democratization: modernization, transition, and structuralism. 
Literature on democratization has generally been concerned with success stories. 
Transitions in Eastern Europe, Former Soviet republics, and Latin America attracted 
much of the literature whereas the Middle East, to a large extent, remained under-
theorized. The remarkable failure of the Arab Middle East to democratize and fit into the 
theoretical frameworks of democratization theory has left the entire region with little 
understanding. Applying any of the above-mentioned approaches does not seem to help 
deconstruct the socio-cultural and political obstacles facing democratization in the Arab 
world. 
Looking at these approaches from a critical perspective, this chapter intends to place the 
democratization problématique under different lights. Instead of searching for democracy 
by reading the political developments in the region through the prism of modernization 
and liberalization of systems, structures, ideologies and elites, my focus will be on the 
indigenous modes of deliberation over democracy. This means in practice, exploring the 
new social forces, alternative discourses, and emerging non-state actors. Satellite 
television and new communication technologies are paving the way for these forces to 
play an increasingly influential role in the Arab politics. In doing so, the media has 
become an integral part of democratization processes; this is what the following chapter 
is looking to unpack. 
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Chapter four looks at the new relationship between media and politics from an 
unconventional perspective. Since the publication of “Four Theories of the Press”, the 
study of politics and its relationship with the media has been dominated by the systemic 
approach. The function and role of the media according to this approach can only be 
understood and explained by the political system within which they operate. With the 
phenomenal surge of new media technologies, enabling global media corporations to 
extend their influence beyond traditional boundaries of politics, culture, and geography, it 
has become hard for the systemic argument to hold together. Focusing on the case of Al 
Jazeera, this chapter develops what is called a ‘non-systemic’ perspective. While the 
political systems in the Arab world remain largely authoritarian, parts of the Arab media 
operate in a relatively independent atmosphere. Among other elements, I introduce here 
the geopolitics of the region and the inter-Arab relations as key explanatory factors to 
understand the function of Al Jazeera and the role it has played in changing both the 
media and the political scene towards building democratic societies. Central to these 
dynamics is the public sphere which is addressed in the following chapter.  
Chapter five discusses the concept of the public sphere and looks at its social and 
political dimensions. As a zone of mediation between the state and the private individual, 
the concept of “public sphere” has always been central to the democratic life in the West. 
Yurgen Habermas’ ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ traces much of 
the long and complex genealogy of that concept. Although this early work of Habermas 
is primarily a historical-sociological account of the emergence, transformation, and 
disintegration of the liberal bourgeois public sphere, it still resonates with some of the 
urgent questions facing democratic theory. 
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Critics of Habermas who engaged with his project either with the aim of deepening its 
approach and extending its scope or with the consideration of other theoretical 
frameworks provide us with different ways of problematizing and exploring new 
dimensions of the public sphere. 
This chapter engages with Habermas and his critics whose contributions remain largely 
limited to, and embedded in, the socio-political modern history of the West. The key 
issue this chapter tries to address is to what extent can we speak of the public sphere in a 
fundamentally different sociopolitical, economic and cultural setting? The emergence of 
the Arab public sphere and the democratizing effects of Al Jazeera’s journalism will be 
examined in the course of the following three chapters (6, 7 and 8) which form the 
empirical part of this research. 
Chapter six builds on the theoretical discussion of the public sphere and starts the 
analysis of the empirical data. It explains how the channel contributes to Arab 
democratization through the creation of an expanding and vibrant public sphere. As we 
learn from the interviews, the role of Al Jazeera in restructuring public discourse and 
publicizing political debates beyond their traditional enclaves is undisputed. The practical 
manifestation of this role is what this chapter is trying to demonstrate. Interviewees from 
various positions within the network share the same perception that Al Jazeera has been 
instrumental in the process of creating an Arab public sphere. It has offered Arab publics 
crucial platforms to interact and communicate directly and immediately through multiple 
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spaces. The empirical data explains this process and answers three key questions pertaining 
to the formation of the new Arab public sphere and its democratizing effects:  
1. How can we identify the role of Al Jazeera in the emergence of the Arab public 
sphere?  
2. What are the main features and characteristics of the new Arab public sphere?  
3. What are the political implications of this emerging public sphere and how is it 
contributing to the processes of Arab democratization? 
Under the title ‘Al Jazeera's democratization effect’, chapter seven extends the analysis of 
the data beyond the issue of the public sphere to cover other aspects of Al Jazeera’s 
democratization effects. Starting with the profound changes the channel brought into the 
Arab media landscape since the mid-1990s, this chapter dives into what seemed to be a 
common perception among the interviewees regarding the socio-political meaning of 
such changes. The analysis finds that changes in the media sphere cannot be separated 
from those in the political sphere. The advent of Al Jazeera as a new media paradigm 
explains much of the current changes in the region. The available data provides us with a 
full picture of this paradigm; how it functions and what are its key components. In this 
respect, Al Jazeera’s contribution to Arab democratization is channeled through the 
creative interplay of a number of elements including: breaking the information monopoly, 
bringing in the opinion and the other opinion, and integrating old and new media to 
maximize the level of engagement among the Arab publics. 
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To reconstruct the social meaning of Al Jazeera’s role as derived from the interviews and 
further substantiate these ideas with more concrete examples, chapter eight takes the 
Arab spring as the focal point of analysis. While the protesters were taking to the streets 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, the media were competing not only to cover these 
events but also to construct their own narratives about what was happening. The focus 
here will be on Al Jazeera’s narrative of the Arab spring which it has covered in an 
exceptional way. The data analysis will provide us with an insight into the channel’s 
portrayal of this major political event and tell us how its coverage fits into the ongoing 
Arab democratization process. To understand the political impact of Al Jazeera’s 
engagement with the revolutions, particular attention will be first given to its journalistic 
practice in terms of editorial decisions, field reporting and the upsurge of citizen 
reporting. As the empirical data show, Aljazeera’s extensive coverage of the Arab spring 
was unmatched and its live reporting attracted millions of viewers in the Arab world and 
across the globe. However, paradoxically, this success brought with it serious questions 
regarding the channel’s professionalism and the political agenda driving its coverage. 
Chapter nine tries to provide answers to these questions and reflect on the theoretical part 
of the research as well as on the empirical analysis from a critical perspective. In this 
discussion chapter, there will also be a critical assessment of Al Jazeera’s role in the Arab 
democratization process and its handling of the Arab spring in particular. While 
televising the Arab revolutions showed the overwhelming power of the media over many 
other traditional socio-political actors, it also showed the lack of consistency in this 
coverage and the prominence of particular political agendas over journalistic norms, 
especially when we look at how Al Jazeera reported the different revolutions from a 
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comparative perspective. In this respect, I will examine the channel’s coverage of 
Bahrain and Libya and compare it to that of the rest of the Arab revolutions. The chapter 
also discusses the impact of the Arab spring on Al Jazeera’s journalistic performance 
especially with regard to the space given to 'the other opinion’ during the revolutions, 
which seems to have been shrinking considerably. This discussion also reconsiders what 
has been said about the Arab public sphere in the previous chapters and analyses the 
transformations it has undergone. 
The conclusion recapitulates the main research findings and summarizes the key 
theoretical articulations regarding Arab democratization and the role of the media. It ends 
with recommendations on which direction should Al Jazeera take to consolidate its 
position within the new, post-revolution environment and suggests avenues for future 
studies to take the research agenda of this thesis further. 
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Chapter 3: 
Democratization: The frameworks, the narratives and the Arab 
Dilemma 
 
Democratization has been a global political phenomenon especially during the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. In the course of less than three decades, the international 
scene has gone through spectacular transformations marked by what has become known 
as “the third wave” of democratization.119 The fall of the remaining authoritarian regimes 
in Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece and Spain) in the mid-1970s, followed by the 
breakdown of military rule in Latin America, the regime openings in East and South East 
Asia, and to a lesser degree, in sub-Saharan Africa, and then most spectacularly the 
transition of former communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, plunged the 
world into the largest democratic experience it has ever seen.     
 
On the theoretic side, there has been an upsurge of literature on democratization trying to 
make sense of these changes and explain what happened in a systemic way. Competing 
theories emerged in the academic sphere to conceptualize patterns of democratization and 
compare various paths and processes of democratic transition. The editors of 
Democratization
120
 distinguish between three major approaches: the modernization 
approach, the transition approach, and the structural approach. Regardless of the extent to 
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which these approaches are distinct or overlapped
121
, they all revolve around the 
traditional structure/agency debate.  
 
The modernization and the structure approaches have much in common in terms of their 
philosophical background, basic assumptions, and core arguments. The starting point is 
that society is a structure with interrelated parts that function towards maintaining social 
stability and order. Social change happens only through long-term processes and 
structural transformation. The primacy in analyzing social phenomena is always given to 
the systemic structure whether at the social, political or economic level. Democratization 
from this perspective comes into being as a result of structural changes not through elites' 
initiatives, rational choices and short term negotiations. On the contrary, the transition 
approach focuses on the dynamics of regime change and the role of different agents in 
bringing down authoritarian rule. Combined, these approaches provide a multi-
perspective framework for understanding the successive waves of democratization in 
most parts of the world. Taken separately, they all fail to generate a satisfactory 
explanation of this global phenomenon. The downside of these theoretic frameworks and 
their analytical deficiency become more apparent when we try to apply them onto the 
Arab Setting to understand the potentialities and processes of Arab democratization. In 
this chapter, I will provide a brief and concise assessment of these approaches followed 
by what I think is the missing link in the literature on Arab democratization. Based on my 
critical assessment, the different pieces of this missing link will be brought together by 
following three lines of inquiry: First, I will employ a bottom-up analysis to explore the 
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democratic forces and discourses at the societal level against the backdrop of the 
dominating narratives and their state-centric views. Second, I will engage with the current 
debate on political culture to show the inconsistencies in the use of this explanation and 
demonstrate the limitations of what has become known as the Arab "exceptionalism" 
argument. Third, I will conclude this chapter with bringing the international factor back 
in, not only as facilitator and promoter of democracy as was the case in certain countries, 
but also and more importantly as an additional obstacle that complicates the journey of 
Arab democratization and obscures further its prospects. 
 
1. Inadequacies of the dominating democratization theory    
 
“Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you 
have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve.” 
Karl Popper 
 
The modernization approach to democratization emphasizes a number of social and 
economic factors as necessary requisites for democratic change. Although other variables 
are also considered, the level of socioeconomic development remains central to the 
modernization approach. Seymour Martin Lipset’s essay “Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” published in 1959 
represents the starting point for this trend of analysis. Lipset’s assumption that 
modernization generates democratization is supported by a comparative study of the 
European countries, the English speaking countries in North America and Australasia, 
89 
 
and the Latin American countries. After comparing these countries in terms of their level 
of industrialization, degree of urbanization, as well as their wealth and education, he 
found that the more democratic countries are those in which the socioeconomic indices 
scored higher.  Lipset’s well-known statement “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater 
the chances that it will sustain democracy”122 was seen by his critics as linear, over-
deterministic and lacks enough empirical evidence. From the same perspective, but in 
less affirmative terms, Larry Diamond sums up the modernization approach as “the well-
to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve, and 
maintain a democratic system for their country”.123 
 
On the contrary, it is hardly conceivable that democracy will take place in pre-modern 
societies, or in countries where the socioeconomic indices did not reach the required 
level. This explains in part why comparative studies on democratization did not concern 
themselves much with the Arab world. Addressing a phenomenon that does not exist 
contradicts the basic conventions of social science methodology and therefore asks the 
wrong questions. Surprisingly, this methodological restraint recedes when it comes to 
dealing with the culture factor.   
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Although socioeconomic development remains the driving force behind 
democratization
124
, a number of theorists pushed the modernization approach to another 
direction and developed their own analytical agenda stressing the importance of culture in 
bringing about democratic change. The high level of economic development achieved in 
modern societies brings with it a high level of education and spreads out a particular 
culture that favors democratic values such as tolerance, moderation, pluralism, diversity 
and rationality.
125
 Whether democratic culture precedes the democratic process and paves 
the way for change, or comes as a result of it, is still an unsettled question. What looks 
more problematic though is the use of culture to explain the absence of democracy in the 
Middle Eastern context and the Arab world in particular. The importance of engaging 
with the political culture approach stems primarily from the fact that, whenever Arab 
democratization is invoked, the cultural argument always comes to the fore. A close 
examination of political culture and the dangers of reading the deficiency of democracy 
in the Arab setting through the prism of culture will follow in the next section. 
 
The structure approach emphasizes the long-term processes of historical change and 
looks primarily at the changing structures of power. Different power structures operate 
differently in different social, economic and political settings. In certain cases structural 
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changes lead to liberal democracy, in others they lead to completely the opposite. 
Barrington Moore is a classic example of those who theorized the relationship between 
democracy and dictatorship on the one hand and their social origins on the other hand. In 
his 1966 "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Dictatorship",
126
 he tried to find the link 
between the changing patterns of power structures and the varied political systems that 
emerged in eight countries (England, France, the USA, Japan, Germany, Russia, China 
and India). As structures of power change gradually and normally take time to translate 
into a defined political form, Moore's comparative study spanned a time frame of three 
and a half centuries that is, from the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century. He 
found out that a common pattern of changing relationship between four power structures 
(peasants, lords, the bourgeoisie and the state) led to liberal democracy in England, 
France and the USA. Other patterns of relationship between these same structures 
resulted in fascism in the case of Germany and Japan, while Russia and China moved 
towards communism. Here again, democratization and capitalism go hand in hand in the 
most advanced industrialized countries as we have seen in the modernization approach. 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens expanded Moore's 
structural approach to cover a broader range of countries but focused their analysis on the 
dynamics of class struggle. According to Rueschemeyer et al. the defining factor in the 
democratization process is "the struggle between the dominant and the subordinate 
classes over their right to rule."
127
 Among the five conflicting classes: landlords, 
peasantry, bourgeoisie, middle class, and urban working class, only the working class has 
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always been in favor of advancing democratic rights. However, various class alliances 
may arise in different contexts and change the prospects for democracy depending on the 
level of capitalist development. The authors' comparative history analysis included 
counties from the advanced capitalist world as well as from the developing world but, not 
surprisingly, no Middle Eastern or Arab countries were considered in their study. 
 
The difficulties that arise when trying to understand Arab democratization through the 
lens of the modernization/structure approach remain largely there even if we change the 
perspective and look at the dynamics of the region through the transition approach. 
Although the literature on democratic transition shifted the focus away from the structure 
and placed it on the short term process of regime change and the dynamics of elite 
interaction during transition periods. The building block of this approach is the agency of 
political elites as the main actors in initiating the process of political change. Although 
the time frame for democratic transition is generally limited, the process has to go 
through a number of phases. Dankwart Rustow distinguishes between four transitional 
phases before a democratic regime is firmly established.
128
 First, there has to be a 
background condition for national unity and political identity to be established and 
consolidated. Second, political elites and groups rise to prominence through "a prolonged 
and inconclusive political struggle."
129
 This leads to the third phase where elites come to 
value and accept that the diversity of views is inevitable, so they seek to institutionalize it 
and channel differences among groups and their political orientations in what Rustow 
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calls "some crucial aspect of democratic procedure."
130
 Following this decision phase, 
comes habituation. It is the last and concluding stage characterized by the adoption of 
democratic rules as necessary rather than desirable. Gradually, these rules become the 
norm, and trickle down the whole social and political organization. 
 
Subsequent transition studies altered partially Rustow's four-phased process but kept the 
same theoretic framework in which political elites play a central role in establishing 
democratic rule. This is clear from the seminal transitologist work of Schmitter 
O'Donnell, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and the many studies 
that followed.
131
 O'Donnell and his colleagues distinguish in the democratization process 
between the initial transition from authoritarian rule marked by preliminary 
liberalization, but also uncertainty, and the consolidation phase where democracy 
becomes "the only game in town" in Linz and Stepan's terms.
132
 
 
The upsurge of transitology literature, especially since the publication of Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, has been crucial in shaping our understanding of democratization. 
The rich comparative analysis it provided covers a large number of countries across the 
globe but, like the modernization and structural approaches, stops short of exploring and 
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explaining aspects of Arab democratization. If the modernization and structural 
approaches both failed to account for Arab democratization for obvious reasons,
133
 
transition theorists have little excuse for ignoring the dynamics of political change in this 
region. It is true that full transition to democracy has not happened in any of the Arab 
countries, but considering the whole democratization process as set out in the transition 
literature, a number of those countries have gone through certain phases at certain times 
yet failed to move to subsequent phases and establish democratic regimes.
134
 Here, we 
are confronted with one of the key questions when dealing with democratization in the 
Arab context: the predicament of progress and retreat. The following sections try to offer 
elements of understanding of this uncertain and meandrous process which does not seem 
to fit into the orthodoxy of democratization theory and its analytical agenda.  
 
2. The struggle for Arab democratization: Forces, discourses and the indigenous 
voices 
 
"So long as the people do not care to exercise their freedom, those who wish to tyrannize 
will do so; for tyrants are active and ardent, and will devote themselves in the name of 
any number of gods, religious and otherwise, to put shackles upon sleeping men." 
Voltaire 
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From what we have seen in the above introduction of democratization theory, it is clear 
that Arab democratization is not high on the agenda of the dominant narratives. The 
leading thread uniting the different approaches explains in part why those narratives 
failed to observe the real dynamics behind the facade of stalled or inexistent Arab 
democracy. The Western context in which all these narratives were developed, the ethno-
centric view they all share and communicate through their theoretic approaches, and 
above all, the top-down perspective they adopt in looking at issues of social and political 
change, make it difficult for students of Arab democratization to see the reality on the 
ground as it unfolds.
135
 Changing the lens and using a bottom-up approach seem 
inevitable to present a closer examination and better understanding of the processes and 
potential prospects for Arab democratization. Focusing on the state apparatus and related 
social powers, structures and institutions is not the best starting point for this line of 
inquiry. For, it will only strengthen the thesis of presumed Arab "exceptionalism" and fail 
to observe any significance in the complex struggle of many Arabs for democracy.
136
 My 
focus would be rather placed on the multifaceted struggle for democracy at non-state 
levels. This includes social, political and religious groups (established and emerging), 
popular movements (protests and uprisings), and symbolic systems and discourses 
(traditional and modern). 
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The struggle for democracy and political participation in the Arab world is one of the 
longest and most complex processes. The so-called Arab Renaissance (al-nahda), which 
began in the late 19
th
 century, was but a cultural instance in that process. Pioneered by 
Rifa'a Rafi' el-Tahtawi (1801-1873), who comes from the religious establishment (al-
Azhar), al-nahda initiated a multi-dimensional process of intellectual, religious, and 
institutional reforms in a number of Arab and Islamic countries. El-Tahtawi's views of 
the West, its social modes of organization, its political forms of government, and its 
modern educational systems were deeply influenced by his readings and insightful 
observations during his early trip to Paris.
137
 In section IV of Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis 
Bariz he writes: "I read (…) two volumes of a book called The Spirit of Laws. His author, 
Montesquieu, is famous among the French. (…) They call him the French Ibn Khaldun as 
they call Ibn Khaldun Montesquieu of the East. In this regard, I have also read a great 
book called The Social Contract authored by Rousseau."
138
  
 
Upon his return to Egypt, el-Tahtawi became a fierce advocate of parliamentarism, the 
rights of citizens to political participation, and the rights of women to education. The 
association between Montesquieu and Ibn Khaldun in the above quote is very significant. 
It shows the spirit with which a whole generation of al-nahda pioneers (ruwad) faced the 
challenges of bridging the widening gap between a rising West and a declining East. 
Establishing analogies between ideas, values, symbols and institutions from both worlds 
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was necessary to justify and legitimate the approach of "borrowing" from the West.
139
 
Like el-Tahtawi, Khairuddin al-Tunsi wrote his famous "Aqwam al-Masalik" after 
touring a number of European countries. In one of his statements about parliamentarian 
governance we read under the title "Public Liberties": There is no doubt that, by choosing 
its representatives who act on its behalf (…), the nation (ummah) will have its freedom 
established and all its affairs will be successful. It is vital to have people from the upper 
class as well as ordinary citizens, engage in all matters, care more, and hold the 
executives of their government to account."
140
 
 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) is another emblematic figure of that period. 
Although his efforts concentrated on religious reform, which gave Islam a modernist 
reinterpretation, he also favored the replacement of authoritarian monarchies with 
representative rule. At the theoretic level, "Tabai' al-Istibdad" (The natures of despotism) 
of Abdul-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902) remains unrivaled.141 Al-Kawakibi is best 
known for his spirited critique of tyranny in all its myriad forms: political, intellectual, 
economic, spiritual, and racial. "The worst forms of despotic rule, he says, is the 
government of absolute single ruler who inherits the throne, commands the army, and 
enjoys religious authority."
142
 Conversely, The fewer authorities a ruler has, the less 
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despotic he becomes, until we reach a stage where we have an elected ruler for a limited 
period of time. Any form of government, observes al-Kawakibi, is despotic to a certain 
extent unless it is placed under proper control and is routinely hold to account."
143
 
 
This was the historical and intellectual context within which various administrative, 
constitutional, political and economic reforms took place. In Turkey, the reformation 
movement introduced in 1839 a multi-faceted policy to reorganize state institutions and 
modernize the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to rescue it from an inevitable decline. 
These measures, known as tanzimat, included educational, financial and legal reforms, 
but most important of all, was the establishment in 1876 of the first Ottoman Parliament 
to balance and check the wide-ranging powers of the Sultan. In Tunisia the reforms 
peaked in 1861 with the promulgation of the first written constitution in the Arab world. 
In Egypt the effects of the reformation movement were relatively more visible, especially 
with the help of the printing press, which Muhammad Ali introduced since 1921. Modern 
printing techniques spread rapidly and gave birth to a modern liberal intelligentsia whose 
impact depended so much on the circulation of printed materials.
144
 Transferring the 
reformist ideas and trends of al-Nahda to the wider population was not very successful 
though, since access to books, periodicals and newspapers remained to a large extent 
confined to intellectuals and segments of an emerging middle class. 
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This explains in part, why the first Arab reformist movement did not reach its full 
capacity and ended without translating its constitutional reforms and political 
liberalization into a successful democratic transition. Another element of explanation is to 
be found in the external factor. It is worth mentioning that, by the end of the 1800s, the 
Arab world was almost entirely under direct Western occupation.
145
 Fighting external 
occupation and liberating the land, it seems, took precedence over democratization on the 
agenda of many reformists. Instead of continuing their internal political struggle against 
their local tyrants, modern and traditional elites alike, had to re-order their priorities and 
engage in what will be known as the national liberation movements in many parts of the 
Arab world. The third element of explanation is also linked to the colonial legacy and its 
implication for the political development in the region. The subordination of political and 
constitutional structures in occupied countries (parties and parliaments) and the apparent 
failure of indigenous elites, who led or took part in those structures, to meet the 
aspirations of their people for freedom and independence, resulted in "discrediting the 
parliamentary systems established by the Europeans."
146
    
 
Democratization was not a priority in the state-building process after independence 
either. As Roger Owen notes, the new elites focused their efforts on consolidating the 
emerging state apparatus, securing administrative control at every level, and expanding 
state bureaucracy, the size of the army and the police forces. These processes resulted in 
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"a huge expansion in the power and pervasiveness of the state apparatus."
147
 Control over 
so large an apparatus led to the formation of authoritarian regimes across the region. 
Authoritarian system as defined by Owen, is "one in which power is highly centralized, 
pluralism is suspect, and where the regime seeks to exercise a monopoly over all 
legitimate political activity."
148
 When it comes to dealing with social or political groups, 
which are not part the state monopoly "the ideal strategy for an authoritarian regime is to 
destroy those that it cannot control, and to re-make, and re-order those that it can."
149
 
Whether "personalist, military, single-party, or amalgams of the pure types"
150
 the 
common feature of post-colonial state in the Arab world has been the domination a 
generalized authoritarian system. The difference between family rule (Gulf countries, 
Jordan, Morocco), military rule (Egypt and Syria during the 1950s-60s), single-party or  
personalist rule (Tunisia, Algeria) is too superficial.  
 
However, the picture has changed slightly especially in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century with political openings happening in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait and Yemen. Elections, with varying degrees of 
transparency have taken place in all these countries and political parties were allowed to 
compete for provincial and parliamentary elections. It must be noted though, that the 
upsurge of "Arab electoralism", defined by Larbi Sadiki as "the occurrence of elections 
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with regular frequency but with limited substantive democratic dividends", remains 
cosmetic and operates only at the façade level."
151
 By introducing degrees of political 
openings, controlled liberalization and relatively competitive but not truly free elections, 
Arab regimes "erect the façade of democracy but not the building behind it", says Marina 
Ottaway to whom, only a "political paradigm shift" can lead to real democratization.
152
 
Paradoxically, Arab elections have always been a sign of authoritarianism and 
redeployment of state power than of democratic change. No political alteration in real 
terms has ever happened through election in any Arab country, and political authority is 
everywhere personified and only delegated to members of the ruling families or their 
inner circles of trust. Looking at the situation from this perspective does not provide us 
with enough visibility to understand the dynamics of Arab democratization, which 
operate fundamentally at the societal level. As a response to the failure of postcolonial 
state to achieve its national goals and pursue what they promised in terms of 
modernization, economic development, and liberation of Palestine,
153
 various forms of 
resistance and opposition to the regimes in place emerged in much of the Arab world. It 
is in these forms of political opposition, social pretests, and intellectual debates that the 
dynamics and discourses of Arab democratization emerged and continue to develop. 
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Arab intellectuals' responses to the failure of the Arab state on almost all fronts varied 
according to their ideological backgrounds and political affiliations, but a general 
tendency favoring democracy and supporting democratic change could be traced across 
the spectrum. Voices from the Arab left pointed out to the bourgeois nature of the 
political elites, which have no confidence in the lower classes of society. Their failure, as 
explained by the author of al-Hazeema wal-Ideologia al-Mahzuma (The Defeat and the 
Defeated Ideology), “led to the betrayal of the Arab masses who should take the 
responsibility of leading the nation."
154
 Similar ideas were expressed earlier by Salama 
Musa, a leading Arab socialist, whose works inspired a generation of Western-minded 
elite. Holding that democracy in Europe was the product of the rise of the middle class, 
he recommends: "we need to help this man, the man of the middle class to implant the 
tree of democracy in our land."
155
  
 
Among the issues highlighted by liberal intellectuals with regard to the lack of 
democracy and the widening gap between Arab regimes and the people is the crisis of 
legitimacy. Combining democracy, rationality and legitimacy, Ahmed Baha'a el-Din 
wrote: "If events had taught us the importance of democracy and rationality, it was high 
time for us to be aware that the greatest importance is for legitimacy (…) because in the 
final analysis, it is legitimacy which brings about the harmony between the rulers and the 
ruled."
156
 Harmony in this sense can only be achieved within a strong but flexible 
political and social framework, adds Baha'a el-Din, where democracy and the freedom 
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expression come first.
157
 The primacy of democracy is also clear in Burhan Ghalioun's 
writings. In Al-Masa'lah Al-Tai'fiyah wa Mushkilat Al-Aqalliyat (The Sectarian Question 
and the Problem of Minorities), he notes that the debate among contemporary Arab 
intellectuals shifted from secularity, which is "a false problématique imported from the 
West", to "the real issue, which is democracy".
158
 His "Manifesto" is a significant 
contribution to that debate. He believes that the Arab discourse on democracy should 
move from being used as a slogan to a stage where it represents an effective framework 
for social and political consensus.
159
       
 
Intellectuals with Islamist background criticized the ruling governments for being 
detached from the culture of the people. According to many Islamists, abandoning 
religious guidance is at the roots of not only military defeat, but also authoritarianism and 
social injustice. “Islam and democracy are originally in agreement, says Rashid 
Ghannouchi, a leading Islamist scholar from Tunisia, the democratic procedures 
developed by the West are great achievements; they transformed consultation (shura) 
from being just a principle and value into a complete system allowing the community 
(ummah) to express its will and hold its rulers to account.”160 On his part, Fahmy 
Howeidy from Egypt emphasizes the supremacy of democracy over all other competing 
political systems. He argues that, “what democracy stands for, in terms of values and 
guarantees, represents the best system allowing for political participation and the 
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protection of freedoms. Regardless of any defects or disadvantages it might have, 
democracy remains by far superior to other government systems and political models.”161 
Hasan al-Turabi offers a more synthetic view. Western democracy, he holds, is the 
product of three combined origins: First, the contract of allegiance between the 
community and the ruler in the Islamic tradition; second, the Greek democratic 
experience where the people governed itself; and third, humanism philosophy as the basis 
for rights and fundamental freedoms.
162
 Describing the political regimes in the Arab-
Islamic world, al-Turabi appears very critical. “Most of those who rule in the lands of 
Islam are tyrants, he says. They do not care about the will of the people and do not 
respond to its needs. (…) They are afraid of political Islam and its call for freedom, 
equality, consultation, and the right of the people to choose its rulers, hold them to 
account, and depose them.
163
 The Islamist discourse on democracy, it should be noted, is 
of particular importance especially with regard to the growing constituency it represents. 
In fact, in almost every single election held in the Arab world during the last three 
decades, the Islamist parties proved to be the most powerful political opposition.
164
 Nazih 
Ayubi’s explicit concern that "it is impossible to know whether they [Islamists] would 
relinquish power voluntarily once they had achieved it" seems to be exaggerated. His 
                                                           
161
 Howeidy, Fahmy. Al-Islam wa al-Dimuqratiya (Islam and Democracy) (Ahram Centre for Translation 
and Publication, 1993) p. 102 
162
 Al-Turabi, Hasan. As-Siyasah wal-'Hukm: al-Nuzum as-Sultaniyah baynal Usul wa Sunan al-Waqi'i 
(Politics and Governance: Sultanic Systems between Origins and the Laws of Reality) (Dar al-Saqi, 2003), 
p. 34 
163
 Ibid. p. 48 
164
 This is true in the following instances: In Tunisia, the Islamist Nahda (renaissance) movement won 17% 
of the vote in 1989 elections. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front swept the 1990 elections winning 
more than 50%. In Jordan, the Islamic Front won 36 of the 80 parliament seats in the 1989 elections. In 
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys the largest opposition representation in the parliament. 
115 
 
statement that "many of these groups are openly anti-democratic" is definitely 
inaccurate."
165
    
 
As a final note on the democratic discourse of Arab intellectuals, Mohamed Abid al-
Jabiri reminds us of the Rabat conference organized in November 1980 on "the issue of 
democracy in the Arab world". The final statement of conference, which gathered 
intellectuals from various backgrounds and different Arab countries, stresses the 
importance of democracy in all regards. In this statement we read: "The participants 
unanimously agreed on the centrality of democracy and its crucial position in the struggle 
towards achieving the goals of the Arab nation. (…) The participants have also refused to 
sacrifice democracy under the pretext of the requirements of economic development."
166
 
However, so long as the Arab intellectual's discourse on democracy remained targeted at 
the ruling elites and predominantly focused on the demand for direct political 
participation, the regimes in place perceived it as a challenge to their authority and a 
threat to their social and political status.
167
 Failing to have a real impact on the political 
and institutional level, the democratizing discourse of Arab intellectuals managed to gain 
access to certain social milieus. The student movement which championed political 
activism and street protests in the seventies and eighties of the twentieth century, is 
probably the best example showing how the demand and struggle for democracy 
extended beyond the closed circles of Arab elites.  
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Throughout the Arab world, students have played a significant role in national political 
developments. As Nicola Pratt remarks, "university campuses have provided important 
"incubators" for civil society, as former student activists graduate and go on to participate 
in other forms of civil activism."
168
 Ideas of political reform originating in the circles of 
Arab intellectuals, coupled with the widespread sentiment of discontent post-1967 defeat 
transformed the student movement in many Arab countries into a remarkable social and 
political protest movement. Student demonstrations on and off campus took place at 
various times in Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco during the 1970s and 1980s. 
The 1968 events in France showed the world how students could be a leading force for 
change. Critical theory literature, especially the writings of Herbert Marcuse and his 
colleagues from the Frankfurt school, were widely read especially among students of 
Marxist tendencies. In his “Essay on Liberation”, dedicated to the French student 
movement, Marcuse tried to conceptualize the events of May 1968 by extending the 
Marxist analysis to incorporate students, as a new social force, in the liberating process. 
“The student opposition, he writes, is growing more and more, as much in the old 
socialist nations as in the capitalist countries. In France, for the first time, this movement 
challenged a regime which deployed against it, all its power.”169 Unlike the traditional 
working class, which has become “shackled in the infrastructure of those societies and 
therefore opposed to change”, the student movement, or “the young intelligentsia” as 
Marcuse calls it, started to play a significant political role. This development, which will 
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probably mark a turn in the evolution of contemporary societies, he maintains, "requires 
critical theory to incorporate this new dimension in its conceptual system and to study its 
implications with regard to the building of a free society.”170 A renowned scholar of 
"social movements", Alain Touraine offers another explanation of the 1960s student 
protests with clear emphasis on its political function. According to Touraine, the French 
student movement protested in May 1968 in order to take over control of social change. 
The objectives and meanings of those events, he stresses, "are political and must be 
understood not in terms of the consciousness of the participants nor of the crisis in the 
university organization, but in terms of the conflicts and contradictions of society and its 
social and political system."
171
       
 
Before the turn of the 1970s, another political event reverberated loudly in the Arab 
universities and gave students of the Islamist tendency, this time, a concrete example of 
change on religious grounds. The Iranian revolution in 1979 sent to the opposition 
groups, especially in the neighboring Arab world, a clear message that Islam could 
become a catalyst for change.
172
 Those two events (1968 and 1979) albeit different in 
many regards, framed and informed the intellectual and political debate in the Arab 
universities which revolved essentially around issues of political change. Although 
democracy and political participation has always been at the center of these debates, 
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which feed into other social groups where students belong before or after graduation, 
governments' responses remained limited. 
 
The arrival of satellite television in the 1990s and the upsurge of live and uncensored 
debate on Al Jazeera in particular, gave the democratic forces a unique platform to 
engage with an unprecedented number of people across the Arab world. With regular talk 
shows discussing matters of public interest involving both government officials and 
opposition figures, intellectuals from different backgrounds, women, youth and other 
previously marginalized groups, Al Jazeera shifted some tabooed issues from the 
basement of oblivion into the public arena. In doing so, the Arab media, or part of it, has 
become an important player in relaying the democratic discourse to millions of people, 
thus is contributing to the making of a new political culture based on diversity, pluralism 
and mutual recognition. This is one of the obvious missing links in the existing literature 
on Arab democratization, which this study seeks to address in the following section and, 
in more details in the coming chapters. 
 
3. Political Culture: Why does it matter? 
 
"The best type of Jihad [struggle] is speaking truth before a tyrannical ruler." 
Riyadh us-Saleheen Volume 1:195 
He who has been a ruler over ten people will be brought shackled on the Day of 
Resurrection, until the justice (by which he ruled) loosens his chains or tyranny brings 
him to destruction. 
119 
 
Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 1037 
 
Since the publication of “The Civic Culture” in 1963 the concept of political culture has 
been a recurring source of debate and academic research on democratization. Compared 
to the remarkably little attention the main approaches of democratization theory devoted 
to the complex processes of Arab democracy,
173
 there has been a frequent resort to 
culture as an explanatory variable. Controversies surrounding the political culture 
approach, which developed initially as part of the dominant modernization paradigm in 
the 1960s, remained integral part of the ongoing debate on the of culture in the 
democratic process. Departing from broadly defined conceptions of culture as the product 
of political institutions or social conditions, Almond and Verba define political culture as 
“the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the 
members of a nation.”174 They distinguish between three types of political cultures: 
parochial, subject, and participant. Parochial political culture is characterized by the 
absence of expectations of change from the political system. This type of culture is 
generally, congruent with a traditional political structure, notably the African tribal 
societies. In the subject political culture, there is a high frequency of orientations toward 
the output but not the input aspects of the system. This type of culture generally 
corresponds with centralized authoritarian political structures. The participant culture is 
                                                           
173
 As accurately noted by the editors of Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, this 
is clear from the two most influential research projects on the subject. O'Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead's 4 volume comparative analysis of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986) failed to 
consider one single Arab country. On their part, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset avoided much of the Middle 
East even though, the focus of their massive comparative study, as the title indicates, is Democracy in 
Developing Countries (1988).     
174
 Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Sage Publications, 1989), p. 13 
111 
 
the one in which the members of the society tend to be actively involved in both the input 
and output aspects of the political system. This type of culture is compatible with a 
democratic political structure. These theoretical generalizations, it should be noted, tried 
to conceptualize the findings of a comparative study of five countries; none of them is 
from the Arab world or the Middle East where the debate on democracy and political 
culture is more intense.
175
  
 
Moving the discussion beyond the limits of Almond and Verba's typology, Brynen, 
Korany and Noble identify three major trends with three distinct positions vis-à-vis the 
culture argument. The first trend suggests that Arab/Islamic culture is generally 
incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy. The second trend adopts a 
more composite approach in which Arab/Islamic political culture is characterized with 
diversity and constant change. This position suggests that the dichotomy between 
authoritarian and participatory culture, for instance, is superficial when it comes to the 
Arab/Islamic context, as both strands co-exist and overlap considerably. The third trend is 
critical of the two previous positions. The cultural variable according to advocates of this 
view is not a critical factor in explaining democratization, as democratic culture and 
attitudes not only influence political realities but are also influenced by these changing 
realities.
176
 In what follows I suggest a different categorization from that of Brynen, 
Korany, and Noble. Instead of the three above mentioned positions I propose two major 
trends. There are those who reject any causal connection between culture and 
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democratization, and those who believe that culture plays a decisive role in the 
democratization process.  
 
Advocates of the first trend agree that explaining democratization by the culture factor 
has always been arbitrary and no solid evidence supports it. Transition theorists generally 
tend to ignore the culture effect. Democratization for transitologists results from rational 
choices, mutual compromises, and elites' political negotiations. What drives political 
change is the common interest, not pro-democratic culture, beliefs, or shared values. As 
for structuralists, democratic culture is more likely to result from democratization than to 
cause it. Democratization comes as a result of structural changes at social, political and 
economic levels, not of cultural reasons. In her critique of the political culture approach, 
Liza Anderson underlines a number of analytical problems in what she calls "frequent 
resort to cultural explanations". Besides the normative bias of this sociological trend, 
there is the lack of survey research through which the impact of political culture on 
politics could be established. Anderson believes that, "most analysts who use political 
culture to explain the absence of democracy in the Arab world “either draw their data 
from general (and usually unsystematic) observations of political behavior, or extrapolate 
from other realms of belief and behavior – notably religion- to ascertain values and habits 
that might bear on politics."
177
 Alternatively, Anderson prefers the use of "objective 
conditions" to analyze democratization in the Arab world. By objective conditions she 
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means "the economic organizations and levels of development that seem to be most 
propitious for development of democratic government."
178
    
       
The second major trend is composed of two contrasting positions both advocating the use 
of culture as an explanatory variable. The common ground bringing together theorists 
belonging to the first position is the theoretical framework of Orientalism with its key 
characteristic, as defined by Edward Said, “the absolute demarcation between East and 
West.”179 This is not to say, however, that all those who justify the absence of democracy 
in the Arab world in cultural terms are orientalists or agree on every detail of the 
argument. Different, inconsistent, and sometimes even contradictory arguments come 
from the same theorist, as is the case of Bernard Lewis who justifies the difference in his 
accounts on the relationship between Islam and democracy by the difference between two 
perspectives: “From a historical perspective, he says, it would seem that of all the non-
Western civilizations in the world, Islam offers the best prospects for Western-style 
democracy.”180 According to Lewis, the history of Arab and Islamic civilization provides 
us with strong supporting evidence. He argues that "the Arabs united in a single society 
two formerly conflicting cultures- the millennial and diversified Mediterranean tradition 
of Greece, Rome, Israel and the ancient Near East, and the rich civilization of Iran (…). 
Of the cohabitation of many peoples, faiths, and cultures within the confines of the 
Islamic society a new civilization was born, diverse in its origins, and its creators (…). 
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From this diversity of Islamic society arises a second feature, particularly striking to the 
European observer – its comparative tolerance."181 
 
However, the political experience of Arabs and Muslims throughout their extended 
history appears to Lewis in contradiction with the above historical evidence. From a 
political perspective, he retracts, “Islam seems to offer the worst prospects for liberal 
democracy.”182 From the early days of Islam until the introduction of modern political 
institutions in the Islamic world, Lewis fails to find any “equivalent among the Muslim 
peoples of the Athenian boule, the Roman Senate, (…) or of any of the innumerable 
parliaments, councils, synods, diets, chambers, and assemblies of every kind that 
flourished all over Christendom.”183 In short, the two worlds (Islam and the West) 
developed two entirely distinct political systems. While in Islam there was “no principle 
of representation or any procedure for choosing representatives”, in the West, on the 
contrary, “the conduct of elections and the definition and extension of the franchise” are 
central issues.
184
 
 
Samuel Huntington is another strong supporter of cultural analysis. He clearly believes 
that “Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of democracy in much of the 
Muslim world.”185 In his essay Will More Countries Become Democratic? Samuel 
Huntington argues unequivocally that, "Islam has not been hospitable to democracy" 
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because "in Islam, no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the 
spiritual and the secular, and political participation was historically an alien concept."
186
 
In The Third Wave though, his position appears more cautious. It is unclear he says, 
“whether Islamic democracy is a contradiction in term”, especially since “egalitarianism 
and voluntarism are central themes in Islam.”187 On the one hand he holds that “Islamic 
concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics.”188 On 
the other hand, he believes that “Islamic doctrine contains elements that may be both 
congenial and uncongenial to democracy.”189 With Elie Kedourie, we arrive to the 
extreme end of this view. He leaves no doubt that Islam and democracy are completely 
irreconcilable. “Arabs and Muslims more generally, he firmly argues, have nothing in 
their own political culture that is compatible with Western notions of democracy or, more 
accurately, constitutional and representative government." Replicating Huntington's 
above expression, he finds that "the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of 
Islam.
190
 
 
Conversely, the second position rejects the idea of characterizing the political culture of 
the region as anti-democratic. They believe that Islam, which played and continues to 
play a critical role in shaping the political culture of Arab and Muslim societies, has 
many facets and tendencies. They refuse to present this rich and multifaceted experience 
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in a one-dimensional depiction.
191
 Among the founding principles used to demonstrate to 
pluralistic character of Islam is the saying of the Prophet: "difference of opinion within 
my community is a sign of God's mercy."
192
 This saying (hadith) has been widely 
interpreted as a call for mutual recognition based on the original state of diversity of 
opinions, and that diversity is something to be welcomed, not to be suppressed. This 
attitude is typified in history by the emergence and acceptance by Sunni Muslims in 
particular, of four different schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, 
Hanbali). The type of culture that allows for flexibility of understanding and 
institutionalizing various interpretations of law must be one which accepts diversity, 
respects difference of opinions, and celebrates mutual tolerance. John Esposito and James 
Piscatori hold that, "Muslim interpretations of democracy build on the well-established 
Quranic concept of shura (consultation). They refer to one school of thought to argue that 
"Islam is inherently democratic not only because of the principle of consultation, but also 
because of the concepts of ijtihad (independent reasoning), and ijma' (consensus)."
193
 
Translating these concepts into political terms, Esposito and Piscatori put it this way: 
"Just as Islamic law is rescued from the charge of inflexibility by the right of jurists in 
certain circumstances to employ independent judgment and to secure agreement among 
themselves, Islamic political thought is rescued from the charge of autocracy by the need 
of rulers to consult widely and to govern on the basis of consensus."
194
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On his part, Tim Niblock sees these values and concepts in practical terms. He considers 
that many of the different interpretations competing within the Islamic framework, "have 
no problem in accommodating liberal parliamentary institutions; some Islamic countries 
have succeeded in establishing democratic systems (e.g. Malaysia and Turkey); and some 
elements in Islam are specifically favorable to democratic values (e.g. the emphasis 
placed on extending full participation in the sacred community to all."
195
 While adopting 
a broadly similar approach to culture and democratization, Michael Hudson supports the 
idea of bringing the concept of political culture back-in, but "carefully" as he insists.
196
 
Instead of focusing his analysis on Arab authoritarianism, following the tradition of 
economistic and institutional studies,
197
 Hudson shifts his lens to what he calls new 
liberalism in Arab politics, which cannot be “adequately explained without invoking 
political culture.”198 In his effort to present an approach, which can seize the complexities 
of culture in the Arab and Islamic setting, and avoids at the same time the shortfalls of 
both “reductionist” and “empiricist” interpretations, he suggests a “more sophisticated, 
less biased formulations of political culture(s)”199 that include values, beliefs, ideology, 
and legitimacy. 
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Mark Tessler's comparative study on the impact of religious orientations on attitudes 
toward democracy is among a very few survey research on the topic. The findings of this 
comparative study conducted in four Arab countries: Egypt, Palestine, Morocco and 
Algeria, suggest that support for democracy is not necessarily lower among individuals 
with the strongest Islamic beliefs. On the contrary, "it provides support for those who 
challenge the thesis that Islam discourages the emergence of political attitudes conducive 
to democracy."
200
 
 
The debate over culture and democracy in the Arab world generated a large amount of 
literature and contributed to the development of competing discourses on Arab 
democratization. However, most of those who employed the political culture factor, 
either in a positive way or to argue against it, have generally treated the subject with 
simplistic generalizations. The complex nature of culture in general and its political 
function and relationship to democracy in particular requires a close examination of a 
number of unsettled issues that the debate over culture and democracy in the Arab world 
did not seem to have addressed in-depth. Following are just few examples highlighting 
these issues.  
 
While we are easily tempted to speak of "one" Arab culture, there is a need to understand 
the intricacies and complexities of such a diverse and composite notion. Different 
elements contributed to the formation of what we call Arab/Islamic culture in different 
countries and in different historical contexts. Patterns of peoples' attitudes toward 
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political systems cannot be explained by simply categorizing their cultures as compatible 
vs. incompatible with democracy. As David Latin notes, people with strongly opposed 
views can share a culture, while people from different cultures can have similar 
views.”201 
 
Examples of the widespread simplistic generalizations about Arab political culture are to 
be found in the frequent resort to religion and tribalism. Neither Islam nor tribalism can 
fully explain the different attitudes of Arab and Muslim societies toward democracy. 
Blaming the democratic deficit on tribalism, David Pryce-Jones explains Arab political 
culture by what he calls the legacy of tribal society which survived down the centuries, 
and caused "the power-challenge dialectic to perpetuate absolute and despotic rule 
everywhere, preventing the evolution of those pluralist institution that alone allow people 
to participate in the processes of the state."
202
 Considering tribalism as the sole source for 
absolutism in Arab politics is unquestionably a reductionist analysis. On the one hand, it 
might be surprising to the holders of this view that the most competitive elections in the 
Arab world took place in countries where the tribal system is still more influential than 
any other social or political structure. Examples include Yemen, Mauritania and Kuwait. 
On the other hand, not all Arab societies are tribal. In countries like Tunisia, where 
modernization and social engineering deeply affected the social structures, tribalism 
disappeared since the early days of independence; the political system however, is purely 
authoritarian. In the absence of the “many well entrenched interests and intermediate 
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powers which imposed effective limits on the ability of the state to control its subjects”203 
as was the case in traditional Islamic societies, the modern Middle Eastern state has 
become more interventionist and more authoritarian. 
 
Azmi Beshara highlights another dimension of tribalism. He disagrees with Price-Jones' 
analysis and suggests to look at the tribal traditions within their social and historical 
context, He believes that tribal system acts as a social restraint "preventing the society 
from plunging into a sort of violence similar to that of Europe immediately after the start 
of the modernization process, like Nazism, Fascism, and Stalinism.”204 Partly, this 
preventive power originates from what Khaldun Al-Naqib calls “organizing principle” 
that defines the general framework for membership to the group according to a particular 
organizational hierarchy.
205
 Al-Naqib prefers to use the term “political tribalism” as an 
analytical concept rather than tribalism in its ethnographic sense. Political tribalism, he 
holds, characterizes better the dynamics of Arab politics. Modern structures such as 
political parties can be formed along tribal or sectarian lines like what happens in 
Lebanon. Similarly, tribal leadership can be officially recognized and given political 
representation, as is the case in Yemen where democratically elected politicians obtain 
their legitimacy primarily from the tribal order.
206
 Interestingly, in Yemen the tribal 
system has been more active and more able to generate wider political participation than 
the party system in all three consecutive parliamentary elections (1993, 1997, 2003). 
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More than half the seats of the 1997 parliament went to tribal leaders and their allies 
according to Samir Abdali.
207
 
 
As for the religious factor, the situation is no less intricate. Islam has certainly been 
crucial in shaping the culture of all Muslim societies, but how to explain why a number 
of countries sharing the same religion moved to democracy while others have not? Islam 
has always been open to different readings and interpretations, and there is no single or 
official interpretation on many issues, nor even a consensus on who speaks for Islam, to 
borrow John Esposito’s title. With no clear text in the Quran, and no central religious 
authority, observes Esposito, the legal opinions (fatwas) that experts (muftis) give “can 
differ substantially depending on how conservative or reform-minded and how politicized 
or apolitical they are as individuals.”208 
 
On the hand, this character of Islam poses a serious difficulty to the democratic ideal, as 
the influence of religion depends to a very considerable extent on how and by whom it is 
interpreted. But, on the other hand, it sits comfortably with democratic principles such as 
pluralism, diversity and the accommodation of different opinions. In this regard, Muslim 
participate in what Esposito calls “a fee market of religious thought”, a perception that 
Azmi Beshra shares and puts in the current debate over Arab democratization.   
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Beshara makes a significant distinction between Islamic and Arab Culture. He argues that 
"serious empirical investigation confirms that there is no Islamic exceptionalism with 
regard to democratization, but there is an Arab exceptionalism."
209
 This distinction 
between Islam and Arabism answers in part why a number of non-Arab Muslim countries 
democratized or are in the process of democratization (Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia), 
while Arab countries still lag behind. According to Beshara’s analysis, the Arab 
democratic exceptionalism can only be explained by what he calls "the Arab Question". 
Three elements constitute the “Arab Question” and mutually contribute to the 
impediment of democratic change: the rentier economic system, the weakness of 
democratic culture, and the tribal structure of society. None of these components is of 
particular significance, or is specific to the Arab world, if taken separately. It is their 
combination that gives the Arab political culture its specificity and explains the absence 
of democracy in the Arab world.
210
 By placing the problématique of Arab 
democratization in its social, economic and cultural context, Beshara's analysis 
contributes significantly to our understanding of the real challenges facing democratic 
change in the Arab world. Nevertheless limiting these challenges to the internal factors 
and neglecting or ignoring the role of the international dimension, especially in an 
increasingly globalized world, is a serious shortfall. The following section of this chapter 
highlights the role of external powers in helping or hindering transition to democracy in 
the Arab world.     
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4. Bringing the international factor back-in 
 
"The spirit of democracy cannot be imposed from without. It has to come from within." 
Mahatma Gandhi 
 
On September 29, 1991 the democratically elected President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, was overthrown in a violent military coup that brought General Raoul Cédras to 
power. On October 2, the Organization of the American States (OAS) unanimously 
recommended that its member states “take action to bring about the diplomatic isolation 
of those who hold power illegally in Haiti” and impose economic sanctions through the 
suspension of their economic, financial and commercial ties with the new regime until 
"full restoration of the rule of law and of constitutional order and the immediate 
reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the exercise of his legitimate 
authority" is achieved.
211
 A week later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, 
unanimously without vote, a resolution demanding the return of Aristide to office and full 
application of the Haitian constitution.
212
 The military regime remained in power until 
September 1994 when the pressures of the international community increased and the 
Generals were forced to step down. The UN Security Council resolution 940 authorizing 
member states “to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the 
military leadership” and “the prompt return of the legitimately elected President”,213 
paved the way for the US forces to lead an invasion of Haiti under what was known as 
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“Operation Uphold Democracy”214. The reaction of the international community, 
represented here by the United Nations and the Organization of the American States, to 
the overthrow of the democratically elected Haitian President highlights the crucial role 
the external factor could play in supporting and maintaining democracy. In the Arab 
world however, the role of the external factor looks quite different. The following 
example shows how the reaction of the international community, to a similar coup d'état, 
failed one of the potential democratic transitions in the Arab world. 
 
On January 11, 1992, not long after the Haitian coup, the Algerian army staged a similar 
coup d'état, overthrowing President Chadli Bendjedid and canceling the runoff elections, 
which was supposed to take place one month later. In the first round, the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) had already secured more than 47% of the total vote, and seemed 
virtually certain to obtain an absolute majority in the second round. Ironically, instead of 
negotiating a peaceful and legitimate accession to power, the leadership of the winning 
party and thousands of their supporters found themselves locked up in jails and the 
country plunged into a ten-year period of brutality and violence.   
 
Although there are no significant differences between the Haitian and the Algerian coups, 
as both violent acts came to depose a democratically elected government or subvert an 
ongoing democratic process, the international reaction was unmistakably different. 
Describing the Western positions regarding the Algerian coup, Peter Rodman remarks, 
"in the case of Algeria, they are in a state of total intellectual confusion about what 
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democracy really means and how to ensure it."
215
 This confusion is manifest in the 
speech of Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian at Meridian House International 
on June 2, 1992 when he reaffirmed the United States unequivocal support for "those 
who seek to broaden political participation in the Middle East."
216
 But, when political 
participation was likely to bring to power an Islamist party like in the case of Algeria, the 
tone changes and the policy on the ground moves to the opposite: "we do not support one 
person, one vote, one time."
217
   
 
Reflecting back on the same policy, Secretary of State James Baker explains in a critical 
tone, "When I was at the Department [of State], we pursued a policy of excluding the 
radical fundamentalists in Algeria, even as we recognized that this was somewhat at odds 
with our support of democracy."
218
 This was also at adds with the US policy on dealing 
with what he calls "Islamic fundamentalism". Saudi Arabia for instance, "is an Islamic 
fundamentalist state, but it is a friend of the United States and very important to the 
United States."
219
 
 
Such a confusion is not confined to politicians or policy makers, it is also to be found in 
scholarly literature such as that of Laurence Whitehead who finds it difficult to establish 
with confidence “whether Algeria’s thwarted process of democratization was that alone, 
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or also and equally an aborted process or Islamicization.”220 More explicitly, Samuel 
Huntington blames the West for easily assuming that democratically elected governments 
are generally cooperative and pro-Western. This assumption, he says, "need not hold true 
in non-Western societies where electoral competition can bring anti-Western nationalists 
and fundamentalists to power."
221
 This explains in part why "the West was relieved when 
the Algerian military intervened in 1992 and cancelled the election which the 
fundamentalist FIS clearly was going to win."
222
 
 
By drawing parallels between these two military coups and comparing the role of the 
external factors in supporting or impeding the democratic processes in Haiti and Algeria I 
do not mean to over-emphasize the international dimension of democracy. There is 
definitely a broad range of internal political factors without which no political change can 
be achieved, no matter how significant the external ones might be. The case of Algeria 
though, remains a good example typifying what many Arabs describe as Western 
hypocrisy, and discredits, to a large extent, the efforts of promoting democracy in the 
region. 
 
Democracy promotion initiatives have been around in the Arab world for more than two 
decades. They generally take the form of aid programmes aiming to promote small-scale 
projects such as good governance, accountability, efficiency of legislatures, strengthening 
civil society organizations, and the rule of law. In addition to the above mentioned crisis 
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of credibility, much of these initiatives are “quite technical, rather than political, in 
nature” as correctly remarked Nathan Brown and Amy Hawthorne.223 They do not 
address the real issues as they are generally introduced and executed with prior 
governmental approval which strips them from any substantial role. Furthermore, instead 
of contextualizing democracy promotion programmes and strategies to meet the 
requirements of the region and address the specific needs of each country, most initiatives 
tend to implement ready-made templates that have been used in different contexts, 
notably in democratizing countries like in Eastern/Central Europe and Latin America. 
Such templates may have been useful in pushing forward democratization processes in 
those regions, but they certainly needed other supporting mechanisms to operate 
properly. Laurence Whitehead suggests three mechanisms to analyze the role and effect 
of the international factor: Contagion, control, and consent.
224
 None of these mechanisms 
seem to work in the Arab setting. Although, as Larbi Sadiki remarks, contagion as a 
trend-setting process is not unknown to the Arab Middle East
225
, it is hard to think of any 
contagion effect either from without or from within the region due to "the absence of 
indigenous democratic models.
226
 Ironically, the consent factor works perfectly well as an 
explanatory variable in the Arab world, but in the opposite direction. Instead of 
contributing to the democratization of the region, the consent factor plays a crucial role in 
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supporting and consolidating the current authoritarian systems. While in other contexts, 
the international dimension contributed to generate domestic consent favorable to 
democratic change, the policies of Western powers towards the Arab world prioritized 
"cozy relationships with authoritarian regimes"
227
 which can only generate the type of 
consent that favors the maintenance of the non-democratic status-quo. This approach, 
however has been subject to mounting criticism from both within and without policy 
making circles, especially since after September 11, 2001. In 2003, Richard Haass, then 
director of policy planning staff at the State Department, suggested a re-orientation of the 
US policy towards the Muslim world in term of democracy promotion. Admitting that, 
"at various times, the United States has avoided scrutinizing the internal workings of 
countries in the interests of ensuring a steady flow of oil; containing Soviet, Iraqi, and 
Iranian expansionism", Hass stresses that the US "failed to help foster gradual paths to 
democratization in numerous important U.S. relationships—yielding to what might be 
called a “democratic exception” in parts of the Muslim world." He then concludes, 
"continuing to make this exception is not in U.S. interests."
228
  
 
While the US administration is still searching for ways to make its democracy promotion 
initiatives deliver, it seems that what Sadiki calls "declaratory policy", in his critique of 
the Greater Middle East Initiative, is still the rule.    
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Chapter 4: 
Beyond the systemic approach  
Al Jazeera reshapes the media - politics relationship  
A free press can of course be good or bad, but, most certainly, without freedom it will 
never be anything but bad 
Albert Camus 
The study of political communication has been dominated by the systemic approach 
since the publication of "Four Theories of the Press" in 1956. In their comparative 
analysis of the relationship between politics and communication in various political 
settings Siebert, Peterson and Schramm came up with four distinct theories; each 
corresponding with a particular system of political organization. Four Theories of the 
Press set out the ground for a number of subsequent studies, adopting the same 
approach linking systemically between media and politics. Along these lines we find 
the works of Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), Jeffery Alexander (1981), Luhmann 
(1977, 2000), Hallin and Mancini (2004), some of which will be analysed in the 
course of first section of this chapter. 
Theoretically, systemization is an act or process which reflects a tendency to explain 
differences and put things in order according to a predefined system or rationale. The 
basic assumption of the systemic approach is that there are always some forms of 
organizing political principles according to which all kinds of media operate and can 
be understood. In the last analysis, the differences between media systems can be 
reduced to two broad social and political systems:  liberal and authoritarian. 
129 
 
This chapter outlines the main arguments of the systemic approach and explores other 
approaches to the relationship between media and politics, especially in the context of 
an increasingly globalised world and the pervasive presence of new information and 
communication technologies. These local and global developments resulted in 
significant transformations that affected both the media and the political systems and 
shifted the debate away from the traditional paradigm. The Al Jazeera phenomenon, 
as Mohamed Zayani puts it,
1
 will be looked at from this new perspective and treated 
as a non-systemic media. 
1. Defining and contextualizing the systemic approach 
In an attempt to explain why the media takes different forms and serves different 
purposes in different countries, the authors of Four Theories of the Press developed 
an explanatory framework with a set of arguments to support their fundamental thesis 
that the media "always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political 
structures within which it operates.
2
 The traditional divide between the liberal West 
and the authoritarian East during the Cold War is clearly manifest in this founding 
work. This can be seen at the philosophical level, at the socio-political level, and at 
the media level.  
Philosophically, the two systems line up almost completely contradictory throughout 
history. While the libertarian doctrine is grounded in centuries of enlightened political 
thought of the likes of Milton, Locke and Mill, the roots of the authoritarian tradition 
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goes back as far as Plato and Machiavelli, to culminate in the nineteenth century with 
Marxist materialist determinism.
3
  
Politically, the contrast between the two systems is more apparent. The libertarian 
political system's ultimate goal is to provide the individual with a milieu in which he 
can realize his own potentialities, or change it in case of failure. For, the government 
is simply the trustee to which the people delegate authority and from which they could 
withdraw it.
4
 Authoritarianism on the other hand, is regarded as a system of absolute 
submission; the mass must submit to the dictatorship of the party, so the party must 
submit to the dictatorship of its central bureaucracy and leaders. In such a setting, no 
competing power structures or substantial ideological differences are allowed.
5
  
Based on this philosophical and political divide, the media systems in both 
environments differ significantly. The media in the libertarian system is an essential 
source of information and guidance. It should be independent and free from state 
control or domination to function properly and check on government. In the 
authoritarian system, the media is used as instruments of social and political control. 
It is either owned by the state, or tightly controlled and censored by its various 
agencies to turn it into mere propaganda. 
It is within this broad context (East/West divide) that the systemic approach has 
developed its analytical framework of the relationship between media politics. The 
following four comparative studies tried, in slightly different ways, to systemize this 
relationship. 
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In Four Theories of the Press, Fred, S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur 
Schramm present us with four media systems; each of them corresponds with, and fits 
into a distinct political system. First, there is the authoritarian media system which has 
been omnipresent both historically and geographically. For almost two centuries after 
the spread of the printing press, the authoritarian system has been furnishing the basis 
for media conceptions and practices in many modern societies, even where 
governments theoretically embrace libertarian principles. As defined by Siebert, the 
authoritarian theory of the media "is a theory under which the press, as an institution, 
is controlled in its functions and operation by organized society through another 
institution, the governments."
6
 Theories of authoritarian political systems within 
which this type of media operates started, according to Siebert, as early as Plato who 
advocates rigorous control of opinion and discussion. In the Republic, he states: "we 
shall send him away to another city", he who does not obey the rigid rules prescribed 
for the artist and philosopher and the poet.
7
 Subsequent political philosophers who 
accepted and supported explicitly or implicitly, authoritarian principles include 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel, and even Rousseau and Carlyle. 
The most obvious representation of authoritarianism in the form of political systems 
in modern Europe was undoubtedly Fascism and Nazism. Both systems exemplify the 
idea of the "corporate state" which was based on a theory of interventionism in both 
economic and cultural affairs. The supremacy of the state over the economic and 
social groups within the nation requires that the functions of these groups fit, directly 
or indirectly into the policies of the state as perceived and defined by the government 
in power. The result says Siebert "was a system for organizing society under which 
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the mass media were assigned a specific role and were subjected to controls in order 
not to interfere with the achievements of ultimate ends through the state."
8
 In 
authoritarian political systems, the state exerts complete monopoly over the status and 
function of various types of mass media. The operation and programming of radio and 
television rest with government agencies whose responsibility is to ensure that the 
government objectives and policies are implemented.     
The second media system that stands almost in contrast with the authoritarian one is 
the libertarian system. Liberalism, as a philosophy and socio-political system is the 
intellectual and organizational framework within which the various institutions 
including that of mass media operate. According to the libertarian principles, the 
underlying purpose of the media is to help discover the truth and assist in the process 
of exposing social and political problems. To carry out its function properly, the 
media should present such problems along with a variety of evidences and opinions as 
the basis for informed decisions. The basic characteristic of the media in a libertarian 
system is therefore, to operate freely from the shackles of governmental controls or 
domination. Unlike in the authoritarian setting, the government and its officials in the 
libertarian system should not have the advantage of exclusive access to the public 
through the use of mass media. They should not, as well, interfere with the 
presentation of arguments from political parties or social groups, as governments 
often become a party involved in public disputes. Assuming that, out of a multiplicity 
of voices carried by various media outlets, certain information would be false and 
certain voices would be unwelcome. Nevertheless, the state has no right to censor or 
restrict what it deems unacceptable. The general public is the only body entrusted to 
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"digest the whole, to discard that not in the public interest and to accept that which 
served the needs of the individual and the society of which he is a part."
9
 Such 
conception of the status and function of the media in the libertarian framework 
enables them to check on government and keep it from overstepping its bounds. Each 
institution acknowledges the limits of its own power and uses it within the designated 
areas. 
The third media system is based on the social responsibility theory; it is a 
development and modification of the libertarian system. The basic principle 
characterizing the social responsibility theory is that freedom always carries with it 
concomitant obligations. The privileged position enjoyed by media operating in 
contemporary free societies requires them to be "responsible to society for carrying 
out certain essential functions of mass communication."
10
 This responsibility should 
be recognized by media organizations and put to practice as their basis of operational 
policies. Generally, the social responsibility theory of the media adopts the libertarian 
principles but modifies them to avoid some of the criticism directed at the way these 
principles were implemented. For instance, it recognizes the role of the press in 
servicing the existing political and economic system, but rejects the idea that such a 
role would take precedence over other tasks such as maintaining and promoting 
democracy, or telling the truth and enlightening the public. 
The fourth and final system in this approach is the Soviet communist mass 
communication theory. Similar to the relationship between the social responsibility 
and the libertarian systems, the Soviet theory is a development and modification of 
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the authoritarian doctrine. It has grown out of the Marxist ideology and then 
developed on the ground under Lenin and Stalin. The combination of Marxist outlook 
of dialectic social change and materialistic determinism on the one hand, and the 
practical experience of Leninism and Stalinism on the other hand, produced a unique 
socio-political system perceived by the West as "one of the most complete 
dictatorships in modern history."
11
 
Mass media under such a closely controlled system are used instrumentally. They are 
integrated in the functioning of the state machinery along with other instruments of 
state power and party influence. Their role is limited to preserving and sustaining 
unity within the state and the party. They have to follow clear and straightforward 
guidance from the political leadership and operate under strict control. As such, they 
are almost used as instruments of pure propaganda. This type of media and its 
relationship to the political system was not confined to the Soviet Union; it extended 
during the Cold War to most communist countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. 
The systemic approach to the relationship between media and politics is also 
illustrated by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini in their comparative study: 
Comparing Media Systems. Unlike Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, Hallin and 
Mancini propose a framework for three models of the relationship between media and 
political systems: The Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model, the North/Central 
European or democratic corporatist model, and the North Atlantic or liberal model. 
Each of these three models developed within a particular political context. 
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The Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model is marked by a number of 
characteristics among which are: elite-oriented with relatively limited circulation; 
strong focus on internal political life vs. external pluralism; instrumentalization by the 
government, political groups, as well as industrialists with political interests; 
relatively weak professional journalistic practice; the state largely owns, regulates and 
funds this type of media which exists in large part in Southern European countries.
12
 
The North/Central European or democratic corporatist model is characterized by an 
early development of press freedom along with wide circulation of newspapers 
including those owned and run by political parties. This model is known for its high 
journalistic professionalism and solid organizational structures. Both commercial 
media industries and politically oriented press coexisted in the democratic corporatist 
model. 
Similar to the democratic corporatist model, the North Atlantic or liberal model has 
also developed early press freedom as well as mass circulation. But the commercially 
driven press dominated over the political oriented media. Although the liberal model 
enjoys a high degree of journalistic professionalism, it lacks the type of formal 
organization widely known in the democratic model. In the United States in 
particular, the role of state in owning and running media organizations is limited. 
The main differences between these three models can be summarized as follows: "In 
the Liberal countries the media are closer to the world of business, and further from 
the world of politics. In the Polarized Pluralist system they are relatively strongly 
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integrated into the political world, while in Democratic Corporatist countries the 
media have held strong connections to both the political and economic worlds."
13
  
The third framework for a systemic relationship between media and politics is 
proposed by Niklas Luhmann who draws on the functionalist approach to distinguish 
between three forms of social organization or differentiation. The first mode of social 
organization is segmentation in which society is divided into equal subsystems. 
Equality here refers to the principles of self-selective system-building. The second 
mode of social organization is stratification, in which society is divided into unequal 
subsystems. Equality here becomes a norm for internal communication and inequality 
becomes a norm for communication with the outside environment.
14
 The last form of 
social organization is the functional differentiation, which is regarded as the latest 
outcome of social, economic and cultural evolution.
15
 In such societies new forms of 
system autonomy is attained. Analysing the system of the mass media therefore is 
similar to analysing the economic system, the legal system or the political system. 
The relations between the media system and the political system is set in a way that 
media operates with "attention rules" while politics operates with "decision rules" in 
which The media develop communication themes, discuss them publicly and bring 
them to the attention of the political system which is responsible for making 
decisions. The media select their discussion topics and communication themes 
autonomously and function independently from the pressure of political institutions.
16
 
2. Rethinking the systemic approach 
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As an explanatory tool, the systemic approach remains largely valid, and provides a 
useful framework for understanding the relationship between media and politics in 
many parts of the world. However, the transformations we have seen in both the 
media and politics spheres raise a number of concerns as of the universal applicability 
of systematization.       
In general terms, systemization is a practice of superimposing predesigned theoretical 
frames and structures onto a more complex social reality. Attempts to 
compartmentalize human behaviour can sometimes obscure the reality and produce 
inaccurate results. Adopting such an outlook, especially to explain changing 
phenomena like media or politics or more importantly, their mutual relationship, may 
lead us into the dangers of conditioning our interpretation and hinder our efforts to 
arrive at authentic and genuine reconstruction of facts and processes. 
The second issue facing the systemic approach when applied to media and politics is 
its capability to explain and account for social and political change. If the media are 
systematically and sometimes organically linked to the political system within which 
they operate, it would be hard to conceive of real or potential change they might 
foster. Authoritarian media form an integral part of their corresponding political 
system, which they strive to maintain and uphold. Similarly, the libertarian media 
function along the lines of liberalism and endeavour to preserve its principles and 
socio-political setting. Attempts by the media to challenge the existing system from 
within are usually aimed at maximizing its functionality and enhancing its 
performance.       
The third and most significant challenge facing the systemic approach is globalization 
and its processes that deeply affected both politics and the media and reshaped the 
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relationship between them. It is true that the impact of globalization has been different 
in different areas and varied from one country to another, but no single country seems 
to have escaped this sweeping phenomenon. The question is no longer whether the 
globalization effect is real, but to what extent it has changed the course of domestic 
and international politics. Without going into details about the different interpretations 
of globalization and the various arguments regarding the nature and scope of its 
consequences, it may be useful at this point to just think how political authority and 
mechanisms of governance are being articulated and rearticulated.
17
 The idea of 
national security remains essential in defining the modern statehood, but other key 
components of the state, such as the traditional concept of sovereignty, have 
undergone profound changes. Sovereignty, defined by Krasner as "an institutional 
arrangement associated with a particular bundle of characteristics – recognition, 
territory, exclusive authority and effective internal and trans-border regulation or 
control"
18
, has been affected in many respects and the ability of states to regulate and 
exercise effective control over the flow of people, goods, capital and information is 
clearly reduced. It is an on-going process where the different components of state 
sovereignty as described above by Krasner are increasingly being relocated onto 
supranational, nongovernmental, or private institutions. Associated with this process 
is the strengthening of alternative actors in international relations and politics.
19
 
One aspect of this increasingly globalized world is the blurring of boundaries between 
domestic matters and global affairs in a way that "the impact of distant events is 
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magnified while even the most local developments may come to have enormous 
global consequences."
20
 In this context, connections across frontiers are no longer 
random or occasional; they have become an integral part of an intensifying process of 
global interaction which transcends in many ways the conventional geographical state 
borders. In such an environment, the status, function and role of the media, like those 
of other social and political institutions, have to be seen in different light. The 
traditional framework that links the media in a systemic way to the political system 
may not grasp the significance of these global changes, especially when combined 
with the unprecedented surge of information and communication technologies. This is 
not to say, however, that the relations between media and politics have completely 
changed and that the nation-state is no longer capable of controlling communications 
policy. Admittedly, state control of the media has in many ways weakened, but 
national governments still exercise some forms of authority, including licensing the 
right to broadcast within their territory, defining the frameworks of media law that 
regulates content, and subsidizing the media organizations which they deem worthy of 
governmental support. But, on the ground, the sweeping effects of media 
globalization outweigh these practices.         
Historically, it could be argued that the first trends of media globalization occurred in 
the first half of the twentieth century, with the rise of American film industry and the 
global expansion of American music through records and radio. But, the subsequent 
period, as James Curran notes, witnessed a dramatic shift back towards the 
restabilization of national media systems after television's defeat of cinema. Most 
popular television, radio and press media in Western European countries originate 
                                                           
20 Held, David. Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture (Polity Press, 2000), p. 15 
141 
 
most of their content and are owned by national rather than global organizations.
21
 
But, for a number of reasons, the role played by public service television has been 
reduced significantly. Elihu Katz's following statement summarizes some of the key 
reasons: "The governments of Europe – once proud of their public broadcasting 
systems – are bowing to the combined constraints of the new media technology, the 
new liberal mood, the economic and political burden of public broadcasting, and the 
seductions of multinational corporations."
22
 
These developments plunged the public service media into a deep crisis causing them 
to suffer a major drawback at various levels, "from a loss of legitimacy, underfunding, 
declining audiences, and a less clear sense of purpose."
23
 Contrary to this declining 
trend, there was the rising trend of commercial and community media which, through 
satellite broadcasting and the use of other new information and communication 
technologies, witnessed an unparalleled growth, mostly at the expense of national 
broadcasters. Not only has the shrinking of the presence and influence of public 
service media affected their own status and function, but has also altered the way they 
relate to the political system within which they operate. State control, whether direct 
or indirect becomes obsolete and irrelevant if audiences are increasingly migrating to 
new media such as transnational satellite television and the internet. As John Street 
observes, the emergence of transnational conglomerates, empires built upon the 
exploitation of new technology, appears to create power bases which exist above the 
realm of any one nation state.
24
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The marginalization of state power and the weakening of its control over the media 
resulted in the emergence of new forms of political communities, whose presence and 
activities are no more confined within the traditional boundaries of nation states. With 
the help of new and transnational media, "imagined communities", to borrow 
Benedict Anderson's term, mushroomed across the world. Different communities 
created along different lines: political, religious, linguistic, sectarian, etc. All these 
formations use the media in a way that undermines and sometimes contradicts the 
principles upon which conventional national identity has been built. If the novel and 
the newspaper, as Anderson suggests, once "provided the technical means for 're-
presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation"
25
, satellite television 
and the internet today provide the technical means and platform for creating 
supranational and sub-national imagined communities.  
This way, the role of the media, or at least some of them, has fundamentally changed, 
and the logic behind the systemic approach to the relationship between politics and 
the media no longer holds together. The rise of new political communities like the 
virtual Ummah (nation) with its global membership, its common and unifying issues 
and its transnational media networks presents the systemic approach with a range of 
challenges which it has never faced before. The virtual Ummah as Olivier Roy 
observes, "no longer has anything to do with a territorial entity. It has to be thought of 
in abstract or imaginary terms."
26
 Roy's argument is supported by the realities of new 
media and the unprecedented level of access to these media, particularly satellite 
television and the Internet. While satellite television is by nature trans-territorial, the 
internet, as Philip Seib notes, may be considered as "supra-territorial because national 
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boundaries within and among states are not merely inconsequential, they need not, in 
the cyber-world, be acknowledged at all."
27
 In this emerging new media environment 
it has become hard to uphold the old explanations of how the media relate to politics. 
Regulating media operations and controlling its content is now beyond the capabilities 
of single nation states. These are challenges which regional groupings and 
international bodies are struggling to face up, not only at the legal and organizational 
level, but also at the conceptual level. Among the media organizations that are hard to 
understand within the traditional approach of the relationship between media systems 
and political systems is Al Jazeera. The following section tries to highlight the 
characteristics of this organisation and explain how this new media paradigm cannot 
fit into the framework provided by the systemic approach. 
3. Beyond the systemic approach: Al Jazeera, a non-systemic phenomenon 
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the 
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, 
(…) If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error 
for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.  
(John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (52:16). 
Since the launch of Al Jazeera in November 1996, questions about its relationship to 
the political system within which it operates has never come to an end. Mostly, these 
questions reflect a perplexity concerning the establishment and running of an 
independent and free media in a political setting that has never been regarded as free 
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or liberal. Some have gone as far as to cast doubts over Qatar's ownership of the 
channel, suggesting that it was "created by the American administration to contain the 
hostility of people in the Middle East against American hegemony and to legitimize 
the setting of  American troops in the Gulf."
28
 We had to wait until February 2004 to 
see the American answer to this sort of questions when the Bush administration 
launched its government-funded Al-Hurra (the free one) to "cut through the barriers 
of hateful propaganda" by Arabic television stations, according to President George 
W. Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address.
29
   
Qatar, where Al Jazeera is based, is part of an Arab world, which by all standards 
hosts the most conservative and authoritarian regimes of our era. While the world is 
massively embracing democratic principles and moving towards more open and 
pluralist political systems, the Arab regimes do not seem to be going anywhere. It has 
become typical to ask with Daniel Brumberg: Where does the Arab world stand vis-à-
vis such a global trend of democratization? "Clearly outside it", comes his 
straightforward and unambiguous answer.
30
 Whether living under so-called 
progressive republican regimes or conservative family systems, Arab societies at large 
suffer what Salwa Ismail called "non-representativeness" and "non-accountability" 
authoritarian style of rule, and repressive practices are key characteristics of Arab 
governments that indicate their undemocratic nature.
31
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Besides, Qatar also belongs to the Gulf region, known for its high levels of economic 
resources which, to some scholars, represent an additional obstacle to democracy and 
liberalism. As major oil producers, the Gulf countries developed what has come to be 
known as the "rentier" economy. It is a political economic model where "state 
decision-makers are much less constrained by the interests of domestic actors"
32
 
because state revenues are almost completely dependent on the international market. 
Under this sort of regimes, political values such as freedom and liberties are not given 
a position of supremacy in society. The absence of institutions supporting and 
representing these values is a scarcity, if they exited at all. Elections and power 
sharing modalities are uncommon practices due to the availability of substantial 
financial resources that support the coercive apparatus of the rentier state. Such 
availability also sustains large government programmes of social welfare and "fuels 
powerful neo-patrimonial networks based on family, tribe, and proximity to the ruling 
elite."
33
  
From a systemic perspective, this setting is only suitable for authoritarian media 
systems as we have seen in the first section of this chapter. Admittedly, if we consider 
the Arab media scene where censorship and restrictive policies are largely the norm in 
almost every single country, the systemic approach still applies. But if we look at the 
case of Al Jazeera and a number of other emerging media outlets in the region, the 
need of an alternative theoretical perspective becomes unavoidable. 
The starting point of this alternative perspective is to shift the focus from the nature 
and character of political system to the geopolitics engulfing the system itself. This 
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shift requires first and foremost considering the domestic, regional and international 
context of the politics of country where the media organization in question is based. 
Without contextualizing that, it would be difficult to understand the so called 
"ambiguous" relationship between the Qatari political system and Al Jazeera, as it 
developed on the ground rather than through a superimposed predesigned theoretical 
lens. 
On the domestic level, the year 1995 brought to power in Qatar a new ruling Emir 
known for his liberal ideas. Among the first decisions aimed at restructuring the 
government was the abolition of the Ministry of Information. These measures towards 
liberating the media from the tutelage of the government and promoting non-censored 
media in the region were taken a few months before the launch of Al Jazeera. The 
launch of an all-news satellite television in those circumstances did not go 
unquestioned. While ordinary Arabs and intellectuals received Al Jazeera as "a gift" 
since it provided them with access to uncensored news broadcast in Arabic, by Arabs, 
and for Arabs
34
, the governments in most Arab countries reacted with visible hostility 
towards the network as well as the government of Qatar. This brings us to the second 
element of this analysis, the regional context. 
To understand inter-Arab relations, scholars employed a number of analytical tools 
most of which present Arab states lining up in two opposed camps. Malcolm H. Kerr 
summarized a decade of inter-Arab relations in his book: The Arab Cold War where 
he analysed the conflicting ideologies and political orientations of Nasser and his 
rivals during the sixties of the twentieth century. The two camps have also been 
portrayed in terms of oil-rich vs. oil-poor countries, progressive vs. conservative 
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regimes, core states vs. marginal states etc. Qatar's regional politics could well fit in 
the last analytical framework. 
Considering its size, whether in geography or in demography, Qatar is by all means a 
tiny state. Bordering the much larger Saudi Arabia to the south and surrounded by the 
turbulent Persian/Arabian Gulf from the west, the north and the east, this oil and gas-
rich peninsula of 11,437 sq. km and a population of less than 1.5 million, has gone 
through a number of regional disputes in its short history since independence in 1971. 
Border disputes involved both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but what is more significant 
for such a small and powerless state in terms of geopolitics is its proximity to another 
emerging, but extremely controversial regional power, which is Iran. This explains in 
part, why Qatar has resorted to the power of United States whose Central Command 
has been stationed near Doha for more than a decade. Whether the consolidation of 
the American military presence in the region is seen by neighbouring countries as a 
stabilizing or destabilizing factor, this remains unclear. 
Al Jazeera emerged in this problematic and uncertain geopolitical context, and 
understating its mission, vision and role has to take these considerations into account. 
Adding to its media scene another state-run and controlled television would have not 
benefitted Qatar in any way. Its national broadcaster, Qatar TV, like in any other Arab 
country, plays the role that any public service television would play in embellishing 
the official discourse/propaganda and channelling it through to its domestic 
audiences. To be able to transcend this type of media and play an effective regional 
and global role, Al Jazeera has to be treated in a completely different way. Like 
everywhere else in the world, the success of media organizations is largely due to the 
margin of freedom they enjoy. Obviously, freedom is not the only condition for 
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success, as many other factors are also required among which is the financial support. 
But, without free operation in news gathering, processing and dissemination hardly 
any success could be achieved. 
Understandably, the Qatari officials were well aware of this reality when they 
ventured to launch a 24 hour news operation from the heart of a long standing 
authoritarian political setting. The editorial autonomy of the media narrative and its 
relative independence vis-à-vis what is considered the official truth, as El Oifi 
correctly observes, are enhanced by the pre-eminence of the non-official reading of 
news against which the truthfulness of the official version of news is measured. The 
first noticeable success Al Jazeera has achieved in this regard, since its early days, 
was that "Arab governments lost the power to impose on their subjects a particular 
reading of events or explanations concerning internal matters and foreign policies."
35
 
This significant development regarding the demise of the official truth resulted from 
an explicit targeted strategy that Al Jazeera followed from day one, which is 
addressing directly the Arab people and stirring them up against their own 
governments. In doing so, the nascent channel started forming its own constituency 
across the Arab world, providing it with unfettered news broadcast and engaging its 
members in a continuous open and live debate over issues considered by national 
service television as taboos. Arab intellectuals too, see that Al Jazeera along with 
other emerging satellite television stations "have done probably for the Arab world 
more than any organized critical movement could have done, in opening up the public 
space, in giving Arab citizens a newly found opportunity to assert themselves."
36
 
Similar remarks came from Fahmy Howeidy who wrote in 2006, "Before the 
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emergence of Al Jazeera, I only watched entertainment programmes or football 
matches on Arab TV channels (...) I  researched important events or ideas through 
chasing news bulletins, reports and discussion programmes broadcast on Western 
television channels, particularly British and American ones. I never thought that I 
would find 'food' of that nature on any Arab channel."
37
 
Such resounding success did not seem to be expected even from the Qatari officials 
when they decided to launch Al Jazeera. In his address on the occasion of the 
channel's 10
th
 anniversary, Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al-Thani, chairman of the 
board acknowledged that, "at the beginning, no one expected Al Jazeera to go as far 
as this, and achieve this level of success which exceeded our own expectations."
38
 
That was probably the reason why Qatar resisted the enormous pressures that came 
from the Arab states as well as some Western powers to shut down the station. This 
explains in part, how success could sometimes become a defining element in making 
or consolidating political decisions.  
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Chapter 5: 
The Arab public sphere in the context of the current debate 
 
The privation of privacy lies in the absence of others; as far as they are concerned, 
private man does not appear, and therefore it is as though he did not exist. Whatever 
he does remains without significance and consequence to others, and what matters to 
him is without interest to other people. 
Hannah Arendt 
The new Arab media landscape and its changing relationship with politics have been 
the subject of an increasing academic interest, especially with regard to the political 
implications on the ground. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the newly 
reshaped media-politics relationship offered unprecedented opportunities for Arab 
societies to democratize. One of the key elements in the process of Arab 
democratization is the emergence of a lively and performing public sphere. This 
chapter lays the theoretical ground for the possibility to speak of a genuine Arab 
public sphere in practical terms. 
In his 'Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' Emmanuel Kant observes 
that "the public use of one's reason must always be free and that, only can bring about 
enlightening among men."
1
An enlightened nation is a nation whose citizens can 
reason publicly and freely to deliver it "from personal despotism and tyrannical 
oppression. "The link, which Kant establishes between the existence of a public space 
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where people come together and discuss matters of general interest, and the rise of a 
participatory democratic polity, is seen as the starting point in the course of 
formulating the concept of the public sphere and its political function."
2
 Although 
Kant tends to limit the sphere of public deliberation to the educated elite (the men of 
letters)
3
, his text continues to inform students of democratization theory and provide 
the concept of public sphere with an historical and philosophical context. 
If the concept of the public sphere originated with Kant, it was Yürgen Habermas who 
brought it to prominence and placed it at the heart of the debate on democratization 
and participatory politics. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
4
, 
first published in 1962, Habermas offers the fullest articulation of the concept of the 
public sphere and traces its historical genesis. Although history shows us that, in 
many instances, human society developed a wide range of categories of publicness, 
the eighteenth-century bourgeois public sphere remains unique in many respects, and 
any attempt of abstraction, generalization or transferability has to be thought of very 
carefully. For, it is strongly tied to and profoundly grounded in the developmental 
history of that particular civil society originating in parts of Europe in the high middle 
ages.
5
 
The enlightenment category of public sphere is different from that of Athens some 
five centuries BC, and is by no means identical to the contemporary forms of 
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publicness, which manifest themselves differently in different societies. Ancient 
Greek made a clear separation between the private and the public realms. While the 
agora, served as an open forum for citizens to gather and discuss publicly and freely 
issues of general interest, the oikos was the private sphere where the master of the 
household had to deal with issues of necessity. As it developed throughout history, 
many aspects of the public sphere have undergone structural transformations. Among 
the core characteristics that remained unchanged though is the separation between the 
private and the public realms. 
1. The bourgeois public sphere: social structures and political functions 
The separation between the private and the public realms and the rise of the bourgeois 
public sphere developed as an integral part the sociopolitical and economic 
transformations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Following is an attempt 
to show how these transformations took place in four distinct but overlapping areas: 
economic, political, social and institutional.  
Economically, the expansion of the capitalist system went hand in hand with the rise 
of print media and had a profound impact on the social and political structures. Long 
distance trade as noted by Habermas meant that traffic in news was almost required as 
immediately as traffic in commodities. For, merchants needed to know prices, demand 
and exact information about distant events in the emerging markets. The great trade 
cities and economic centers became at same time centers for the traffic in news.
6
 Print 
media that carried this news supplied along with it other sorts of information that 
helped create a widespread literacy and contributed to "publicize" information. 
During the mercantilism era, the growing trade relations between those economic 
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centers linked them up and transformed them into national territories. To administer 
these territories, the modern state grew up and developed its own bureaucratic 
institutions as agents of permanent administration, thus creating a new sphere of 
"public" authority. 
At the political level, the rise of the modern state allowed for the emergence of a 
public domain categorically different from that of the middle ages, when the notion of 
publicness itself was an attribute of the ruler as a person. The King represented the 
state and the state existed only to reflect his unlimited and unquestionable authority. 
Publicness in its modern sense existed only once the state apparatus developed into an 
autonomous and impersonal entity and distinguished itself from the personalized 
characteristic of political authority. Alongside this emerging public authority rose a 
genuine domain of private autonomy that "came into existence as the corollary of a 
depersonalized state authority."
7
 It was in the context of this modern political 
environment that became possible for a private sphere of society to take on public 
relevance by selecting sets of issues, discussing them and bringing them forward to 
the public authority as issues of public interest. Gradually, this process produced a 
political environment in which the new public sphere of private individuals played the 
role of a counterbalance vis-à-vis the state and stood opposed to its public authority. 
The public sphere in this sense originated primarily in the private realm including the 
family and is constituted of autonomous individuals whose prime goal is to keep this 
sphere free from the dominance of the state.  
At the social level, it was the Aristocracy of the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century who played a leading role in the formation of the bourgeois public sphere. 
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What made Habermas call it bourgeois is not however, the class composition of its 
members, but because the society itself was bourgeois. Joining in the public debates 
in coffee houses and solons were "noble as well as bourgeois, sons of princes and 
counts associated with sons of watchmakers and shopkeepers."
8
The bourgeois was 
then able to transcend the barriers of social hierarchy and meet with members 
belonging to different social classes. The only common ground that united them was 
"their common quality as human beings and nothing more than human beings", says 
Habermas. As autonomous private people who "come together as a public", the 
members of the bourgeois public sphere unite to engage in rational discussion through 
the public use of their critical judgment. In such a context of "social intercourse" that 
disregarded status altogether, it is the best rational argument and not the identity of 
the speaker that is the sole arbiter of any issue. The rational critical discourse 
produced through these debates focused primarily on "the general rules governing 
relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labor."
9
 In addition, the debate addressed a range of other issues 
which until then had not been questioned. Among those areas of common concern 
was the complete monopoly that church and absolutist state authorities had over 
interpretation" not only from the pulpit, but in philosophy, literature and art."
10
 
Liberating these areas from the shackles of political and religious authorities and their 
imposed interpretations led to an early formation of what Habermas calls "public 
opinion". 
Intrinsic to this enlightened public opinion was the power of the rationality born of the 
better argument that strove to discover what was at once just and right. A power that 
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enabled the rising public opinion to play an increasing role in defining the framework 
for morality and setting up the legal system for the social sphere, at the expense of the 
two traditionally dominating institutions (church and state). Here, Habermas joins 
Locke and Montesquieu who respectively, tied the promulgated public law to "a 
common consent" and "la raison humaine". According to Habermas, public opinion, 
equipped with the political consciousness that developed in the public sphere, 
"articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws"
11
 and ultimately 
became the only legitimate source of these laws. 
At the institutional level, the literary public sphere in England, France and Germany, 
contributed to the political public sphere through the development of organizational 
bases such as parliaments, clubs, literary salons, public assemblies, pubs and coffee 
houses, meeting halls, and other public spaces where socio-political discussion took 
place. Debates were communicated to the wider public through journals, newspapers 
and other kinds of webs of social relationships. By the first decade of the eighteenth 
century, London alone had some 3000 coffee houses "each with a core group of 
regulars"
12
 Open access to the coffee houses made social integration easier and 
facilitated the interaction between the nobility and the bourgeois as well as the wider 
strata of the middle class including craftsmen and shopkeepers. In France, the salons
13
 
played a crucial role in this process of social intercourse by bringing together 
"intellectuals" with the aristocracy who, for different reasons, was excluded from 
leadership in state and church altogether. In Germany, the learned Tischgesellschaften 
(table societies) were less active than the coffee houses and the salons, but played a 
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similar role as institutions of the bourgeois public sphere. They recruited their 
members from "the private people engaged in productive work from the dignitaries of 
the principalities' capitals, with a strong preponderance of middle-class academics.
14
 
By giving equal access to private members from different social classes, the main 
purpose of the German public sphere was to bring about a form of communicative 
equality and association among persons of unequal social status. 
The economic origins, the social structures, the political functions and the institutional 
bases are the key components of Habermas's concept of the bourgeois public sphere. 
Coupled with the communicative dimension, this concept gained more public 
relevance and played a major role in expanding political participation among the 
members of the bourgeois society. 
Although Habermas's philosophical thought took a number of significant twists and 
turns since the publication of Structural Transformation, the concept of the public 
sphere and its importance in fostering genuine participatory politics remains a central 
theme in his later woks, especially Between Facts and Norms where he further 
developed the idea of deliberative democracy.  
2. The public sphere: the rise and decline of democratic politics 
Habermas's focus on democratization goes hand in hand with his emphasis on 
political participation as the core of a democratic society. One of the key functions of 
the bourgeois public sphere is to facilitate rational debate over issues of general 
concern and secure maximum public participation. This in turn sustains the process of 
democratization and promotes the values and practices of democratic politics. The 
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principles of the public sphere as articulated by Habermas in Structural Transformation 
presuppose freedom of speech and assembly, a free press, and the right to openly 
engage in public debate leading to political participation and informed decision-
making. Discursive argumentation through the public use of reason was thus 
employed to determine general interests and pursue the establishment of democratic 
politics. 
With the transition from market capitalism and liberal democracy in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century to the advanced state capitalism and the rise of the welfare 
state liberalism in the twentieth century, the public sphere began to degenerate and 
went through structural transformation from an open space of rational discussion and 
consensus to a realm of mass cultural consumption and manipulation by powerful 
corporations and dominant elites. This socioeconomic and political process led to a 
gradual fusion between the economic and political spheres on the one hand and the 
public and private spheres on the other hand, which consequently resulted in the 
formation of a mass culture industry and the emergence of an administered society. In 
Habermas's term, this process of "re-feudalization" of the public sphere started taking 
place in the late nineteenth century as private (vs. public) interests assumed direct 
political functions, and giant corporations came to control the media and state at once. 
As the bourgeois public sphere declined, so did democracy and political participation. 
Citizens became passive consumers, dedicating themselves more to private interests 
than to issues of common concern. Public opinion in turn, shifted from being the 
product of critical rational debate to a one based on polls designed by media experts 
and advertising agencies, and tailored for the most part to suit particular private 
interests. In the course of this transformation, "publicity loses its critical function in 
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favor of a staged display; even arguments are transmuted into symbols to which again 
one cannot respond by arguing but only by identifying with them."
15
 
The decline of the eighteenth century liberal democracy in Europe and the 
transformation of the bourgeois public sphere that facilitated its emergence were 
caused to some extent by the changing function of the media. As noted by Habermas, 
the role of the media has changed from mediating rational debate to shaping the 
public discourse and defining its themes according to a predesigned agenda validated 
and approved by influential media corporations. 
To revitalize the public sphere that collapsed under the social-welfare state and re-
democratize the political life, Habermas suggests to "set in motion a critical process 
of public communication through the very organizations that mediatize it."
16
 This 
process is required to counter-balance the growing state monopoly over the public 
sphere and redress the waning status of civil society and its institutions. Habermas's 
suggestion that "a critical publicity brought to life within intra-organizational public 
spheres" might revive democracy and drive the process of democratization does not 
seem to be sufficient to some of his critics. As Douglas Kellner observes, "he did not 
provide concrete examples, propose any strategies, or sketch out the features of an 
oppositional or post-bourgeois public sphere.
17
. This is true if we keep our 
understanding of the Habermasian public sphere within the framework of Structural 
Transformation. However, if we consider his later writings we find that Habermas 
provides new philosophical grounds for critical theory as well as democratization theory.  
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Before analyzing the new conception of the public sphere as articulated in his post 
Structural Transformation writings, I shall point to the main arguments of Habermas's 
critics regarding his account of the emergence and disintegration of the bourgeois public 
sphere of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
3. Habermas's conception of the public sphere: a critical assessment 
Habermas's conception of the public sphere has been subjected to intense and 
continuing critical debate that led to major revisions on both sides; Habermas and his 
critics. Not only has this debate pushed the boundaries of discussion beyond the 
theoretical framework set by Habermas, but also stimulated a whole corpus of related 
studies and paved the way for more research agendas to develop and enrich our 
understanding of this intricate concept. Critics from various backgrounds and different 
academic fields raised a number of theoretical as well as practical issues surrounding 
Habermas's account and suggested alternative approaches to the analysis of the public 
sphere and its relationship to democratization theory. The following section outlines the 
main arguments characterizing this debate, with particular emphasis on the ones that 
are more relevant to my research topic: 1. The need for a more pluralistic and open 
approach to conceptualizing the public sphere; 2. the role of social movements in 
developing alternative public discourses and spheres; 3. the role of the media in 
facilitating the emergence of the public sphere. 
1. The first among these critical arguments concerns Habermas's failure to distinguish 
clearly enough between the ideal-type and the actuality of the liberal bourgeois public 
sphere. His idealization of the liberal type of the bourgeois public sphere made him 
fail to examine other non-liberal and non-bourgeois public spheres. Or, to borrow 
Nancy Frazer's term, it is precisely because he fails to examine these other public 
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spheres that he ends up idealizing the liberal public sphere.
18
 The importance of this 
critical argument of Habermas's conceptualization of the ideal type public sphere lies 
in fact that it breaks with the idea that only one single public sphere existed. The 
bourgeois public sphere derived from the historical context specific to certain 
European bourgeois societies was but one model among many others. The historical 
experience, as states Alan McKee, shows that "there have been distinct public spheres 
organized around different political beliefs and geographical locations; and public 
spheres for other identity groups (such as Black, Spanish, and Jewish people) have 
existed in Western countries at least since the nineteenth century."
19
 Elizabeth Breese 
insists on using the term ‘‘public spheres’’ rather than ‘‘the public sphere’’ to reflect 
the multiplicity of publics and to reflect the range of institutions, groups, and media 
that form public spheres of discourse, action, representation, and criticism.
20
 Hanna 
Arendt on her part, and in contrast to Habermas’s conception, believes that the 
historic public sphere was characterized by the plurality, rather than unity, of 
participants and their convictions and an emphasis on action over discourse. In 
Arendt's terms, the public sphere emerges whenever 'men act together in concert' and 
wherever 'freedom could appear'. In this respect, small sites of common action 
coordinated through discussion and persuasion can become public spaces as they 
become sites of power. In very simple terms "a field or a forest can also become 
public space if it is the object and location of an action in concert, of a demonstration 
to stop the construction of a highway or a military  air base."
21
 
                                                           
18 Frazer, Nancy. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
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Several attempts to apply the concept of the public sphere onto non-European 
contexts proved to be problematic and raised serious issues as to the universality and 
generalizability of this ideal-type model. In the American experience for instance, the 
rational-critical character of the public sphere explains very little the nature and 
quality of political participation. Analyzing segments of the social and political 
history of American society in the nineteenth and twentieth century, Michael 
Schudson argues that the extent and quality of political participation cannot be 
explained by the Habermasian model of the public sphere. Politics, he observes, "was 
more a communal ritual than an act of individual or group involvement in rational-
critical discussion."
22
 If we consider that the more people participate in political 
affairs, the closer they are to the ideal of a public sphere then mid-nineteenth century 
America would best qualify for that criterion. For, the voting rates and turnout were 
higher than the following history of American politics. The question that Schudson 
rightly puts is whether those high turnout figures meant that political participation was 
carried out through rational and critical discourse as entails the concept of the public 
sphere. Schudson contends that, despite what looks as wide-ranging political 
involvement and participation, mid-nineteenth century American politics was more 
characterized by "political confessionalism" than by individual or group interest in 
discussing general affairs. People tended to live in what he calls "island communities" 
surrounded by other like-minded persons and were driven to participate in politics by 
the ideological content of political parties rather than publicly held rational-critical 
discussions. 
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As the debate over this issue increasingly tends to emphasize the notion of multiple 
and in some cases, overlapping or competing public spheres, it might be useful to 
shed some light on other types of public spheres. The most cited example by critics is 
probably the plebeian sphere which developed alongside and in opposition to the 
bourgeois public sphere. This sphere, remarks Nicholas Garnham, was "build upon 
different institutional forms, e.g., trade unions, and with different values, e.g., 
solidarity rather than competitive individualism."
23
 
Besides the plebeian public sphere, it is argued that Habermas failed to pay enough 
attention to the gendered nature of the public sphere. His obvious neglect for the 
women's public sphere has also attracted a large amount of criticism. Feminist studies 
addressed this issue extensively emphasizing the historic fact that women were 
excluded from the bourgeois public sphere and constrained to the realm of the private. 
As Nancy Fraser notes, women of all classes and ethnicities were denied access to the 
official liberal male-only public sphere. Consequently, they were excluded from all 
sorts of political participation on the basis of gender status. To use Pierre Bourdieu's 
terminology, 'exclusion' existed even among the male constituents of the public 
sphere since the capability of rational-critical debate is a kind of linguistic capital' not 
equally available to all participants in a discursive field. Speakers without the 
legitimate competence, explains Bourdieu, "are de facto excluded from the social 
domains in which this competence is required."
24
  
While exclusion of many social categories from the bourgeois public domain was the 
norm in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the situation in late-
                                                           
23 Garnham, Nicholas. "The Media and the Public Sphere" in Calhoun (eds.), Habermas and the Public 
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twentieth century America followed a completely different course of action. U.S 
feminist subaltern counter-public, stresses Frazer, was known for its "variegated array 
of journals, bookstores, publishing companies, film and video distribution networks, 
lecture series, research centers, academic programs, conferences, conventions, 
festivals, and local meeting places."
25
 Benefitting from this wealth of institutional 
networks and active communication environment, the feminist public sphere produced 
its own oppositional feminist discourse through which women managed to recast their 
needs and identities, and therefore reduced the extent of their exclusion and 
disadvantage in the official public sphere. 
Mary Ryan sketches a counter-narrative to Habermas's depiction of the decline of the 
eighteenth century public sphere. She argues that, approximately at the same time and 
place where Habermas started tracing the degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere 
and the waning of its political function, women showed substantial ascension into 
politics. This manifest ascension into the political life brought with it undeniable 
changes to the structure of the public sphere. The new women's movement, remarks 
Ryan, "injected considerable feminist substance into public discourse, articulating 
concerns once buried in the privacy of one sex as vital matters of public interest."
26
    
The term “counter-public” is also used by Rita Felski also who provides us with a 
more complex picture of a marginal public sphere in her discussion of the feminist 
public sphere. She characterizes the counter-public spheres as "coalitions of 
overlapping sub-communities, which share common interest in combating gender 
oppression but which are differentiated not only by class and race positions but often 
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by institutional locations."
27
 Like Fraser, Felski describes the feminist public sphere in 
relation to the dominant, patriarchal public sphere, but her definition extends far 
beyond the notion of multiple public spheres to address the issue of the internal 
diversity within a particular public sphere.  
The feminist scholarship on the public sphere developed its own critical literature 
trying to break away from the Habermasian legacy. It is argued that the feminist 
analyses have too often had the parochial quality which characterizes most public 
sphere theory. Most feminist theorists depart from the Habermasian framework 
without being able to independently investigate the characteristics of the feminist 
public sphere. To this end, Lisa McLaughlin remarks that "the feminist public sphere 
theory remained too focused on categorical distinctions embedded in Western 
modernism and on forms of discursive interactions that prevail within Western 
societies."
28
 
Addressing the women's role in Arab democratization, Larbi Sadiki challenges the 
Western narrative and lays the ground for a counter-discourse to the dominating 
orientalist depiction of Arab and Muslim women. Contrary to the orientalist account, 
Sadiki shows that Arab women are powerful agents of change, increasingly involved 
in intellectual, social, and political life. Through interviews with a range of Arab 
women, he finds that "women in many parts of the Arab world are engaged in 
debating and deconstructing democracy, a system they recognize as important for 
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their own struggles for gender equality as well as for the overall struggle against 
authoritarian rule."
29
 
2. The second line of criticism of Habermas's account concerns his neglect of social 
movements and their role in constructing public discourse and influencing democratic 
politics. As Craig Calhoun points out, social movements are crucial to reorienting the 
agenda of public discourse, bringing new issues to the fore. The absence of social 
movements from Habermas's account reflects his "inattention to agency, to the 
struggles by which the both public sphere and its participants are actively made and 
remade", explains Calhoun
30
 The relevance of social movements in the current debate 
over the public sphere lies not only in the fact that they contain the ideal possibility of 
constructing a relatively autonomous space for public discourse, but in their ability to 
respond to questions about legitimacy and accountability of governments, and it turn, 
raise them, as Gemma Edwards points correctly.
31
 In their ongoing struggle over 
lifestyle, identity and needs, social movements contribute to defining the agenda of 
public debate and generate a genuine public sphere. 
The importance of incorporating social movements in the theory of public sphere and 
democratization stems from the new realities of social and political organization in 
modern societies. The real power capable of stimulating social change has shifted 
from the old labor movement and political parties to the new social movements of 
youth, students, women, environment groups etc. For, the old labor movements and 
traditional political parties ceased to be the source for change because they have 
become integrated into the existing political system and its extended bureaucracy. 
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To ease relations among different social groups and movements, and facilitate cross-
border communication between competing public spheres, the media plays an 
instrumental role in speaking to different publics at the same time. Reaching out to 
men and women formally and informally educated, young and elderly, white and 
black citizens, the mass media are able to piece together what appears to some as 
fragmented publics.   
3. The impact of the media on social relations, modes of thought and the formation of 
public opinion had been significant since its early stages of print media. The liberal 
bourgeois public sphere in particular always had close links to the printing business 
which flourished in capitalist Europe in the eighteenth century. In addition to 
literature and artworks, the printed press circulating in coffee shops, literary salons 
and among educated persons publicized the triumphs of experimental sciences 
achieved in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In advertising the 
successive accomplishments of science, the press created what David Zaret called 
"public forums" in which the scientific experimental findings were produced, 
discussed and validated. "The printed revolution, he observes, created the 
experimental laboratory of a public sphere."
32
          
Before broadcasting, distinct public spheres were spatially separated arenas. Barriers 
separated the white male liberal bourgeois public sphere from those of working-class, 
women or people of color spaces. "If you wanted to listen to women's after-dinner 
conversations, you would have to go into the room with them."
33
 It was difficult to 
cross between public cultures. Broadcast media blurred the boundaries between 
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different social groups and public cultures since they are circulated for widely 
domestic consumption. Mass media, especially satellite television, transformed the 
way these social groups and sub-systems interact with one another. Nowadays, no 
matter which social group you belong to, or which public culture you personally feel 
comfortable with, you do not have to change location or physically move from 
geographic area to another. From the comfort of your sitting room you can flip 
through, select and watch on your TV screen, programs aimed at women "only", 
drama shows produced by and directed to Black or working-class audiences, or talk 
shows in which only highly-educated persons can take part and lead public "critical-
rational" debate. 
4. After The Structural Transformation, Habermas re-conceptualizes the public 
sphere  
Responding to his critics, Habermas wrote an article under the title "Further Reflections 
on the Public Sphere" where he made significant changes to his original thesis in 
Structural Transformation. In this article, he justifies the revisions he made by the 
changes that occurred in "the extra-scientific context that shapes the horizon of 
experience from which social-scientific research drives its perspective."
34
 Consequently, 
he refers to his original text as "exhibiting a number of weaknesses." 
Regarding the criticism directed at his "unjustified" idealization and generalization of an 
ideal-type public sphere from the historical context of a limited number of European 
societies (British, French and German), Habermas admits that "it is wrong to speak of 
                                                           
34 Habermas, Yurgen. "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere" in Calhoun (eds.), Habermas and the 
Public Sphere (MIT Press, 1992) p. 422 
167 
 
one single public sphere."
35
 On the contrary, history shows that there was a co-existence 
of multiple and competing public spheres with various processes of communication that 
are excluded from the dominant bourgeois public sphere. The "plebeian" public sphere is 
just an example of those which Habermas neglected from his analysis or did not consider 
at all.  
The major shift in Habermas's approach to critical theory in general and the public 
sphere in particular is to be found in his later writings. In an attempt to overcome the 
theoretical impasses that Frankfurt School and its rational critical tradition seemed to 
have become trapped in, Habermas extends the boundaries of his intellectual enterprise 
beyond the socio-historical analysis. He turns to the domain of language and 
communication to renew critical theory and re-establish it on stronger analytical 
foundations. It is through the rational employment of linguistic and communicative 
arguments that the above mentioned critical process could be "set in motion" and social 
critique and political democratization become possible. 
Habermas's 'linguistic turn' as it has become known, is more relevant to the current 
debate over the public sphere than his earlier formulation. It brings into the debate new 
elements and keeps the process of democratization open-ended rather than limited and 
conditioned by a particular type of society. The decline of democracy caused by the 
degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere cannot be historically separated from the 
decline of the eighteenth and nineteenth century bourgeois society within which it rose. 
Instead of grounding the process of democratization in the historical reality of that 
particular society, Habermas looked for alternative mechanisms to unlock the potential 
of social critique and keep the prospects for democratic change open. Language and 
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communication appear to be to right vehicles to re-launch this process and regain the 
critical power of free speech and discussion.  
  
In Between Facts and Norms Habermas's argues that the communicative aspect of 
language enables it to become the prime medium capable of criticizing domination 
systems at the social, political and cultural levels. The language "communicative action" 
resides in the unparalleled capacity of people to understand the speech of one another, to 
submit to the power of rationally articulated arguments, and to finally reach mutual 
agreements and consensuses among various communicators. To characterize this process 
of collective opinion and will-formation, Habermas developed the concept of 
"deliberative democracy." 
 
This concept of 'deliberative democracy' is based on his critique of the state-centric 
understanding of politics and  what he considers as an unrealistic assumption of citizenry 
as a collective actor capable of collective action. Alternatively, he calls for a decentered 
society in which individual citizens function as dependent variable in power structures 
and processes. This conception requires the existence of a dynamic 'higher-level inter-
subjectivity' of processes leading to a common understanding which is best achieved 
through the communicative network of public spheres. The success of deliberative 
politics thus depends not on citizenry acting collectively, but rather on the 
institutionalization of the procedures of communicative structures as well as on "the 
interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with informally developed public 
opinions."
36
 The image of the above-mentioned decentered society go together with the 
notion of procedural popular sovereignty and the type of political system that works 
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closely with the peripheral networks of political public sphere. 
 
Inherent in the communicative function of language, this collective rationality could 
generate norms and procedures to criticize different forms of societal domination and 
uncover various strategies of manipulation and distortions. Gradually, this critical 
communicative action translates into practices of rational discursive opinion-and will-
formation and consequently drives the process of institutionalization of democratic 
politics. The regular flow of communication between public opinion-formation on the 
one hand and the institutionalized procedures of elections and legislative decisions on 
the other hand guarantees that "influence and communicative power are transformed 
through legislation to administrative power."
37
 
 
Once established and institutionalized, administrative power turns into a network of 
interconnected systems maintaining and consolidating existing modes of social and 
political life. This networked systemic reality which inherently tends to maximize power 
and control, contradicts what Habermas calls human "lifeworld" of which language and 
communication are a central feature. Against this background of conflicting 'system' and 
'lifeworld' which undermines the critical power of traditional social and political 
structures, language and communication remain the only powerful tools resisting 
systemic social control. There is no need for specific types of language or specialized 
communicative structure as "ordinary language is the medium of communicative action 
through which the lifeworld reproduces itself."
38
 In fact, what enables ordinary language 
to occupy such a central position and play such a key role in the communicative action 
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theory is precisely its multifunctional character and lack of specialization. It is through 
the 'shared code' of ordinary language as is called in Habermas's terms that the different 
components of the lifeworld interpenetrate and maintain functional relations to its 
totality and its core private public spheres. 
 
In his post Structural Transformation works, Habermas conceives of the public sphere as 
a 'communication structure' grounded in the lifeword through civil society and its 
associational networks. Based on its communicative character, the public sphere serves 
as a bridge between the lifeworld in which it is rooted, and the political system, the arena 
in which problems are processed and solved.  In this way, the public sphere has two 
functions: the 'signal' function and the 'problematisation' function. With regard to its 
'signal' function, it works as a warning system with sensors throughout the entire society. 
In its capacity of problematisation, the public sphere not only detects and identifies 
problems, but also and more importantly, "convincingly and influentially thematise 
them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they 
are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes."
39
 
 
Communication is what entrenches the public sphere into the lifeword on the one hand 
and channels its pressure and influence on the political system on the other hand. It is in 
itself a network for communicating information and points of view. Communicative 
structures and institutions process the streams of information, filter them and synthesize 
them in order to make them available for decision-making instances in the form of 
bundles of thematically ordered 'public opinions'. Like the lifeword, the public sphere is 
also reproduced through communicative action of which natural language is a central 
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feature.  
 
To better characterize this linguistically constituted public sphere, Habermas developed 
what he called an "ideal speech situation" in which persons acting communicatively 
encounter each other in concrete locales where an audience is physically gathered. But, 
with the help of communication structures and mass media, the informational content 
articulated in these physically constructed locales is generalized beyond the thick 
contexts of direct interaction of specific persons. The more these specific communicators 
detach themselves from the constraints of physical presence and extend their 
communicative action to the virtual space of "scattered readers, listeners or viewers 
linked by public media, the clearer becomes the abstraction that enters when the spatial 
structure of simple interactions is expanded into public sphere."
40
 
 
This instrumental role of language and communication in producing and reproducing the 
public sphere and represents a remarkable shift from the perspective of Structural 
Transformation where Habermas defined an entire set of procedures and institutions that 
could transform all realms of social and political life. The universal and transcendental 
character of language makes the rise of public sphere, at least theoretically, free from the 
shackles of specific socio-historical conditions. The rise and decline of a particular type 
of society in a particular historic period does not necessary entail the rise and fall of the 
public sphere, which is more a product of the communicative action of language than of 
social or economic factors. In this context, mass media and related communication 
technologies become the real platform for the public sphere to operate and democratize 
the established political system. 
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Together with Habermas's revisions, the three major critical issues highlighted above, 
lay the ground for further theoretical debate on the public sphere. The following section 
explores the conditions of possibility of the rise of an Arab public sphere. What is the 
socio-historical context of such a concept? To what extent has new media and Al Jazeera 
in particular, played a role in its emergence? And how is it contributing to the 
advancement of Arab democratization process? These are the key questions that I will 
address in the remaining part of this chapter. 
 
5. Al Jazeera, new media and the rise of Arab public sphere 
 
My earlier discussion of Habermas and his critics provides a number of theoretical bases 
for a possible examination of the public sphere in a different context from that of 
Western societies. The concept 'Arab public sphere' is relatively new to the Arab 
political discourse, however it has gained prominence in the last few years with the 
changing landscape of the Arab media. This explains in part, why most scholars who 
wrote about the Arab public sphere link its emergence to the information and 
communication revolution and its impact on the Arab world since the early 1990s.  
 
In one way or another, attempts to apply the concept of the public sphere to the Arab 
social and political setting have not yet departed from the classical Habermasian 
theoretical framework in which, the media are indispensable independent fourth-estate 
players in democratic societies. The historic experience of Arab and Muslim societies 
provides us with remarkable analytical elements for a better understanding of what 
might be called an indigenous Arab public sphere. 
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To use Habermas's terminology, pre-Islamic Arabia knew what could be called a literary 
public sphere, attended by leading poets and public speakers from across the Arabian 
Peninsula and surrounding areas. Situated between Tae'f and Mecca, the 'Ukaz 
marketplace (Souq 'Ukaz), represented the hub for economic and social activities. Public 
announcements regarding inter-tribal treaties, legal arrangements new tribal chiefs, war 
alliances etc., were made there. The term 'Ukaz itself originated from the root verb 
"'akaza", which means arguing and debating.
41
 That's why 'Ukaz was best known 
throughout Arab history for its literary function than its economic or social activities. 
Mastering language was the key element that gives competing poets and public speakers 
access to the 'Ukaz stage regardless of their tribal belonging or social status. The best 
poems and speeches were displayed on the market wall to maximize circulation and 
publicity. Given the reign of tribal system in pre-Islam Arabia, it is difficult to talk about 
political function of this "literary public sphere". The Habermasian positioning of the 
public sphere vis-à-vis the state and its public authority is not applicable to this case. 
 
During the early Islamic era, 'Ukaz marketplace maintained its literary and 
communicative function as an Arab forum for public debate, but with more religious-
oriented content. Prophet Muhammad attended the place for ten consecutive years to 
communicate his message to tribal leaders and their followers. A few years later, 'Ukaz 
started to disintegrate and gradually lost its strategic importance as the main trade routes 
moved north towards Baghdad, Basra and Damascus. The major political development 
that affected the status of 'Ukaz and caused its influence to fade down, was the rise of the 
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Islamic state, a new political phenomenon in Arabia that had domestic, regional and 
international impact. 
 
Public debate has taken various forms throughout the Arab-Islamic history and culture. 
The continuous perfection of these debates culminated in the emergence of specific art 
of discussion and rational argumentation during the Abbasid era called "al-Munazarah" 
(intellectual disputation). It is a well-defined form of public debate between two persons 
or parties of different and mostly opposed views. The two sides are required to follow 
certain sets of strict rules and procedures leading to what could be termed as "ideal 
speech situation". This type of public debates spread almost all over the Arab-Islamic 
world and covered various fields of knowledge i.e. Language, logic, philosophy, 
theology, jurisprudence etc.  
 
Following are the common rules contestants or participants in al-Munazarah should 
adhere to
42
:  
- Clearly identify the discussion topic. 
- Concentrate on the debate and refrain from turning to those who want to divert 
the contestants' attention 
- When you construct your arguments, consider seeking the truth as your ultimate 
goal. 
- Do not use claims as evidences 
- Do not give yourself the right to interpret scripts according to your school of 
thought (madhhab) without giving the other contestant the same right. 
                                                           
42 For a complete list of rules see Mu'hadharaat al-U'dabaa' wa Mu'hawaraat as-Shu'araa' wal-
Bulaghaa' of al-Raghib al-Asfahani; see also Fann al-Jadal of Ibn A'qeel; Ihyaa' 'Uloum ad-Din of 
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali; and al-Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldoun. 
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- Listen carefully to your counterpart and do not interrupt him. 
- Do not deny truth if found in any part of your adversary's presentation 
- Do not respond to your adversary until you make sure you have understood his 
point perfectly; if you need him to repeat what he has said, do not hesitate to ask 
him to do so.  
 
Being the medieval Arab-Islamic forum for public debate, al-munazarah is seen by 
Larbi Saki as symbolizing "Muslim enlightenment", since it provides an open platform 
for "logicians, grammarians, philosophers, theologians, jurists and "lovers of wisdom" to 
debate one another on all sorts of controversies and disputed matters."
43
 Other aspects of 
these forum for public discussion are highlighted by Muhammad Ayish who, stressing 
the importance of these debates in the Arab-Islamic historical experiences, notes that 
“debates need to be based on reasoning, adherence to Islamic beliefs, and the 
safeguarding of individual’s decency and reputation as well as protecting community 
interests on the basis of established facts rather than rumors or unverifiable 
statements.”44 
 
Along the same lines, Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson believe that public dialogue 
has long held a special place in the Muslim world. They take as an example the religious 
domain where "a religious public sphere of learned scholars, schools of jurisprudence, 
and their supporters was often autonomous from the official sphere of rulers in the early 
Islamic centuries."
45
 They remind us of the precedent of inquisition (mi'hna) towards the 
mid-ninth century in which leading scholars ('ulama) refused to submit to the orders of 
                                                           
43 Sadiki, Larbi. The Search for Arab Democracy (Columbia University Press, 2004) p. 379 
44 Ayish, Muhammad. The New Arab Public Sphere (Frank & Timme, 2008) p. 50 
45 Eickelman, Dale and Anderson, Jon. New Media in the Muslim World: the Emerging Public Sphere 
(Indiana University Press, 2003) p. 2  
176 
 
four successive Caliphs to issue a religious ruling (fatwa) decreeing that Muslims had to 
believe that the Quran was created. Had the scholars agreed to issue the fatwa, they 
would have ruled against the strongly supported popular belief that the Quran always 
existed. The mi'hna lasted for fifteen years and ended with the caliphs abandoning their 
demand. This result was to "strengthen the role of the men of learning ('ulama) in the 
public sphere from the third Islamic century through the modern era."
46
 
 
In more recent times, especially since the end of the colonial rule and the emergence of 
independent Arab states, public debate took significantly new shapes and new structures 
of autonomous public communication appeared in different parts of the Arab world 
under different names. In Kuwait, ordinary people alongside prominent personalities 
gather in the diwaniyah to discuss political issues and matters of general interest. 
Diwaniyah gatherings are commonly attended by politicians like Ministers, members of 
parliament and other social notables and public figures, who often transfer these 
discussions to the political system.
47
 There are signs of further expansion of the 
diwaniyah's social and political function as a platform for public deliberation as  
"Kuwaiti women are initiating their own diwaniyat (plural of diwaiyah).
48
 In other Gulf 
countries i.e. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the majlis (council) plays quite a similar role, but 
council debates revolve more around religious and intellectual issues than political 
affairs. In Yemen, the qat-chewing meetings are more spread and some of them are 
attended by women only. As Lisa Wedeen describes, qat chew gatherings occur daily in 
public or semi-public places, in which qat is chewed in the context of structured and 
                                                           
46 Ibid., p. 2 
47 See al-Diwaniyah al-Kuwaytiyah: dawruha al-Ijtima'i wal-Siyasi (Kuwaiti Diwaniyah: its Social and 
Political Role) by Kandari, Yaqub Yusuf (al-Kandari, Kuwait, 2002) 
48 Sadiki, Larbi. Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections Without Democracy (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) p. 46 
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lengthy conversations. In these gatherings "as many as several dozen people, some of 
whom are strangers to one another, meet to debate literary matters, political life, and 
social problems."
49
. In some parts of Sudan, especially in Darfur, similar meetings of 
public discussions take place in what is called rakuba. The "literary salons", another 
version of these gatherings emerged in a number of other countries albeit with a more 
elitist tendency. In Egypt as well as in Syria, these salons usually take the name of their 
host or initiator like the famous salon of Abbas Mahmoud al-'Aqqad.
50
 Female literary 
salons flourished in both countries and were an important aspect of public life during the 
first half of the twentieth century. Among the earliest and most influential salons in 
Egypt was that of the Lebanese poet and writer May Zyadeh, which lasted for twenty 
successive years (1911-1931) and hosted top intellectuals and political figures such as 
Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid, Mostafa Lotfi al-Manfalouti, Taha Hussein, and Abbas 
Mahmoud al-'Aqqad. Other female salons include those of Nazli Fadil, Huda Sha'arawi, 
and Zeinab Fawaz. In Syria, the salons of Meryana Mrash and Mary Ajami played a 
leading role in connecting the Syrian elites and structuring the public debate along 
common literary, social and political issues, independently from the ruling authorities.
51
 
 
The structural transformation of Arab media landscape since the advent of satellite 
television in the 1990s changed the way public discourse is channeled and created new 
modes of deliberation. In Anderson's terms, with Al Jazeera talk shows, there has been a 
                                                           
49 Wedeen, Lisa. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (University of Chicago 
Press, 2008) p. 104 
50 Anis Mansour documented parts of the debates that took place in al-'Aqqad's salon in his book "In al-
'Aqqad's Salon, We had Days" (Dar al-Shuruq, Cairo, 1983). 
51 Larbi Sadiki's forthcoming book on "Salon Democracy" provides a comparative analysis of the 
indigenous ways for learning democracy, as opposed to democratization, in the Arab World.  
178 
 
"migration of debate-and-discussion formats from salons to the air."
52
 
 
In addition to satellite television, the rapidly expanding usage of communication 
technologies among Arabs of different contributed significantly to the emergence of 
what Marc Lynch calls "new Arab public". At the center of these developments stands 
Al Jazeera as leader and trend setter. The next chapter discusses in practical terms, how 
Al Jazeera is contributing to the advancement of the process of Arab democratization 
through the creation of a lively and politically engaged new Arab public sphere. 
                                                           
52 Anderson, Jon W. Technology, Media, and the Next Generation in the Middle East, paper delivered 
at a the Middle East Institute, Columbia University, Sept. 28, 1999. 
(http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/104T45.htm) 
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Chapter 6: 
Al Jazeera: Democratizing through the public sphere 
 
The conviction that news influences human action undergirds nearly all studies of 
news. Just how or to what extent news affects us, however, is a matter of controversy 
and uncertainty  
Michael Schudson 
 
This chapter builds on the earlier theoretical discussions aiming to give an empirical 
dimension to the new Arab public sphere. As has been shown, the role of the media in 
restructuring public discourse and publicizing debates beyond their traditional enclaves 
is evident, the practical manifestation of this role is what this chapter is trying to 
demonstrate. My analysis of Al Jazeera's contribution to the reshaping of the new Arab 
public is supported by data gathered through interviews with selected staff members of 
Al Jazeera. First, I will be looking at the reasons why Al Jazeera in particular, was able 
to play such a crucial role. Second, I will identify the key characteristics of the new Arab 
public sphere. Third, I will explore the political implications of this emerging public 
sphere with special emphasis on its democratizing effects. 
 
Al Jazeera was not the first Arab satellite TV to broadcast live news and programmes to 
an Arab public eager to break away from the boring world of government run and 
controlled TV stations. The Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) was the first 
entrant to the Arab satellite realms, to borrow Naomi Sakr's expression, broadcasting 
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news, films, drama and music.
1
 With the arrival of Arab Radio and Television (ART) in 
1993 and Orbit in 1994, these satellites TV channels competed to win the hearts and 
minds of Arab viewers and managed to create niche markets in which an Arab public 
started to build up around entertainment-oriented contents away from government 
contours. While these channels established the technical means for the emergence of a 
potential Arab public sphere simply by enabling people from across the Arab world to 
communicate directly and immediately through the same space, it is hard to speak of a 
genuine public sphere. For, as Mark Lynch notes it takes an orientation to public 
argument to make a public sphere. According to Lynch, "only when Al Jazeera 
refocused the satellites away from entertainment and toward politics – more precisely, 
toward political argument about Arab issues defined by an Arab identity – did it become 
a public sphere."
2
 But, how has Al Jazeera contributed to the making of this public 
sphere? Next is an assessment of Al Jazeera's role in the emergence of the new Arab 
public sphere followed by an analysis of its main characteristics and its political 
implications. 
 
1. Al Jazeera's role in the emergence of the Arab public sphere 
 
The emergence of the new Arab public sphere is certainly not limited to satellite 
television, let alone to Al Jazeera per se. Communication technology has undeniably 
played an increasingly crucial role in helping quite a number of Arab media outlets 
develop into public forums for relatively free discussion of issues of general concern. 
However, the role of Al Jazeera remains unparalleled for a number of reasons:  
                                                           
1 Sakr, Naomi. Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization & the Middle East (I. B. 
Tauris, 2001) p. 18 
2 Lynch, Marc. Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today 
(Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 33 
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First: "The channel of choice": Al Jazeera, the Arab media "phenomenon" as some 
prefer to call it
3
, has become the default channel for the majority of Arab viewers across 
the Arab world with a considerable reach and power. This Arab media phenomenon is 
now the channel of choice, says J. A., a former member of Al Jazeera's editorial 
committee:  
 
If we say we have acquired only one stream of the Arab public or a certain class, we are 
not doing justice to Al Jazeera, which became the channel of choice for all sections of 
society. you'll find educated, you find the professionals, normal people, housewives, 
students, and so on among the followers of Al Jazeera, they all find something to satisfy 
their needs.
4
  
 
Fahmy Howeidy, deputy chief-editor and columnist of Al-Ahram newspaper, expressed 
in his own way, how Al Jazeera satisfied the needs of Arab citizens: "Before the 
emergence of Al Jazeera, I only watched entertainment programmes or football matches 
on Arab TV channels, only stopping at the latter during times of relaxation, laziness or 
boredom. I researched important events and ideas through chasing news bulletins, 
reports and discussion programmes broadcast on Western television channels, 
particularly British and American ones. I never thought I would find "food" of that 
nature on any Arab channel."
5
     
 
In 2007-2008, the Knowledge World Center for Polls in Jordan conducted an opinion 
poll in 19 Arab countries covering 1225 (almost 50%) of university teachers of media 
                                                           
3 Mohamed Zayani edited a book titled The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New 
Arab Media (Pluto Press, 2005). 
4 Researcher's interview with Jamil Azar, April 2011. 
5 Howeidy, Fahmi. "Setting the News Agenda in the Arab World" in The Al Jazeera Decade: 1996-2006 
(Al Waraqoon, 2007) p. 139 
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and political science. The study found that 98.4% of the respondents consider Al Jazeera 
as their preferred channel, watching it at a daily average of 3.2 hours. It also showed that 
they watch a variety of more than 20 programs aired by the channel. The viewership rate 
of Al Jazeera is three times higher than the rates given to the news channel that came 
second with less than 18% of viewers' share.
6
 In 2009, Nielsen Company conducted an 
opinion poll and found that 140 millions of Arabs (nearly 50% of the total population of 
Arab countries) consider Al Jazeera as their go-to channel. The surveyed sample 
included 27000 respondents from 14 Arab countries and involved various social groups 
and categories.
7
  
 
Politicians often show serious concerns over the growing power of Al Jazeera and its 
capability to influence and mobilize large segments of the Arab public. In his diaries of 
the Iraq war between 2003 and 2004, Ambassador Paul Bremer recounts President 
Bush's first reaction to the capture of Saddam Hussein and his worry about the potential 
role Al Jazeera could play through its coverage of this incident. During an emergency 
meeting of the National Security Council to discuss the implications of this big 
development, "the president looked up, relates Bremer, and asked: "How'd Al-Jazeera 
play the story, Jerry?"
8
 In the Arab world, government attempts to circumvent or, at least 
minimize the influence of Al Jazeera are countless. In one remarkable instance, the 
Algerian authorities cut power to the capital city of Algiers to prevent citizens from 
watching one episode of a particular talk show programme. However, the "Al Jazeera 
                                                           
6 The findings of this study were published in a book called Polling Media and Political Science 
Professors on Al-Jazeera Channel's Professionalism" (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. 2008). The 19 
Arab countries in which the study was conducted are: Jordan, Emirates, Bahrain, Algeria, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Lebanon, 
Libya, Egypt, and Mauritania. 
7
 Here, I refer to an unpublished study by Nielsen, the international research company specializing in 
viewer conduct and TV rating. 
8 Bremer, Paul. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (Simon & Schuster, 2006) p. 
264 
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effect" phenomenon is becoming more significant as the number of regional satellite 
television stations grows, along with the proliferation of other new communications 
technologies such as the Internet and cell phones."
9
 
 
Second: Innovative formats, engaging content: The nature of newscasts and 
programmes broadcast on Al Jazeera changed the face of Arab media and reshaped the 
media-politics relationship. Soon after its launch in 1996, it turned into the leading 
regional media outlet and dominated Arab public discourse. Al Jazeera brought to the 
Arab media landscape a new type of programming aimed at creating a vibrant and 
engaged public.  
 
Besides the non-stop news flow that runs throughout the day with one newscast every 
hour, and two extended bulletins of two hours each: Nashrrat al-muntasaf and Hasad Al-
Yawm (midday newscast and harvest of the day), the channel broadcasts several live-
debate talk shows. Al-Ittijah Al-mu'akis (the opposite direction), Akthar min Ra'y (more 
than one opinion), 'Hiwar Maftou'h (open dialogue), Bila 'Houdoud (without borders), 
and As-Shari'a wal-Hayat (Sharia and Life) are broadcast regularly on a weekly basis, 
ach lasts for one hour. Reflecting on the impact of his own talk show, Faisal Al-Kasim, 
host of Al-Ittijah Al-Mu'akis
10
, says: "Debate programs and live talks on satellite 
broadcasting are watched avidly by millions of Arabs and are contributing a great deal to 
the formation of pan-Arab public opinion over many issues. Arab viewers can now share 
                                                           
9
 Seib, Philip. "New Media and Prospects for Democratization" in Philip Seib (eds.), New Media and 
the New Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) p. 1  
10 Modeled on CNN's Crossfire, Al-Ittijah Al-Mu'akis hosts two guests of fundamentally opposed views 
on extremely controversial issues and allows members of the public to call in, with no time delay, and 
voice their opinions. This live interaction between the guests on the one hand, and between them and 
members of the public on the other hand,  forms an essential ingredient of the new political discourse in 
the Arab world.    
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each other's problems, issues and concerns."
11
  
 
Al-Kasim's view is shared by Lynch whose study of the new Arab public indicates that 
Al Jazeera's talk shows were a key factor in the emergence of the Arab public sphere. 
Besides its leading position in the Arab media in terms of news coverage, "its talk shows 
often set the agenda for local arguments and debates, as well as reflecting the issues 
considered important among the Arab intellectual elite."
12
 Lynch's point does not seem 
to convince Oliver Hahn who, on the contrary, believes that television talk shows such as 
Al-Ittijah Al-Mu'akis have often been characterized more by emotion and lack of 
rationality. Where interactive television disputes dominate the schedules they indicate 
tendencies towards extreme politicization, polarization, personalization, and 
emotionalization."
13
 Critics of Al Jazeera tend to generalize this picture and extend it 
over the channel's coverage of news stories. Al Jazeera's former editor in-chief, A. Sh., 
responds to such claims by suggesting that:  
 
Al Jazeera has been passionate rather than emotional. We are siding with people in 
hardship, those who cannot find food in the Atlas mountains, who cannot even protect 
themselves against cold and who lose their fingers, if I go there and try to make them 
talk you accuse me of being emotional. No, this is a human passion this is not emotional.  
I'm reporting with human passion the sad side of the story. When we go to those in 
Bangladesh and try to reflect their suffering, you tell me this emotional, no this is not 
emotional, we were just showing the hardship.
14
 
 
                                                           
11 Al-Kasim, Faisal. "The Opposite Direction: A Program which Changed the Face of Arab Television" 
in Zayani (ed.), The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media (Pluto Press, 
2005), p. 103 
12
 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, p. 76  
13 Hahn, Oliver. "Cultures of TV News Journalism and Prospects for a Transcultural Public Sphere" in 
Naomi Sakr (eds.), Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy, and Public Life (I.B. 
Tauris, 2009) p. 25 
14 Researcher's interview with Ahmed. Sheukh, April 2011. 
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In addition to the talk shows, Al Jazeera airs a weekly programme called Minbar Al 
Jazeera (the Al Jazeera platform) in which the host moderates a live and direct debate 
with viewers over selected hot issues. The programme main title comes with a subtitle in 
the form of a widely circulated Arabic slogan: "the platform for those who have no 
platform." It accommodates a wide ranging spectrum of callers without any sort of 
exclusion. As Laila Chaieb, the main host of the show explains:  
 
You don't choose your guests; they choose our show by taking the initiative of dialing 
the number and calling in to express their views. You don't select those who should take 
part. You can't say this is academic I'll pick him; this is from the general public I don't 
pick him. This is Islamist I'll pick him; this is secularist I don't pick him. We don't have 
this kind of classification… I personally cannot allow this to happen. Otherwise how 
could we call it the platform of those who have no platform?
15
 
 
In addition to allowing everyone free access to the show, the discussion topics are jointly 
selected by the viewers and the production team. Before Al Jazeera, the Arab public had 
limited or no rights to choose what to watch let alone participate or select the discussion 
topics. As Chaieb underlines, the Arab viewer-citizen has had enough of being treated as 
minor, always accused by the authorities of being irresponsible, immature, emotional and at 
times even unpatriotic.  The long list of blames goes on to include ridiculous characterizations of 
the masses as "making a lot of noise without presenting an alternative, unable to prioritize on the 
personal and public levels, politically naïve and overly critical, uncivilized and chaotic, unable to 
demonstrate peacefully.
16 
 
What can a public with such characteristics offer? asks Chaieb, or to put it differently, 
                                                           
15 Researcher's interview with Laila Chaieb, March 2011. 
16 Chaieb, Leila. "The Age of the Masses" in The Al Jazeera Decade: 1996-2006 (Al Waraqoon, 2007) p. 
71 
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what had Al Jazeera offered this public in order to help him change its negative image 
and status? The point of departure has been, according to the host of Minbar Al Jazeera, 
to challenge the existing perception of the Arab public as "minor". To use Kant's term, 
Al Jazeera has played an 'enlightening' role in liberating Arab viewers and relieving 
them from the constraints of the age of 'minority'. "Nonage or minority, says Kant, is the 
inability of making use of one's own understanding without the guidance of another."
17
 
Enlightening means quitting the status of minority and having courage to make use of 
their own understanding: Courage on the side of the public to express their views 
without fear of being persecuted or harassed by autocratic governments, and courage on 
the side of the media to publicize those views and make them available for public 
discussion without bias or censorship. That is the enlightening role Al Jazeera has played 
over the last fifteen years and has certainly succeeded in painting a completely different 
image of the Arab public, contrary to that described above by the host of Minbar Al 
Jazeera.        
 
The second aspect of Al Jazeera's contribution to the creation of an Arab public sphere 
after changing the perception of Arab viewers is to identify the needs of those viewers 
and treat them as they deserve. Since they are capable of using their 'own understanding' 
in Kant's terms, the Arab audiences need to get involved in the discussion of public 
issues and more importantly, to 'participate' as clearly mentioned by Chaieb. "The 
content of the messages we receive convinced me that the need for 'participation' for 
many is far more profound than what we may imagine. They really believe in 
participating through views and words first, then through action when the opportunity 
                                                           
17 Kant, Emmanuel. "Answer to the Question: What is 'Enlightenment'?" (1784) in The Age of 
Enlightenment: An Anthropology of Eighteen-Century texts. Simon Eliot and Beverly Stern (ed.), Vol. 
2, (The Open University, 1979), p. 250  
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arises, anticipating the desired change, and each with their own vision and project."
18
 
 
The need to "participate" has been translated into an Al Jazeera initiative called "Sharek" 
(Participate). It is an interactive tool empowering ordinary people to actively participate 
and enrich the television news content. Along the lines of the CNN "iReport", "Sharek" 
receives pictures and video clips from eyewitnesses and allow people with limited 
resources and modest technical experience to share their stories and discuss their ideas 
with a widening network of viewers, readers and interconnected audiences around the 
world. The Sharek service was set up jointly by Editor-in-Chief, A. Sh. and the Al 
Jazeera new media section in 2007. As the founders of this initiative explain, Sharek 
allows the channel to have field reporters in every single city or even village. It has also 
introduced new tools of newsgathering and strengthened Al Jazeera's relationship with ordinary 
people on the ground. By using this service, the audiences are no longer just recipients of the 
story that television stations broadcast to them, they have become part of the story themselves. 
They have become even sort of broadcasters who do not need to wait for the regular TV news 
bulletin to bring them stories they already know about. 
 
The Sharek service is more than just a platform for free expression and exchange of 
materials among interconnected like-minded news gatherers. As the head of Al Jazeera's 
new media states, it plays an increasing role in enriching the content of the Al Jazeera 
news channel as well as speeding up the process of building and interactive Arab public. 
Defining its role and describing the way it functions, M. A. says:  
 
Sharek is like a contribution from essentially anybody who has an internet connection to 
come and upload a video that comes in and gets checked within the Al Jazeera 
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 Chaieb, L. "The Age of the Masses" in The Al Jazeera Decade, p. 72  
188 
 
newsroom. So, people can upload something like a video by a mobile, an audio file, an 
image or some text if they want to share. It comes and it goes through a filtration process 
then through a verification process, and those videos become available to our newsroom. 
So, if they [at the newsroom] want to tell a story relating to a subject that corresponds to 
videos which are available in Sharek, they would use that. In many times they get story 
ideas from Sharek as well, it is like a repository.
19
 
 
With the recent political developments in the Arab region known as the Arab spring, 
Sharek seems to have gained more relevance to both the young Arab public and the Al 
Jazeera network. Traditionally, the voice of the young public has been neglected by the 
mainstream media whether print media or radio and television. These generations are 
generally excluded mainly because the mainstream media are usually monopolized by 
politicians, intellectuals and different types of elites from the social and cultural 
domains. The dynamics of the Arab revolutions reshaped many aspects of the regional 
landscape including that of the media and changed the way these media interact with 
their publics, especially the younger generations whose main source of communication 
used to be limited to the social media networks. Since the eruption of the Tunisian 
revolution, the traditional media and the new media have become close partners and the 
new Arab public played a defining role in creating this partnership and benefiting from it 
at the same time. The amount of materials uploaded onto the Al Jazeera servers through 
Sharek
20
 during this period demonstrates that not only the new Arab public found a new 
voice on the traditional media, but also that the traditional media started to rely heavily 
on the content generated by its public.  
This mutual beneficial relationship empowers both sides, says M. A. as it enriches the 
television screen and makes it more interactive. On the other hand, users of these new tools 
                                                           
19 Researcher's interview with Moeed Ahmed, April 2011. 
20 According to M. Ahmed, the quantity of videos received by Al Jazeera through sharek since the start 
of the Arab revolutions amounted to 1000 videos per day and sometimes 2000 videos on Fridays. Prior 
to that, they only received 50 to 100 videos per day.   
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understand that eventually they can make their voice heard on traditional television, which in 
turn amplifies their voices so many folds. Regardless of how communication technologies 
change and how social habits of young generations change consequently, the mass of the people 
will still watch television be it in cafeterias, in their homes through satellite dishes or on their 
computer screens through internet. Making that special connection "between the younger 
generations who are well connected and those who are not or less connected was manifest in 
Tunisia in particular", confirms M. A.
21 
 
For many years, Minbar Al Jazeera has been a call-in only programme whereby callers 
from around the world are invited to comment on the topic, ask questions, and suggest 
topics for future discussions. In late 2009, the channel announced it had added new 
features to Minbar Al Jazeera, to make it more interactive. These improvements meant 
"allowing the public to have a greater ability to express their views by engaging through 
social media such as Twitter and Facebook."
22
Employing new communication 
technologies to complement the traditional work of television, not only has it 
empowered Arab viewers by offering them new tools to counter governmental strategies 
and circumvent the ongoing attempts to minimize the Al Jazeera effect, but it has also 
expanded the reach of the network exponentially and made its engaging content 
available to a growing number of people. 
 
Third: Unparalleled reach: The Al Jazeera groundbreaking and engaging content is 
disseminated to viewers across the world through an expanding network of bureaus, 
reporters and channels, making Al Jazeera the largest Arab TV station and one of the 
largest TV networks in the world. With 80 external bureaus and more than 200 reporters 
                                                           
21 Researcher's interview with M. Ahmed, April, 2011. 
22 "Al Jazeera Channel Launches a 'New Look' and New Programmes on its Thirteenth Anniversary" 
(Press Release by Al Jazeera, October 30, 2009). 
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stationed in almost every country, Al Jazeera's international presence makes its coverage 
of global events unequaled. It brings to Arab audiences in the Arab world and elsewhere 
in their diasporas the same live coverage of the same unfolding events by the same news 
anchors and commentators. 
 
When news stories about events of particular significance to Arabs in different parts of 
the world (i.e. the Palestinian Intifada, the invasion of Iraq, the war on Gaza, the Arab 
revolutions) are communicated to them in Arabic and from an Arab perspective, this 
brings them together, across the difference of their geographical locations, to form one 
transnational public. What unites this extended public in the first place, and keep 
together the constituting elements of its shared identity are the common language and the 
common news agenda. In other words, the new Arab public sphere is actually composed 
of multiple, overlapping publics that should be defined not territorially but by reference 
to a shared identity and a common set of political arguments and concerns.
23
  
 
Throughout the years, Al Jazeera continued to expand its operations beyond the barriers 
of language, culture and geography. Starting in 1996 with one Arabic news channel 
broadcasting six hours per day (Al Jazeera Satellite Channel), Al Jazeera has grown 
dramatically into a media conglomerate consisting of over twenty channels broadcasting 
news and programmes in Arabic and English. To further expand its reach, the network is 
launching, before the end of 2011, two more channels, one in Turkish and one in 
Bosnian languages. A third channel in Swahili is in preparation and will go on air next 
year. Those who are unable to watch Al Jazeera on their television screens can access its 
content online. Al Jazeera net is among the most visited news websites in the Arab 
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 Lynch,  Voices of the New Arab Public, p. 22 
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world. It provides its visitors with a non-stop live broadcast of Al Jazeera news and 
programmes. Subscribers to the Al Jazeera Mobile service can also stay connected to the 
news flow and follow the latest developments on their mobile phones. As 
communication technologies continues to proliferate and provide the media with new 
means to expand their reach, Al Jazeera remains one of the largest global media 
networks using the latest technologies with the help of its new media section.        
 
Fourth: Diversity of delivery platforms: The continuing diversification of platforms 
that Al Jazeera provides for public discussion is increasingly widening the scope of the 
public sphere as it opens the doors for more individuals and social groups to freely 
interact and share their views with others. To accommodate different publics and 
respond to various needs, the network had to diversify the means through which it 
delivers its content. Besides the main news channel that targets the general public, Al 
Jazeera keeps developing delivery platforms to reach out to specific publics with specific 
content. As a result, one can assume that the general Arab public is indeed composed of 
a number of specific public spheres revolving around specific contents and specific 
delivery platforms. The youth, the women, and the religious publics spheres are just 
examples in this respect.    
 
Concerted efforts to accommodate the Arab youth on these platforms could be clearly 
noticed when we look at the "Al Jazeera Talk" website. Although not being officially 
part of Al Jazeera's online operations, this voluntarily run youth forum is growing 
spectacularly. With over 320 correspondents actively operating in all 22 Arab countries, 
Al Jazeera Talk occupies a leading position as an online youth forum. The enormous 
amount of visits this site receives every day reflects its role in bringing together this 
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special kind of social group (Arab youth) that has long been marginalized and excluded 
from official and non-official public debates. With a regular flow of online traffic 
exceeding the 100,000 visits per day, this unique platform contributes to the formation of 
an exceptional category of Arab public. According to Ahmed Ashour, founder and 
director of Al Jazeera Talk, the site receives 120,000 to 200,000 visits per day. 
 
Al Jazeera talk was established in 2006 to enable Arab youth to communicate through 
their geographical and cultural differences and create their own interactive sphere. 
According to A. A., this growing network is comprised of: 
 
320 to 350 correspondents, all young people, males and females, writing from their 
corresponding countries and regions such as America, Australia, Malaysia, Asia, Africa, 
almost everywhere in the world… These correspondents first start writing with us 
through our forum which is an open space, then they become part of our media 
community. What is available to public from Al Jazeera Talk is just about 40% of the 
actual size of the site; the bigger part of our network is offline. While other media 
organizations look for professional journalists, we look for young talented people 
aspiring to become journalists and we train them. We believe that once they have the 
ambition and the initiative, they can achieve whatever they wish to achieve.
24
 
 
As for its geographical presence across the Arab world, Al Jazeera Talk is operating in 
every single Arab country but it operates differently in different countries. Although its 
correspondents cover the entire region, A. A. states that the network had to consider the 
varying political situations and the degree of press freedom in each country. The 
composition and size of their presence also depends, to a large extent, on these factors. 
Al Jazeera Talk has quite a large team of correspondents in Morocco, but a relatively smaller 
team in Tunisia which was only established after the revolution and after the ban on the site has 
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been lifted. In Saudi Arabia it is difficult to operate freely, says A. A. mentioning that his 
management in Doha tried many times to set up a team of young correspondents, but because the 
operation is banned inside the Kingdom, they cannot communicate properly with their group 
over there. But, "in Gaza, the West Bank and the 1948 Palestinian territories, as well as in Jordon 
and Egypt we have substantial teams".
25
  
 
Al Jazeera Talk has recently stepped up their operation by setting up units of video 
production. These units receive technical assistance and regular training from the 
network management and produce online video content. This content is first circulated 
among the community members and then posted over to the rest of the general online 
public. This emerging Arab youth public sphere is not only operated from above, from 
the central management in Doha. It is rather extending horizontally in the form of 
autonomous and interconnected cells of actively engaged young Arab journalists.  
 
The similarities in the Arab social and political environment and the common language 
used by Arab youth to express their views, share their stories, and discuss the various 
topics posted on this particular platform seems to have created a genuine rapprochement 
and formed a common understanding between these users of. The managers of Al 
Jazeera Talk believe that they managed to bring together hundreds of thousands of Arab 
youth and build a special kind of an extremely dynamic community. Outlining the main 
issues of general concern to the Arab youth, A Ashour says: 
 
There is an agreement among Arab youth over a wide range of issues. When we talk, for 
instance, about the borders separating the Arab countries, everyone agrees that these 
borders should be removed. Everyone believes that we line in a new era. Everyone agree 
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that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians. There is a number of common issues that 
everyone agrees upon regardless of our differences of religions and opinions. We can 
now talk of a well-defined public opinion among the Arab youth.
26
 
 
The significance of this specific category of public sphere should not be underestimated, 
not only because of the remarkably high percentage of youth population in the Arab 
region, but also and more importantly because of the key role this social group played 
and is playing in the Arab revolutions. The development of such a lively and dynamic 
public in this particular political context should be considered as a turning point in the 
history of Arab people as well as in the study of the public sphere. In addition to 
dedicating an online youth platform for this type of public to raise issues, discuss them 
and generate its own discourse, Al Jazeera continues to diversify and expand its 
platforms to accommodate larger sectors of Arab youth. 
 
In May 2011, the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies brought together around 100 young 
people from 18 countries to participate in what was called "Forum of Youth and Change 
in the Arab World". Over two days, participants discussed, in a completely open 
atmosphere, a wide range of issues.
27
 The closing session announced the launch of "the 
youth initiative for communication and cooperation". As a youth platform, this initiative 
would allow participants to further interact and communicate between each other and 
encourage more "young people from the Arab world who share the same ideals and 
values to join in."
28
 According to Islam Lutfi, who announced the "youth initiative for 
                                                           
26 Ibid. 
27 According to a report by Al Jazeera Center for Studies, the forum, which took place in Doha on 28-
29 May 2011, "discussed issues pertaining to political change and democratization in the Arab world in 
light of the current wave of revolutions and popular protests. The Forum aimed at offering participants 
the opportunity to meet with each other and build means of cooperation, exchanging experiences and 
bolstering understanding and integration amongst them." 
28  Ibid.   
195 
 
communication and cooperation", the participants expect their meeting to the first step 
towards creating a youth public sphere in which participants continue the debate initiated 
in Doha and explore new avenues for this rising social movement to engage politically 
and play a leading role in building a democratic future for their respective countries. 
 
The emergence of an Arab youth public sphere is of particular importance especially 
when we consider the recent political developments in the region. It would be difficult to 
understand what has happened in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and what is happening in 
Yemen, Syria and other troubled countries without a proper understanding of the role 
played by the new generations in organizing and mobilizing the masses. The youth 
revolutions, as they have become known, highlight the need to analyze the Arab youth 
public sphere and define its characterizing qualities in terms of interconnectedness, 
communication modes, and the discourse it produces consumes and promotes. 
 
Besides the youth as a specific public and one of the many constituents of the larger 
Arab public sphere, Al Jazeera dedicated one of its weekly shows to another segment of 
Arab society, the women. The idea of "Lin-Nisaa' Faqat" (For Women Only) was to 
address the issue of Arab women whose voice has long been silenced or unheard for 
various reasons. The programme lasted for three and a half years and has been hosted by 
leading Al Jazeera female presenters including Khadija Benguenna, Laila Chaieb, 
Muntaha al-Ramahi and Luna Chebel. 
 
Dedicating airtime for women in Arab television is not unprecedented. Almost every 
single channel has their own women show but they all fit in one single framework 
portraying the woman as only concerned with such particular types of shows as cooking, 
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fashion, and music. Al Jazeera's women's show, although not ignoring these issues, 
added new dimensions and refocused its lenses more on political, social and cultural 
issues. The analysis of the 162 episodes of the programme shows that all the topics 
discussed over three and a half years
29
 could be classified into nine major categories as 
displayed in the table below: 
Categorization of topics discussed in Al Jazeera's "Lin-Nisaa' Faqat" show 
 Topics Number Percentage 
1.  Social issues 64 39.5% 
2.  Political issues 27 16.66% 
3.  Cultural issues 20 12.34% 
4.  Human Rights issues 12 7.4% 
5.  Economic issues 12 7.4% 
6.  Health issues 10 6.17% 
7.  Religious issues 8 4.93% 
8.  Educational issues 5 3.08% 
9.  Feminism 4 2.46% 
Total  162 100% 
 
As the figures in the table show, nearly 70% of the total number of the episodes focused 
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7
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th
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on social, political and cultural issues. These are the main topics around which the new 
women's discourse revolved and has been structured. Contrary to similar shows on other 
Arab television stations where these common issues are rarely addressed, "For Women 
Only" gained an unparalleled popularity among Arab women who found their general 
concerns displayed and discussed freely.      
 
The guests of Benguenna and her colleagues ranged from female politicians and civil 
society activists to academics and professionals from various backgrounds. The topics 
discussed openly over the years in these TV shows created an unprecedented level of 
interest and engagement among women from all around the Arab world.  
 
Not only did these interactive shows bring to light previously untold stories and gave a 
voice to a large sector of Arab society, but they also brought Arab women closer to one 
another. The diverse and wide-ranging discussion agendas emphasized the common 
ground and highlighted the general issues that unite Arab women through their social, 
political and cultural differences. It is a unique platform through which Arab women 
created their own public sphere and made their voice heard.      
 
Apart from the women and the youth oriented platforms, Al Jazeera has provided its 
viewers with another specific platform around which a third type of public sphere 
emerged, a religious one. Al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat (Sharia and life) is one of two shows 
that started since Al Jazeera has gone on air in November 1996 and is still being 
broadcast to millions of viewers, not only in the Arab world but also across the Muslim 
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world.
30
 As religion plays a central role in the daily life of many people in the region, the 
show, hosted by the leading scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, enjoys an unparalleled 
popularity.  
 
It is not the purely religious aspect of the show that makes it appeal to a vast majority of 
viewers, but the innovative and engaging way of linking the religious content, presented 
by one of the highest authorities in the Muslin Sunni world
31
, with the current issues of 
politics and society. This particular community of viewers, that extends literally across 
the world, follows this show not only for educational purposes or to seek answers to their 
individual questions, which they can find easily elsewhere, but to hear al-Qaradawi's 
interpretations of the current affairs and understand what happens around them through 
his religious lens. A close examination of the topics discussed by al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat 
explains the reason why the show managed to attract such a wide range of viewers and 
form what could be considered as a religiously oriented public sphere.  
 
Surprisingly, and contrary to the widely held perception that the programme deals only 
with purely religious issues as opposed to other talk shows designed to discuss political, 
cultural or social matters, the analysis of 489 episodes aired over ten years (2001 to 
2010) indicates that the religious topics that al-Qaradawi discussed during this period 
                                                           
30 In addition to its groundbreaking news reporting, Al Jazeera has been known for its numerous  
programmes of live debates and talk shows, including al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis (the Opposite Direction), 
Akthar min Ra'ay (More the One Opinion), al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat (Sharia and Life), Dhaif wa Qadhya 
(A Guest and an Issue), 'Hiwar Maftou'h (Open Debate), Bila 'Hudoud (Without Borders). Ma wara al-
Khabar (Beyond the News), Minbar al-Jazeera (The Al Jazeera Platform) etc. Out of all these 
programmes, only Al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat has and al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis have been running regularly for 
fifteen years without stop. 
31 Besides the innovative content of the show and the availability of Al Jazeera almost anywhere in the 
world, the host of al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat enjoys a unique status in the Arab-Muslim world. Yusuf al-
Qaradawi is the co-founder and president of the International Union for Muslim Scholars; chairman of 
the European Council for Fatwa and Research; until recently he was chairman of the widely visited 
website (islamonline.com). In 2008, al-Qaradawi was voted the 3rd most intellectual person in the 
world on the list of Top 100 Public Intellectuals by Prospect Magazine and Foreign Policy.     
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represent less than 25% of the total number of shows. Almost two thirds of these 
episodes addressed political, cultural, social and economic issues. What makes the 
discussion of these issues by an ordinary professional television presenter different from 
discussing them by the host of al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat is the religious aspect and the 
spiritual depth with which al-Qaradawi addresses his topics.  
 
From this perspective, political events taking place in different historical circumstances 
and different geographical areas such as the Palestinian Intifada in 2000-01, the war in 
Afghanistan in 2001, the Iraq war 2003, the Israeli-Hizbollah war in 2006, the Gaza war 
in 2008-09, are not separate events.
32
 They are just different manifestations of a global 
conflict between the right and the wrong, the believers and the non-believers, the 
occupied and the occupiers, the Muslim Ummah and its enemies. This is clearly 
displayed in the discourse of al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat which tries to piece these events 
together and find a common thread linking them to one another. In so doing, the 
programme also links the religious community together by addressing what they 
perceive as common issues with which they all identify and feel concerned. 
Categorization of topics discussed in Al Jazzera's "al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat" show 
 Topics Number Percentage 
1.  political issues 146 29.85% 
2.  cultural issues 112 22.9% 
3.  religious issues 101 20.65% 
                                                           
32 All these events happened in these ten years and this is probably why we find that political issues 
ranked very high in the table above. 
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4.  social issues 41 8.38% 
5.  moral issues 27 5.52% 
6.  economic issues 21 4.29% 
7.  Fatwas 17 3.47% 
8.  educational issues 8 1.63% 
9.  general issues 16 3.27% 
Total  489 100% 
 
This open forum which has been broadcasting for over fifteen years to millions of people 
worldwide has undoubtedly contributed a great deal to the shaping of a new religious 
awareness in which politics, society and culture are central issues. It is this kind of 
awareness that transformed individual viewers from different countries into one 
extended community of likeminded interlinked public meeting regularly and freely 
discussing common issues. Over the years, al-Shari'a wal-'Hayat as a platform and  al-
Qaradawi as a host and a leading religious figure in the Arab and Muslim world created 
a religious public sphere where religion is no longer confined within the traditional 
spiritual and moral frames, but deeply involved in the "worldly" concerns of people. 
 
2. Characteristics and defining features of the new Arab public sphere 
 
Al Jazeera has undoubtedly played a leading role in the creation of the new Arab public 
sphere and giving it its defining characteristics. However, it would be wrong to claim 
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that this rapidly expanding universe of Arabs, actively engaged in public arguments 
about political issues, is generated by one single media outlet. Competing satellite 
television channels, independently operated newspapers, community gatherings, and 
other forms of public discourse, all contributed to varying degrees to the emergence of 
the Arab public sphere. The unprecedented proliferation of new communication 
technologies and social media networks further extended the reach and influence of 
satellite television and added new dimensions to this emerging Arab public sphere. 
Following are the key characteristics and defining features of this emerging 
communicative space. 
 
1. Keeping in line with the Habermasian tradition, most of those who wrote about the 
Arab public sphere characterize it as an arena of unfettered, critical and rational debates 
of issues of interest to Arab communities around the world.
33
 This character also 
reminds us of the Kantian conception of enlightenment, which entails first and foremost 
the free public use of reason. Using our reason to critically discuss social and political 
issues is a practice that can only bring about enlightening among nations, says Kant. 
An enlightened nation is a nation whose citizens have the right to reason freely, 
critically and publically to deliver it from despotism and oppression. Here, the 
Kantian notion of enlightenment establishes a clear rapport between the existence of a 
vibrant public sphere and the rise of a democratic society. The emergence of an Arab 
public sphere consisting of an expanding number of autonomous platforms for free 
and open discussion is having visible political implications. The exposure of large 
segments of Arab societies to almost daily talk shows, in which growing numbers of 
elites, political activists and ordinary people take part, resulted in the formation of 
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protest movements sweeping several Arab countries. The democratizing effects of 
these social movements will undoubtedly be more visible as the new Arab public 
sphere institutionalizes and assumes clearer political functions. 
 
2. The fast expanding social media infrastructure offers alternative communicative 
frameworks for the new Arab public to connect, communicate and generate its 
oppositional counter-discourse away from the confinement of formal institutions linked 
to, or recognized by the state and its public authorities. With the growing capacity to use 
new media and communication technologies, share boundless amounts of uncensored 
information, and actively engage in discussion of public affairs, the new Arab public 
sphere should be understood as being open, discursive, participative and above all, 
communication-based sphere. It is no longer necessary for public debates and 
discussions of issues of public import to occur face-to-face or take place in physically 
pre-defined locations. Access to these debates is now unrestricted and widely open to 
anyone with a TV set, a personal computer with internet access, or even a smart mobile 
phone. Former barriers and traditional restrictive factors such as class, gender, language, 
nationality, formal education etc. are now things of the past. This is not to suggest in any 
way that the new modes of satellite and online interconnectedness are removed from the 
real world or operate independently from the compulsions of social, political and 
economic realities. The recent political developments in the Arab world show clearly 
how the divide between the so called "virtual" and "real" worlds is superficial and has 
become completely obsolete.  
 
3. Stretching from Morocco in Northwestern Africa to Iraq  in Western Asia, the Arab 
public consists of more than quarter a billion speakers of one single language albeit with 
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different accents and variations. Looking at this public from a mass media perspective, 
the Arab region contains "one of the largest single-language audiences in the world."
34
 
Among the early media ventures that targeted the Arab public and reached across 
national borders, bringing Arab audiences together was Sawt al-'Arab radio station (the 
voice of the Arabs) broadcasting from Cairo in the 1950s and 1960s. The radio, as Laura 
James remarks, "deliberately created a sense of national identity that had previously 
existed in, at most, a latent form."
35
 Apart from the fact that Sawt al-'Arab was primarily 
used as a political tool to promote the Nasserist version of Arab nationalism, it 
succeeded in creating a particular form of Arab public and pulling the rug from 
underneath local media outlets. In more recent times, the Arab public has been brought 
together again by satellite television and new media technologies with increased 
importance and significance. This explains, in part, the ongoing global struggle for the 
"hearts and minds of Arabs", exemplified by the proliferation of international 
broadcasters from different countries with competing agendas. What unites them all is 
the language in which they address the Arab publics. This linguistic dimension is 
omnipresent in the minds of Al Jazeera's executives whose target audience is clearly 
identified as "one" Arab public rather than a multitudes of publics dispersed in twenty 
two separate countries. Explaining the linguistic factor in the formation of the new pan-
Arab public, chief language monitor, J. A. stresses the unifying function of using 
standard Arabic:  
 
By avoiding the use of dialects spoken in different Arab countries and using the official 
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Arabic language, we avoided criticism such as why don't you use Egyptian dialect or 
Syrian or Iraqi or Moroccan dialects etc. It's all about influence, when we use the official 
Arabic language; Arab audiences from the Ocean to the Gulf understand one language 
away from these dialects. When people in the whole Arab world listen to, and hear the 
same language and understand every word of it, this is a unifying factor, psychologically 
even, not only culturally. And that has an impact which cannot be ignored by 
sociologists who would look at this aspect.
36
  
 
The unifying function of using one language to communicate with one audience is 
obviously not enough to build a united Arab public. To clarify this point, J. A. gives the 
example of the BBC Arabic service, whose identity is British although its speaks the 
Arabic language. With language comes the unified perspective from which Al Jazeera 
presents and discusses the range of issues it covers. Because we talk a language which 
can be understood by everyone, and we deal with issues which are common to all these 
peoples, that we can speak of the Al Jazeera's role in creating a pan-Arabic role, says J. 
A. Discussing common issues from the same perspective affects people' lives, builds a 
shared identity amongst them, and highlights their historical interconnectedness. Issues 
such as the Palestinian cause, the occupation of Iraq, the split of Sudan into two separate 
states, the Algerian-Moroccan conflict over the Western Sahara, are just a few examples 
of numerous complex issues of common interest to an Arab public communicating in 
one unifying language. 
 
4. Besides the unifying factors that justify, to some extent, the use of the term pan-Arab 
public, there is another aspect to this analysis. As I have demonstrated above, the broad 
Arab public sphere is in reality composed of multiple Arab public spheres. We can 
distinguish between three sub-publics or key components of this general Arab public 
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sphere. There is a youth public sphere in which the discussion topics are largely focused 
on issues of general concerns to the younger generations. The members of this specific 
sphere communicate to each other through the use of new media and the latest 
communication technologies. There is a women public sphere, where Arab women 
deliberate, through television platforms such as "For Women Only", in engaging social, 
political and cultural debates, away from their traditional confines of cooking, fashion 
and interior décor. And there is a religious public sphere, connecting people with an 
innovative approach to religion. Politics is found to be the core subject discussed in this 
public sphere, and religion is no longer a matter of individual or spiritual concern only. It 
is rather, a unifying force which links people together and shapes their vision regarding 
political, social and cultural issues. After highlighting these three public spheres, it is 
worth mentioning that they are by no means distinct or completely separate from each 
other. Overlaps exist between them in terms of discussion topics, communication tools 
as well as the components of each of them.             
 
5. Being part of the larger Islamic world, and building on the historic tradition of the 
religious-oriented public discourse, the new Arab public sphere extends in some ways 
beyond its Arab context. The sense of belonging to one Arab communicative and 
geopolitical space has always overlapped and sometimes competed with the sense of 
belonging to the wider Islamic space. This wider circle of likeminded publics sharing the 
same concerns and often debating the same issues across languages, cultures and 
national identities constitutes another dimension of the emerging Arab public sphere. 
Thus, the communicatively constructed identity of Arab publics, symbolized by the term 
"Arabness" should be understood within the framework of the wider "Ummah" and the 
additional values that come with it. The successful democratic experiences in some non-
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Arab Islamic countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, have always stimulated 
intense debate among Arabs as to the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The 
Turkish model in particular is frequently invoked in these public debates, especially after 
the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions which seek to secure successful transition towards 
democracy. Contributing to this debate at a conceptual level, Ayish prefers using the 
term “’Islamocracy’ or Islamic democracy as a defining political concept for the 
development of a genuine Arab public sphere that draws on cherished moral Arab-
Islamic values and contemporary political traditions.”37 
 
6. Constructed in the process of open debate and rational argumentation, and 
continuously exposed to pluralistic views, the new Arab public sphere can only be an 
effective tool for democratic change. Public discourse generated through the use of 
internet and other new media is likely to change the way people in region see 
themselves and evaluate their political role. For, these tools are intrinsically 
democratic, and if wisely used by informed publics, they can exert pressure and foster 
the intellectual enfranchisement that opens the way for political participation. As Jon 
Alterman observes, among the obvious consequences of more diversified views being 
more widely communicated is the increased political involvement of those who 
receive and interact with such competing views. According to Alterman, "For most in 
the Arab world, technological change means that they are exposed to a broader variety 
of views than has ever been true before. As literacy and bandwidth both expand 
dramatically, publics are exposed to a broad, often unregulated, spectrum of views 
that range from secular to religious, from nationalist to global, and from material to 
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spiritual."
38
 This wide variety of perspectives is likely to drive modernization of 
political values, attitudes and the whole fabric of Arab political culture as notes Kai 
Hafez. Despite the limited effect of Arab mass media on the concrete political 
decisions of those in power, "it is surely possible that they might have far-reaching 
influence on the political agenda of public opinion and on the framing of political 
discourse that is related to the political opinions, values, attitudes and political 
cultures of Arab populations."
39
 In this way, the new Arab public sphere should be 
understood in the context of the ongoing dynamics of democratic change in the 
region. Democratizing public discourse and diversifying its producers, consumers and 
mediating channels is certainly a positive aspect of this public sphere. However, it 
should be noted that there is another dimension to exposing this emerging public to a 
constant flow of a wide variety of conflicting views and competing arguments: 
fragmentation. 
 
Within Al Jazeera, not everyone agrees to this. News producer N. L., wants to be very 
cautious when talking about an Arab public sphere. Not only because concepts are 
culture specific and trying to apply them onto other cultural and social settings has 
always proved to be problematic, but also because no serious theoretical attempts has 
been made to adapt the concept of the public sphere to the Arab society. Although the 
concept itself is so attractive says N. L., there is a need to make a clear distinction 
between the different epistemological contexts in which concepts emerge and 
develop. How can we move concepts from one particular setting to another he asks: 
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We know that concepts are conditioned by their cultural, social and political 
environments and using concepts out of their particular environments is not possible 
without one crucial epistemological condition: the conceptual function of a particular 
concept within a particular discourse. In the absence of that condition, the discourse 
becomes detached and removed from its social reality. It looks at, and perceives this 
reality through the lens of another theoretical framework that has initially been 
developed to account for the mood and mindset of a European society, a specific 
society in Europe.
40
 
 
The normative aspect of the concept of the public sphere which makes it appeal to 
theorists of democracy and advocates of political change, is confronted with 
additional difficulties in the Arab context. As N. L. remarks, we do not have one 
single "Arab society", we have a multiplicity of Arab societies and there are 
considerable differences between them in terms of internal mutual recognition and the 
available spaces of public deliberation. Lebanon is different from Bahrain or Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria is nothing like Morocco or Egypt. Any discussion of the public 
sphere has to take these differences into account. Even the term "Arab media" needs 
to be treated very cautiously according to N. L. especially when we talk about 
national television which plays different and sometimes contradictory roles in 
different countries. Al Jazeera tried over the years to provide a platform for the 
emergence of an Arab public sphere but its effect remains limited. Only social media 
networks have the real potential to build an Arab public sphere thinks N. L. He insists 
on distinguishing between blogs which are intended to express personal views and to which 
public access is restricted, and social media networks such as Facebook, which could be truly 
regarded as a public sphere, even though at the virtual level only. The formalities users have 
to run through when using these networks such as choosing your list of friends and engage 
with them in unrestricted discussions over an unlimited number of issues, indicate that they 
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all belong to one interactive open space. There are sets of common moral rules among friends 
of the same list remarks Louati. and "there are also recurrent practices and behaviors such as 
"like", "share", each of which has an argumentative value.
41 
 
To conclude, I shall reinstate that, as a byproduct of the interaction between satellite 
television and social media networks on the one hand, and the general public of 
viewers and users on other hand, the new Arab public sphere is an arena of free, 
unregulated critical rational debates. Although it is vastly participative, open-to-all and 
transnational in scope the democratizing effects of the new Arab public sphere should 
not be overestimated. As noted by Louati, we should look at these effects more 
carefully and consider all the competing discourses within its contours.  
Under the surface of what looks a unified, sharing the same identity, and united by the 
same narrative, there lies a polarized and divided space. Far from being uniform and 
homogeneous, this pan-Arab public space is indeed composed of rival sub-spaces 
"deeply riven with intense disagreements, with discourse seemingly tending toward 
greater radicalism."
42
 
Divides occurring along various social, ethic, cultural and ideological lines are often 
represented and sometimes magnified online and through television screens. I addition to 
the three sub-publics highlighted above (youth, women. religion), the Arab public sphere  
is also composed of three or four competing ideological tendencies which can be clearly 
seen on Al Jazeera, as Mohammed El Oifi remarks. The analysis of the ideological 
tendencies "and editorial line of Al Jazeera in light of the programs it offers, the subjects 
it emphasizes and the allegiances its leading figures have, reveals a subtle balance 
                                                           
41 Ibid. 
42 Lynch,  Voices of the New Arab Public, p. 35 
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between three trends: the Arabist, the Islamic and the liberal."
43
 To these three 
ideological and political trends I would also add a fourth one, the left, which represents 
another distinct ideological trend with a political presence in much of the Arab world. 
These divides are especially heightened in critical social and political circumstances 
during which members of deliberating groups predictably tend to move towards more 
extreme views. This worrying aspect of Arab public sphere raises serious questions 
about the limits of the democratizing effects of Al Jazeera, especially in light of the 
extraordinary proliferation of communication technologies. However, the emergence of 
a new Arab public sphere, regardless of the controversy it brings with it, remains one 
aspect of the democratization process in the region. Other aspects of this process will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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 El Oifi, Mohammed. "Influence without Power, p. 73  
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Chapter 7: 
Al Jazeera's democratization effect 
 
Al Jazeera may turn out to be the pioneer of experimental, risk-taking and audience-
driven programming that drives a range of changes within and between Arab states. 
Jon B. Alterman (2005) 
The power of the media continues to grow dramatically and influence policy 
processes at different levels. The advent of the popular 24-hour international 
television news channel known as Cable News Network, or CNN had a major impact 
on the way U.S. foreign policy is conducted. On the military field, television's 
instantly transmitted images from the battle grounds have also altered the way 
strategic level decisions are made.
1
 The omnipresence of cameras waiting at every 
corner to cover unfolding events and broadcast them live makes policymakers and 
warfighters alike, plan carefully every move beforehand and watch out for their 
political and military behavior. To conceptualize these developments and demarcate 
the dynamics of the changing the relations between the media and power-holders, 
scholars came up with the term "CNN effect". 
The "CNN effect" is a catchall phrase that has been used to describe a whole complex 
phenomena produced by the exponentially increase of the media power and influence. 
Perhaps the best definition is the one used by Steven Livingston, who defines it as a 
loss of policy control on the part of policy makers because of the power of the media, 
                                                           
1 CNN has risen to global prominence especially because of its unparalleled comprehensive coverage 
of the first Gulf war. 
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a power that they can do nothing about. According to Livingston, the "CNN effect" 
could be seen as functioning at three different ways: it is a policy agenda-setting 
agent; an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, and thirdly an 
accelerant to policy decision-making.
2
 
The phenomenal advances in satellite and communication technologies and the 
proliferation of the CNN-type news networks extended the media effect even further 
and increased its influence to cover almost all sides of social and political life. The 
phenomenal emergence of Al Jazeera in the mid-1990s pushed the boundaries of the 
CNN effect and brought into the debate a broader range of issues. As mentioned by 
Cassara and Lengel, comparing "Al Jazeera effect" to the "CNN effect" is not 
uncommon. Whenever international news coverage is invoked, one regularly 
encounters the comment "what the 1991 Gulf War did for CNN, the 2003 Gulf War 
has done for Al Jazeera."
3
 Or, to use Ralph Berenger's terms, "the CNN effect has 
become the Al Jazeera effect."
4
 But, unlike the debate over the CNN effect, which 
focused primarily on the US foreign policy and the military-media relations, the Al 
Jazeera effect
5
 is more about changing the Arab media and influencing domestic and 
regional politics. In societies where autocratic rule is the norm, like in the Arab 
setting, changing the media and changing politics should be seen as two interrelated 
and inseparable processes. 
                                                           
2 Livingston, Steven. "Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to 
Type of Military Intervention, The Joan Shorenstein Center, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government (1997). 
3 Cassara, C. and Lengel L. "Move over CNN: Al Jazeera's View of the World Takes On the West" 
Transnational Broadcasting Studies Journal -TBS (Spring - Summer 2004). 
4 Berenger, Ralph D. "International Middle East Media Challenge Cultural Imperialism Thesis" Global 
Media Journal, Arabian Edition (Summer/Fall 2011),Vol.1, No.2) p. 100 
5 In 2008, Philip Seib of the University of South California, wrote "The Al Jazeera Effect: How the 
New Global Media are Reshaping World Politics" (Potomac Books Inc. 2008). 
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In this regard, the powerful role played by Al Jazeera in reshaping the Arab media 
landscape has undoubtedly influenced, to varying degrees, the internal politics in a 
number of countries and affected inter-state relations in the Arab world as a whole. 
Assisted with the growing power of new media and communication technologies, the 
"Al Jazeera effect" attracted much attention over the last fifteen years and it does not 
seem to fade away any time soon. The heated debate over democratic change that has 
accompanied the recent political developments sweeping the region makes the Al 
Jazeera effect a continued topical issue and a recurring subject in the political 
discourse. 
Based on the data collected from interviews with selected members of the network 
staff, this chapter analyses the Al Jazeera effect and its role in the democratization 
process in the Arab world. Regardless of whether it is a direct or indirect effect, the 
traditional theoretical paradigms, as discussed in earlier chapters, do not seem to fully 
explain the role of the media in democratization. In this respect, the old structure vs. 
agency debate is certainly unable to inform us if Al Jazeera is a political agent 
operating freely from the constraints of existing social structures, or is profoundly 
structured within the wider historical, cultural, political, and social institutions of the 
Arab setting. The findings of this study suggest that the concepts of structure and 
agency that always stood in opposition need to be reconsidered and reviewed in the 
light of the new communicative environment. Structure and agency should no longer 
be seen as separate entities from each other; they are at all times engaged in a constant 
dynamic interplay. 
Being part of this ongoing dynamic process, Al Jazeera, like any other influential 
media, owes its success, partly to an early self-awareness of its capability to have a 
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real impact on Arab politics,
6
 and partly to the fact that it is deeply anchored in the 
socio-political and cultural fabric of the region where it belongs. 
Building on the previous chapter on the emergence of an Arab public sphere and its 
manifest implications on the process of political change, Al Jazeera's democratizing 
effect will be analyzed along the following four lines of enquiry: 1. Changing the 
media landscape and its impact on changes in the political field 2.  Breaking the 
information monopoly as an indication of the weakness and retreat of autocratic 
regimes 3. The opinion and the other opinion and the introduction of a pluralistic 
political culture 4. Old and new media: from competition to complementarity. 
 
1. Towards Arab democratization: changing the media landscape 
As discussed in chapter III on the media-politics relationship, changing the media 
often leads to fundamental changes in the political field and reshapes power relations 
in non-democratic societies. The existence of free and independent media is, to a large 
extent, a pre-condition for enabling the general public to exercise freedom of 
expression, which in turn, constitutes one of the essential foundations of pluralistic 
and democratic societies. As Fadl al-Ameri remarks, "free and independent media are 
key tools for democratic change and consolidation of democracy. Moreover, the right 
to free media is an integral part of human rights; it is a fundamental right for 
individuals and groups alike to express their views, opinions and beliefs. Reforming 
                                                           
6 Since the launch of Al Jazeera, there has been a long debate about its identity and the role it should 
play to positively influence its sociopolitical environment. This collective debate culminated in 2004 
by drafting what has been called "Mission and Vision", where we read: "While promoting public 
awareness of local and global issues, Al Jazeera aspires to be a bridge between cultures, to support 
people's right to knowledge, and to strengthen the values of democracy and the respect of liberties and 
human rights".    
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the media is therefore an essential stage in the process of political democracy."
7
 
Students of Arab media and their role in political change always refer to Al Jazeera as 
the leading institution, not only in reforming the media, but in revolutionizing them 
and enabling citizens to exert more pressure towards political change. As Kai Hafez 
remarks, "many observers assume that Arab media are the vanguard of a democratic 
revolution and that they, especially their icon Al-Jazeera, are 'rattling' authoritarian 
governments."
8
 
Inside Al Jazeera, the editorial staff seems to be fully aware of the role of free media 
in building democracy. We cannot imagine a democratic society without guaranteeing 
the right of the citizens to free media, says news producer Louati: 
When Al Jazeera talks about democracy, it talks about the fundamental right of its 
viewers to be informed with accurate information about what happens around them. 
Their right to free media which do not distort reality or embellish it, but present what 
goes on in their local and regional environment as well as in the context of the world 
we live in. We need the media to help us develop a vision according which we can 
deal with issues that face us in our daily life.
9
 
Before Al Jazeera, Arab media were largely dominated by governments, as part of 
their tightened control over political and social life. Across the Arab world, television 
channels, radio stations and print press were either owned, financed and run by the 
state or belonged to individuals and agencies connected to governments directly or 
indirectly. In Cassara and Lengel's terms, Al Jazeera "has challenged the tradition of 
                                                           
7 Al-Ameri, Fadl T. 'Hurriyaul I'ilam fil-Watan al-'Arabi (Freedom of the Media in the Arab World) 
(Hala Publishing, 2011) p. 40  
8 Hafez, Kai. " The Role of Media in the Arab World’s Transformation Process" in C. Hanelt, A. 
Möller (eds.), Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East II (Gütersloh & Berlin, 2008) p. 322 
9
 Researcher's interview with N. Louati, May 2011.  
216 
 
state-controlled television in the Arab world and, in the process, threatened 
government interpretations of news in the region."
10
 
Although Al Jazeera is owned by the state of Qatar and its budget comes from the 
Qatari government, its editorial policy and news agenda are set independently by its 
management and editorial staff. The distance between those who fund and those who 
set the editorial line has given the network a unique status and guaranteed its 
autonomy since the beginning. J. A., one of the founding figures of Al Jazeera 
believes that this exceptional relationship with the government is very unique. 
Although the channel broadcasts from Qatar, it does not speak for the Qatari government as 
does the country's national television. He insists on the fact that the founding team knew and 
realized from the start, "before even we went on air, we were given that sort of status that we 
are not a Qatari channel in the sense of speaking for of the Qatari government.
11
  
This status not only allowed Al Jazeera to speak for the wider Arab public but Also to 
become the preferred and most trusted platform for the ordinary "men of street". They 
use this platform to address their concerns, raise issues of public interest and more 
importantly question power holders regardless of their position within the state 
hierarchy. Unlike national television stations which always echo the official line and 
speaks for their respective governments, Al Jazeera represented, for many Arabs, an 
alternative voice reaching out to political authorities and decision-makers wherever 
they are. In the absence of professional and credible local media, ordinary citizens in 
remote areas of Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Iraq or Mauritania, pick up the phone, come 
on Al Jazeera screen, and question their officials and government ministers. As J. A., 
observes, this behavior has become a common practice among viewers of Al Jazeera. 
                                                           
10 Cassara, Catherine and Lengel, Laura. "Move over CNN: Al Jazeera's View of the World Takes On 
the West" Transnational Broadcasting Studies Journal -TBS (Spring - Summer 2004). 
11 Researcher's interview with J. Azar, April 2011. 
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"We have people who get hold of the telephone and say hello I want to speak, I want to 
question or challenge the Minister, the head of government, the Prime Minister or the 
President", he says.
12
 What makes this practice even more influential is the fact that whatever 
is said on the phone goes live on air, not only because of Al Jazeera's anti-censorship policy 
but also because technically the channel does not use the mechanism of time delay that allows  
it to filter phone calls. 
In this way, Al Jazeera not only represents an alternative media channel conveying 
people's concerns, and mediating between them and their governments, but has also 
played, to varying degrees, the role of political representation. In Mohamed Zayani's 
terms, the channel filled not only a media void but also a political void. In the absence 
of political pluralism in the Arab world, he observes, "Al Jazeera plays a de facto pan-
Arab opposition and a forum for resistance. It provides a voice for Arab opposing 
views and a high-profile platform for political dissidents."
13
 In playing this 
remarkably active role, "Arab media almost seem like a replacement for political 
parties", notes Kai Hafez.
14
 The failure of the so called Arab parliaments or shura 
(consultation) councils in representing their citizens and holding the executive power 
to account produced a sense of frustration and generalized the lack of confidence in 
political institutions in much of the region. 
This remarkable status that enabled Al Jazeera to gain the trust of Arab audiences and 
represent their views and aspirations is one of the obvious results of the "reputation it 
has won for independent reporting that sharply contrasts with the commonly known 
                                                           
12 Ibid. 
13 Zayani, Mohamed. "Al Jazeera and the Vicissitudes of the New Arab Mediascape" in Mohamed 
Zayani (eds.) The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media (Pluto Press, 
2005), p. 2 
14
 Hafez, Kai. Arab Satellite Broadcasting: Democracy without Political Parties", Transnational 
Broadcasting Studies Vol. 15, 2006. (www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall05/Hafez.html). 
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state-sponsored news coming from other media outlets in the Arab world"
15
 as rightly 
points Maha Bashri. The growing political influence exerted by Al Jazeera over Arab 
publics may, in certain circumstances, translate into action and end up with 
'activating' the people to take the street for political demonstrations. This has become 
possible, says Jon Alterman, "as control of public opinion increasingly slips away 
from governments' grasp. Those who can organize and mobilize will find a far more 
receptive environment than any time in the recent past."
16
 
The relationship between the emergence of free and independent media and building 
democratic societies is obvious to many of Al Jazeera's employees. Almost all those 
who have been interviewed in the course of this research hold the same opinion 
regarding this issue. Director of news, Mostefa Souag, confirms this clearly: 
Freedom of the media is one of the biggest contributions to promoting democracy and 
human rights… Al Jazeera is a leading institution in defending and promoting 
freedom of the media in every way including in its own practice. Second, when you 
have a free media institution like Al Jazeera, this means you are giving platform to all 
kinds of views about society, politics, economic, culture, religion etc… By giving 
people a platform to express their different opinions, attitudes, analyses and 
understandings, you are creating an environment in which they become aware of the 
real issues that face society and therefore face the building of democracy.
17
  
Liberating the media from the grips of autocratic regimes and making them accessible 
to different groups and individuals regardless of their political and ideological 
affiliations was therefore a remarkable change in the Arab media. This perception is 
shared with news anchor and programme presenter Mohamed Krichen, who believes 
                                                           
15 Bashri, Maha. The Opinion and the Other Opinion: Al Jazeera's Agenda Setting Function in the Arab 
Islamic World (VDM Verlag, Germany 2008) p. 6 
16
 Alterman, Jon. "Information Revolution and the Middle East", The Future Security Environment in 
the Middle East: Conflict, Stability, and Political Chance,  (Rand Report, 2004), p. 244  
17 Researcher's interview with Mostefa Souag, April 2011. 
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that Al Jazeera started its mission of liberating the Arab media space by breaking the 
old system of unequal access to state media:  
Al Jazeera gave voice to Arab dissidents living in exile, or those who lived within the 
Arab world but were deprived from speaking their minds. The first step in this 
mission was just to give the opportunity to speak to people who did not have this 
opportunity. This in itself was a revolution since most of the political leaders and 
opposition figures in the Arab world were, to varying degrees, either imprisoned, 
exiled or facing media blockade.
18
 
Enabling dissidents and giving them access to the media was then conceived by Al 
Jazeera as the first milestone in the process of changing the practices of Arab media. 
Besides, the channel made a significant cultural contribution by raising the people's 
awareness of human rights through "diffusing and widely circulating statements and 
reports of human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, and Reporters Without Borders" as remarks Krichen. The third and most 
important aspect of Al Jazeera's contribution to changing the Arab media landscape 
was the introduction of controversial issues into the public debate. The discussion of 
such issues says Krichen was restricted and open only to closed circles of trust; others 
were excluded. On the contrary, Al Jazeera's talk shows like Al-Ittijah Al-mu'akis (the 
opposite direction) or Akthar min Ra'y (more than one opinion) try to be as inclusive as 
possible. Even at the terminology level we can see the change he adds, "the terms 'opposite 
direction' and 'more than one opinion' are of great significance in the Arab political context. 
because we were only used to hearing 'one opinion' which is almost sacred and irrevocable."
19
 
In doing so, Al Jazeera has built a new culture of diversity and multiplicity of opinions, which 
goes completely against the existing culture of 'the one' opinion that state television always 
try to embellish and impose on viewers.      
                                                           
18 Researcher's interview with Mohamed Krichen, April 2011. 
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Ibid.  
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Airing different views and giving different political and social actors equal access to 
the mass media is particularly important in societies where the government 
monopolizes the public sphere and controls the flow of information at its different 
levels. Not only did Al Jazeera bring into the Arab media scene a new model that is 
pluralistic diversified and largely free from the shackles of the political power, it also 
managed to engage politicians and policy makers publicly and question their power in 
its newscasts and programmes. It has inspired a culture of accountability where 
"leading figures and policy-makers have suddenly become accountable and 
answerable to their public."
20
  
In the absence of free and independent media there would be hardly any real prospect 
for democratization or political change in the proper sense. Al Jazeera has 
undoubtedly been instrumental in resetting the agenda of Arab media and reshaping 
its relationship to the political sphere as points M. Souag: 
When we bring a foreign Minister, a prime Minister, a President, a General etc. for an 
interview on Al Jazeera's screen, we are free to discuss with them any issue and ask 
them any question. This means that people will understand and see them as they are, 
without the myth that is built around them in their own countries ruled by 
dictatorship. If you take any Arab country where the system is dictatorial, you will 
find that the media try to make the President into a mythical figure, so far away from 
realty.
21
   
In this way, Al Jazeera unpacks and demystifies the political world in the eyes of 
ordinary citizens by showing them the real side of their leaders. It is an ongoing 
practice that has had a clear effect on both the role of the media as well as people's 
perception of politics and political change. While undoing what state media has done 
in terms of mythicizing political leaders and turning them into a sort of imagined 
                                                           
20 Zayani, "Al Jazeera and the Vicissitudes of the New Arab Mediascape", p. 2 
21 Researcher's interview with M. Souag, April 2011. 
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beings, Al Jazeera is building a new political culture in the region. Exposing 
government officials and state leaders in such an interactive communicative 
environment, not only contributes to raising people's awareness of the limitation of 
their leaders, but also engages them politically and creates among them the desire for 
change and to look for alternative leadership. 
It is true that the Al Jazeera effect did not completely reshape all Arab media, and that 
national television stations in most of the Arab world still function in almost the same 
way, except for the introduction of talk shows and debate programmes in privately 
owned stations in certain countries.
22
 However, the Arab media landscape is now 
much different from that in the 1990s and the process of change is ongoing on two 
major tracks. First, the proliferation of Arab-speaking satellite television stations such 
as Deutsche Welle (2002), Al-Hurra (2004), France 24 (2006), Russia Today (2007), 
BBC Arabic (2008), Euronews (2010). The most recent channel is Sky News Arabia 
that launched in May 2012. Second, the proliferation of new media and 
communication technologies and the extraordinarily rapid increase in the numbers of 
users.   
The implications of these technologies are not confined to individual users but also to 
traditional media outlets which seem to be using them extensively and effectively to 
extend their reach and influence. The combined effect of old and new media, 
especially in the form of social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, is 
profound and multidimensional. Empowering people through giving them open access 
to uncensored and unrestricted information is just one aspect of these changes. 
                                                           
22 Egypt in particular has seen an upsurge of this style of programming especially on "Dream", "Al- 
Mehwar TVs. The Moroccan French speaking "2M" also features interesting debates in many of its 
programmes. Responding to local political realities, a number of Lebanese television channels, host 
lively political talk shows. 
222 
 
2. Breaking the information monopoly 
These profound changes in the media sphere meant in the first place that government 
control over information is no longer possible. Partly, because the leading role played 
by Al Jazeera in changing the Arab media and reshaping its relationship with politics 
and power holders created a "journalistic field" to borrow Pierre Bourdieu's term. 
Among the most apparent implications of the emergence of a journalistic field is to 
reverse the tide of influence that autocratic regimes generally exert over the media 
through monopolizing the process and circulation of information, especially 
government information. This monopoly, notes Bourdieu, "provides government 
authorities with weapons for manipulating the news or those in charge of transmitting 
it."
23
 
The emergence of an Arab autonomous journalistic field, capable of setting its own 
agenda away from governmental and commercial pressures, made it possible for 
media institutions and satellite television in particular, to bring the government 
monopoly of information to an end. Moreover, through this emerging journalistic 
field, the media started to "profoundly modify power relationships within other 
fields"
24
 and exert an increasing influence over politicians who, quite often find 
themselves forced to adapt their actions, appearances and sometimes discourses to fit 
the journalistic agenda, not the other way round. The increasing power that the mass 
media have acquired is not limited to the amount of information distributed through 
various and sometimes uncontrollable channels, and which deeply affected the role of 
autocratic governments to manage information in their favor. It is also about re-
presenting politics to the publics and the ability of these media to set the conditions 
                                                           
23 Bourdieu, Pierre. On Television and Journalism (Pluto Press, 1998) p. 69. 
24 Ibid., p. 68. 
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for politicians to appear on their platforms. It is about framing politics or 'packaging' 
it, to use John Street's term, through to use of images, interviews, sound-bites and 
other appearance techniques in reporting and telling political stories.
25
 
This profoundly transformed media-politics relationship made it extremely delicate 
and sometimes tantalizing for politicians to access the journalistic field and get their 
messages through. Prior to the arrival of Al Jazeera, journalists and media outlets used 
to go through a fierce competition to gain access to politicians or their information 
officers, and quite often access is given  after substantial concessions on the side of 
journalists and the media in general. Now, on the contrary, the competition is among 
politicians to secure appearances through the media, particularly on Al Jazeera's 
screen. To gain access to millions of viewers nationally and across the region, 
politicians no longer have the luxury to say whatever they wish to say without being 
questioned or challenged. They have to accept that their message is conveyed to its 
recipients 'packaged' and accompanied with a whole set of other competing messages. 
They know that they are no longer the unique source of information, including official 
or government related information, and that journalists on their part, tap into a variety 
of alternative sources which enable them to face politicians with the right questions. 
In such circumstances politicians have no choice but to 'tell the truth' and provide the 
publics with as much and as accurate information as they could. This is a new era, in 
which governments' ability to monopolize information or manipulate news has 
become impossible or very limited. 
The role played by Al Jazeera in bringing about these profound changes and 
facilitating access to unfettered information for the wider public is perceived by the of 
                                                           
25 See Chapter  2 "Telling Tales: the Reporting of Politics" in Jon Street, Mass Media and Democracy 
(Palgrave, 2001) p. 36-59. 
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the channel's editorial management as a process of 'empowerment' of the Arab public 
through knowledge. Director of news, M. Souag. is clear about the impact of truth-
based knowledge on politics and political attitudes when he emphasizes that 
knowledge is power:  
I know it has become a cliché to say knowledge is power (…), but when you give 
your audience the truth as it is and let them know what is going on, when you give 
them the whole truth and nothing but the truth, you are empowering them because 
they are gaining knowledge. Gaining knowledge about their own living conditions, 
about the situation of their politicians and power holders etc. means you are 
empowering them.
26
 
Once the public is empowered with knowledge based on true information they are 
well placed to judge their own politicians and make informed decisions on who to 
choose as their rulers. Al Jazeera's mission is not to tell people how to vote or who to 
choose, says M. S., but to present the public with the necessary information to help 
them make the right decision. People are intelligent enough to make their own decisions, 
all they need is knowledge an true information upon which they can decide. They do not need 
guidance or instructions  as to whom they should vote for. This has nothing to do with  
professional journalism, "just bring politicians on screen, let them show their agendas and 
people will make their choices.
27
  
Learning to make informed decisions about political choice is certainly a major step 
in the process of democratization. Al Jazeera's contribution to this process by opening 
access to information and widening the scope of politically engaged public at the 
regional level is obvious. Its international contribution towards engaging more people 
is also undeniable, especially after the introduction of additional languages to deliver 
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its content. However, the impact of its global presence did not wait until the launch of 
its English online service in 2003 or Al Jazeera English in 2006. 
In fact, Al Jazeera has risen to prominence in the global arena as early as 2001. Its 
exclusive coverage of the war in Afghanistan attracted the attention of global 
audiences after all the international media failed to remain on the ground and report 
the events independently from the Pentagon's lens. As Hugh Miles mentions, Al 
Jazeera was "the only foreign television broadcaster in Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan at the start of bombing and had the only uplink facility, with which it 
could do live two-way communication with the channel's headquarters in Doha."
28
 
This unrivalled position, in which Al Jazeera found itself, caused the number of 
viewers to multiply exponentially; the rest of international news networks had no 
option but to rely on Al Jazeera's coverage. Its exclusive pictures and videos were 
retransmitted and widely circulated beyond its traditional Arab audience, through the 
screens of other networks such CNN, BBC, SKY News etc. If the coverage of the 
Afghanistan war propelled Al Jazeera to the top of the world's most watched 
television stations, its comprehensive coverage of the 2003 Iraq war consolidated this 
position and turned it from a regional news channel into one of the leading global 
media networks. In doing so, it has established itself as the first channel to contest the 
monopoly of Western-dominated global TV news journalism, as noted by H. Wessler 
and M. Adolphsen.
29
 
The impact of Al Jazeera's journalistic practice at the regional level is coupled with 
another significant impact at the global level. As it has broken state monopoly over 
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information in the Arab world, it has equally challenged the monopoly of information 
internationally. In Miles's terms, "it had broken hegemony of the Western networks, 
and for the first time in hundreds of years, reversed the flow of information, 
historically from West to East."
30
 In many cases, Al Jazeera has become the main and 
sometimes the only news network reporting from certain areas. By serving as an 
"alternative source of information" says Daya Thussu, the channel constitutes a 
textbook example of contra-flow in global media, as it weakens "Anglo-American 
domination of news and current affairs in one of the world's most geo-politically 
sensitive areas".
31
 
3. The opinion and the other opinion 
Giving platform to different views to discuss issues of public concern might seem a 
commonplace practice in much of the Western media and the media operating in 
democratic societies. But, in the Arab media, this was an exception until the arrival of 
Al Jazeera.
32
 Prior to that, media outlets were organically linked to the state apparatus 
either directly or through various government agencies and circles of trust. It is not 
surprising in such an environment to find that the only voice aired on these media is 
the voice of the government and its officials. Political opposition figures and civil 
society activists were generally muted and denied access to their own national media. 
Those who are fortunate enough to leave their countries are occasionally given the 
opportunity to appear on foreign, especially European news services to express their 
opinions. With the launch of Al Jazeera in 1996, Arab dissidents started, for the first 
time, to turn to an Arab country to speak their minds and regularly appear in news 
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bulletins and participate in talk shows. The contrast between the quality of journalism 
it has introduced to the Arab world and the dominating model was unmistakably clear 
since it went on air. As Sherry Ricchiardi points out, "when Al Jazeera burst onto the 
highly controlled and censored Arab media landscape fifteen years ago, the network 
boldly defined itself as "the free press."
33
 
Freedom of the press is what Arab citizens needed most when state media served only 
as tools of propaganda promoting government discourse and viewpoint. The channel's 
content, whether in the form of news or programmes came as a response to the 
audience need or 'hunger' as Noureddine Miladi calls it: "it appeals to a hunger within 
Arab audiences for democracy and freedom of expression, suppressed by decades of 
state control on all media outlets in most Arab countries."
34
 
The Al Jazeera motto "the opinion and the other opinion"
35
 will be regarded as a 
landmark in this turning point in the history of Arab media. Showing different views 
and dealing with news stories from different angles not only changed the nature of the 
media coverage, but also created a new, radically different environment in which 
viewers perceive and interact with the content they receive. Described by media and 
political communication scholars as revolutionary
36
, the role played by Al Jazeera in 
bringing in "the other opinions" cannot be separated from its success story. The 
mastermind behind this simple but influential motto explains the philosophy behind 
what he called "our contract with the audience": 
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This motto was actually one of three propositions that came up during our discussion 
when we were trying to define our identity as a new channel back in 1996. 'The 
opinion and the other opinion', I felt, has more substance and is not just a claim. Once 
it started to appear repeatedly on our screen, we cannot deviate from it. We feel that 
we have the obligation to implement it in our daily practice. It is committing us like a 
contract and it was the reason why Al Jazeera became famous in a very short time.
37
 
Presenting the opinion and the other opinion and giving access to all sides of the story 
is one of the main characteristics of democratic media. It has become a daily practice 
in which a new social reality with a different political culture is emerging. By 
involving multiple actors (state and non-state actors) and facilitating constant 
interaction between them, Al Jazeera is gradually fostering a pluralistic political 
culture and redefining the political scene accordingly.  
The first actor in this process of fostering cultural and political change in favor of 
democracy is the journalistic corps itself. It is the arena where information is 
gathered, processed and then transmitted to the wider audience. To an Arab journalist, 
whose experience in state-run media is limited to talking to state officials and 
promoting one particular discourse, "the opinion and the other opinion" means a 
significant cultural change. To accommodate this change, Al Jazeera had to train 
generations of journalists who joined the station from various Arab countries, but with 
similar attitudes when it comes to dealing with different opinions. J. A., one of the 
founders and a leading member of the team who defined Al Jazeera's editorial policy, 
tells us how the management handled this significant change in the channel's 
organizational culture. When they were training the first generation of journalists, they were 
asking them to include in their reports both points of view, the view of the opposition along 
with that of governments. Because this was unprecedented to most of them, "they were asking 
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questions like: are you serious?"
38
 This was the case argues J. A., because previously, no Arab 
journalist dares to speak about the opposition let alone bring them on air and give them a 
platform. 
To institutionalize this process and have more impact on Arab media, the network 
established a professional training center "to train the next generation" says Roger 
Gafke. Since its launch in 2004, thousands of media professionals from different Arab 
media organizations received training courses along the lines of Al Jazeera's 
journalistic style. Many of those trainees "come from the home channel and others 
from as far away as Tunisia and South Africa. About 11% of its workshops have been 
delivered outside Qatar."
39
  
The second actor in this changing media and political environment is the audience. 
Prior to Al Jazeera and the subsequent satellite news channels that started to populate 
the Arab media world since mid-1990s, newscasts across the region were almost 
monolithic in their format, content and running order. Audiences would normally 
expect political news on their national television to be structured in a way that 
leadership speeches, official visits and protocol activities always top the news 
bulletins lineups. With the advent of Al Jazeera, viewers started to see new faces and 
hear previously unheard discourses. The introduction of proper journalism which 
includes a set of distinctive professional values and practices means that news, 
whether governmental or non-governmental; occupy their position in the running 
order first and foremost according to their newsworthiness not according to external 
political agenda. It also means that news stories are covered from different angles and 
that the public is no longer presented with one opinion which is the 'official' narrative. 
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News and programmes on Al Jazeera and other similar stations have become an open 
forum for competing narratives where discourses and counter-discourses reach the 
audiences on an equal footing.  
This exercise, according to Souag, reflects the new dynamics characterizing the 
relationship between politicians and their publics. It aims at bringing both sides closer 
through the mediation of television so that mutual understanding could be fostered. In 
doing so, the media extends its influence beyond its traditional territories of informing 
the public and reporting news stories. Engaging television audiences with politicians, 
intellectuals and activists and presenting them with a multitude of different opinions 
in open debates raises the level of political awareness among people. It also 
contributes to transforming an increasingly large segment of society from passive 
recipients of media content into active participants in their public life. Knowledge 
empowers people and knowledge of the political field including the different 
interacting players is essential for the creation of a lively and vibrant political life. 
When Al Jazeera brings together the opinion and the other opinion to  discuss political, 
religious, cultural or social issues, "this means we are allowing our audiences to see who is 
saying what, and why this or that side says what they have to say," observes M. S.40 
It is a long educational process through which, the audiences not only get enlightened 
with the amount of information they receive, but also get to know their politicians 
closely and familiarize themselves with political deliberations and competing 
arguments that might affect their lives in one way or another. 
The third actor involved in this dynamic process of developing a new political culture, 
besides the journalistic corps and the audiences, is the political opposition and civil 
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society activists. Previously banned from appearing on public broadcasters, these non-
state actors are now regular guests on newscasts and talk shows. They take part in 
uncensored debates and express their opinions on all sorts of political, social, 
economic and religious issues.  
The Al Jazeera policy of airing "the opinion and the other opinion" has radically 
altered the relationship between Arab media and opposition groups, and created a new 
journalistic environment different from that described by Mohammed Ayish in which 
"opposition groups had virtually no access to government monopolized television, nor 
did large segments of the population living beyond urban centers."
41
 Opening up the 
media for different views and opinions to be heard without restriction or manipulation 
is an essential part of any democratic change. For, as Kenneth Newton observes, 
"democratization requires airing all opinions, including those which are unpopular, 
eccentric, or supported only by small minorities."
42
  
What Newton says about media in general applies to Al Jazeera in particular. News 
and programme presenter Laila Chaieb believes that broadcasting all opinions is an 
indication of professionalism and fair reporting rather than a sign of adopting a 
particular political agenda. Democratization comes as a natural effect of this ongoing 
policy of impartiality whereby all opinions and viewpoints are aired regardless of whether 
they are acceptable or unacceptable, privileged or marginalized. This, according to L. Ch. 
"what makes us think that Al Jazeera supports democracy and promotes political awareness in 
the Arab world."
43 
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In the age of new media and the ongoing upsurge of communication technologies, the 
Al Jazeera's democratization effect is becoming more visible. The rapid expansion in 
the use of social media networks among the younger generations in particular, is 
having a profound impact, not only on the way information is gathered, distributed 
and received, but also on people's perception of how powerful they have become in 
the age of free flow of information. The more traditional media and social media work 
together to diversify their platforms and maximize their outreach, the more their 
influence and political impact grow further. The following section analyses the 
interplay between old and new media in the Al Jazeera journalistic practice and looks 
at the implications of this changing relationship on the democratization process.  
4. Old and new media.. From competition to complementarity 
Contrary to what many had initially thought about the relationship between old and 
new media, and that the latter would replace the former or at least take over much of 
its functions, it has been clear that the non-stop proliferation of alternative news 
sources and the phenomenal surge of communication technologies is reinforcing the 
old media and providing them with additional power not only to survive but also to 
expand both their reach and influence. The phenomenal success of Al Jazeera in 
becoming the main and most trusted source of news for millions of Arab viewers, 
which in turn, brought the government monopoly of information to an end, is partly 
due an effective strategy of integrating new media into its broadcasting system. 
According to former chief editor Ahmed Sheikh, the relationship between traditional 
media and social media in generating content and diversifying and widening the scope 
of dissemination of information is one of 'complementarity'. It is a dual carriage way, 
he says: 
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When you use social media, you have what we call crowd-sourcing where the whole 
crowd becomes your source. So, your means of getting information intensify. The 
problem is that you must be able to verify the authenticity of this wide range of 
information sources. Social media provide traditional media with information and on 
the other hand, traditional media take this information, in the form of video, picture 
etc. to a much wider audience.
44
 
This mutual relationship between traditional and social media seems to be working 
reasonably well to complement each other and unravel the existing unequal access to 
these media among Arab users. As A. Sh. explains, access to internet and social media 
networks in the region is considerably low not only compared to Europe where 
28.57% of the population, for instance, use Facebook and North America where the 
population penetration is even higher (42.12%), but also compared to access to 
television which remains, by far, the most popular news provider. While almost every 
Arab household has a regular and open access to satellite television, the internet is 
mainly used by the young generations and those with middle and higher income. A 
Gallup study published in April 2011 shows that only 22% of young Arabs have 
Internet access at home.
45
 The number of those who use social media networks among 
them is even lower as Facebook Statistics below show. With the exception of Syria 
and Sudan which are not included in these statistics, the overall number of Arabs 
using Facebook in the first quarter of 2012 is just below 50 million users out of about 
300 million people. This brings the average population penetration in 18 Arab 
countries to only 13.76%.
46
 
Facebook country penetration 
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# Country Population/million Users  Population Penetration 
1. Egypt  82,637 10,669,020 13.26% 
2. Saudi Arabia  27,897 5,334,080 20.73% 
3. Morocco  32,273 4,297,920 13.59% 
4. Algeria  35,980 3,386,800 09.79% 
5. 
United Arab 
Emirates  
7,891 
3,191,420 64.14% 
6. Tunisia  10,676 2,974,940 28.09% 
7. Jordan  6,632 2,184,880 34.10% 
8. Iraq  32,665 1,645,640 05.55% 
9. Lebanon  4,264 1,419,060 34.40% 
10. Kuwait  2,818 961,980 34.49% 
11. Palestine  4,164 905,060 35.99% 
12. Qatar  1,732 537,400 63.91% 
13. Yemen  23,833 512,080 02.18% 
14. Libya  6,422 498,820 07.56% 
15. Oman  2,997 463,400 15.61% 
16. Bahrain  1,336 348,100 47.17% 
17. Mauritania  3,541 872,200 02.72% 
18. Somalia  9,926 779,800 0.77% 
 Total 297,684 40,982,600 13.76% 
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The competing strategies of old and new media, and the unequal access to different 
media among different users should not necessarily considered as a negative 
development. Beyond this apparent competition lies a profound need of all media to 
work together and complement each other. From his perspective as a leading figure in 
Al Jazeera's editorial management, Ahmed Sheikh explicitly confirms this 
reciprocated need: "traditional media need social media to get information, and social 
media need traditional media to widen their scope of coverage."
47
 At the practical 
level, and to translate this mutually beneficial relationship into a working model, Al 
Jazeera satellite television has been working closely with the network's new media 
section launched in 2004. To explore the perspective of the new media team on this 
relationship, I interviewed their head, Moeed Ahmed, who explained how important 
for both sides to work together and complement each other: 
As was the case with traditional media, this is just journalism. Before you have to go 
on the street and put the microphone at some people's face and ask them questions, 
now they are able to come to you and tell you what is happening or to voice their 
opinion from their home. So, it is just the form that has changed but what is actually 
happening is the same. It is also a lot cheaper than before because previously, you 
have to fly somebody there or to drive or send a cameraman and a reporter. Now, we 
do the same job but more effectively and probably at a wider scale.
48
  
So, both old and new media are doing the same job in terms of informing as many 
people as possible of what happens around them while providing them with a 
platform to voice their opinions. Working together within an integrated free media 
environment, albeit with different means and in different forms, can only maximize 
the reach and consequently the effect of the media as whole. For, the wider the media 
succeed in circulating free information and continue to reach out to, and engage new 
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publics, the more political change becomes possible. In practical terms, traditional and 
new media can complement each other in different ways. They can strengthen and 
assist each other to overcome their limitations in terms of technical, logistical, 
financial as well as human capacity. As explained by M. A. regarding the limitations 
surrounding the work of traditional media organizations, television stations may have, at 
one point in time, one hundred or two hundred reporters, but no company would have a 
thousand reporters covering events around the world. With the advent of new media, every 
person on the street is potentially a reporter who can enrich and extend traditional media 
coverage exponentially. What remains for news companies to do "is obviously the filtration 
and verification of contacts, which is as important, and maybe more important than before.
49
 
The problem for television channels to use citizen journalists as regular news gatherers is that 
they have to deal with so much information coming out of all these different sources. 
Using new media on a large scale and integrating different mechanisms in the process 
of gathering, processing and distributing information has certainly helped Al Jazeera 
reach out to additional audiences beyond its capacity as a traditional broadcaster. The 
latest achievement in this ongoing expansion was the re-launch of its four-year old 
"sharek" service in five languages
50
: English, Arabic, Serbo-Croat, Turkish, Swahili. 
This remarkable online expansion was announced in a press release in which the head 
of new media, Moeed Ahmad says: "Al Jazeera is committed to fostering a culture of 
citizen reporting in communities across the region and worldwide. That is why 
visitors to Sharek are able to watch footage that doesn’t necessarily make it onto our 
screens."
51
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The emergence of active citizen reporting on a large scale and the constructive 
interchange between new and old media provided the media with additional power 
and increased their effect on public life. This newly fostered participatory culture is 
quickly spreading despite the multiplication of mechanisms of censorship applied by 
political authorities. We are witnessing a new social reality in the making where the 
physical barriers aiming at restricting or deviating the free flow of information are 
becoming more and more futile.  
By all means, this is a new phase in the long process of political development in the 
Arab world. It is an unprecedented form of "democratization from below"
52
, which 
involves not only the elites but also the grassroots who believe that these media 
represent a unique source of empowerment and an effective means to challenge 
autocratic political systems. The current revolutionary wave sweeping the Arab world 
will be examined in the following chapter as an example illustrating the role of the 
media in the current phase of Arab democratization. 
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Chapter 8: 
Televising the Arab spring: real-time democratization? 
"esse est percipi" or  "to be is to be perceived" 
Bishop George Berkeley, (Principles of Human Knowledge) 
"All this trouble comes from this matchbox!" 
Hosni Mubarak (2001) 
 
In March 2007, Fred Halliday visited the Al Jazeera headquarters in Doha and wrote 
an article titled "Al Jazeera: the matchbox that roared",
1
 echoing Hosni Mubarak's 
famous remark when he, too visited the station in 2001. Accompanied with his 
Information Minister, Safwat el-Sherif, the President asked: "All this trouble comes 
from this matchbox!", pointing to the tiny newsroom he was shown by his host, the 
Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. Now, after the fall of the 
Mubarak's autocratic regime in the context of what has become known as the Arab 
spring, the debate over the democratizing role of Al Jazeera is back in. As the four 
countries where revolutions took place are still undergoing transition phases, it is hard 
to determine how long it would take for stable democratic systems to be established. 
At the discourse level, the term “Arab spring” seems to have acquired a normative 
dimension as more governments tried to associate themselves with this historic 
change whether in the Arab region or elsewhere. President Omar Basheer of Sudan 
claimed his country preceded the Arab Spring countries and had its own spring twenty 
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three years ago. Those who expect it in Khartoum, he said, will have to wait for so 
long.
2
 Responding to the mounting pressure on the government to introduce 
substantial political reforms, the Algerian authorities used the national television to 
promote the idea of "Algeria's spring: orderly change vs. revolution" during the June 
2012 election campaign.
3
 On her part, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani, 
told her audience during her speech at the Doha Forum on 31
st
 May 2012: "My 
country's spring was in 2007, when the Pakistani people successfully brought down 
the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf and replaced it with a working 
democratic system". 
It is true that the social demands were at the roots of the Arab spring, since the first 
protests in Tunisia started on social grounds and were initially led by local trade 
unions. However, the political aspect of the revolution soon surfaced with clear 
demands to topple the regime. The main slogan of the Arab spring (The people want 
to topple the regime) was formulated at a very early stage of the Tunisian revolution 
and quickly spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and then Syria. Tunisians who first raised 
this slogan in the streets of Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, Kasserine etc. had to tap into their 
collective memory and refer to the literature of national resistance against the French 
colonizer to easily re-discover the famous verse of great poet Aboul-Qacem el-
Chebbi: "if the people one day will to live.. then fate will have to answer their call". It 
was this key phrase, "the will of the people", that mobilized the masses from all 
around the country and made them take the streets demanding the fall of Ben Ali’s 
autocratic regime while chanting with one voice "Dégage" (leave). 
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This voice may have been muted and the pictures of the expanding protest movement 
could have been distorted if the media were not there and failed to bring the unfolding 
story into their visual field. Journalist Mohamed Lemine believes that the presence of 
Al Aljazeera was instrumental not only in reporting the story, but also and more 
importantly in keeping it alive:  
The most important thing, regardless of the nature and quality of its coverage, is that 
Al Jazeera, from the first moments of the Arab revolutions, especially in Tunisia, was 
able to capture that symbolic moment of Bouazizi setting himself on fire and opened 
up the skies on it. If that story died, I believe the Arab revolutions would have died 
consequently.
4
 
Seen by many as a real opportunity for the region to move into a democratic era, the 
Arab revolutions cannot be separated from the comprehensive yet detailed daily 
media coverage provided by Al Jazeera in particular. 
This chapter explores the details of this coverage and analyses its political 
significance through the eyes of those who performed it. The data collected from my 
interviewees draws a clear picture of the ways in which news is gathered, processed 
and disseminated to millions of viewers across the region. Besides editors, producers 
and journalists who covered the revolutions from inside the newsroom at the 
channel’s Doha headquarters, I interviewed a number of field reporters especially 
those who were on the ground during the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya as well as 
Bahrain. These interviews provide us, not only with an insight into the way Al Jazeera 
conducted its coverage of the Arab spring, but also contextualize the Arab spring and 
explain the editorial policies and how media coverage engages public participation. 
1. The Arab spring: the context and the processes 
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As we shall see in what follows, there is a general agreement among the interviewees 
that the Arab spring, as a sociopolitical event, should be understood in the context of 
the changing media landscape that has been taking place in the Arab world since Al 
Jazeera started broadcasting in 1996. Bringing politics and political debates into the 
visual space was one of the building blocks of what the channel’s former Chief Editor 
calls “a new political awareness”5. Televising debates about issues and events close to 
the hearts and minds of Arabs and publicizing them beyond the confines of elitists 
agendas meant that elites are no longer capable of monopolizing the public sphere. It 
is a new era where independent media has become instrumental in the education and 
formation of public opinion. This educational process is carried out along different 
axes. News and programme presenter Mohamed Krichen explains how the channel 
educates people about their rights: 
Reports of human rights organizations started to be shown on a widely viewed 
network such as Al Jazeera. On our screen, people are given the chance to know what 
organizations like Amnesty International, Human rights watch, Reporters Sans 
Frontiers etc. say about their rights. This service was essential in equipping people 
with new knowledge and raising their awareness of various sorts of violations in the 
Arab world.
6
  
It is within the context of the new dynamics which Al Jazeera brought into the media 
and politics spheres that this awareness has been shaped. To characterize this new 
atmosphere, former Director General, Wadah Khanfar coined the term “Al Jazeera 
spirit”. On the occasion of its tenth anniversary, the network published a volume with 
the title “the Al Jazeera Spirit”.7 Terms such as these circulated widely among the 
staff and formed what could be called a new organizational culture. It was “the Al 
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Jazeera spirit, which appeared in the Arab world in the last fifteen years that shaped 
the theoretical framework within which the current state of public awareness was 
fostered”8, says Mohamed Val Ould Eddine. He believes his channel played a pivotal 
role in the massive politicization of Arab publics throughout the years, and no real 
change could have happened without the contribution of Al Jazeera. 
The same understanding is shared by former Chief Editor Ahmed Sheikh who also 
thinks that Al Jazeera’s contribution towards raising people's political awareness and 
empowering them to challenge their autocratic regimes and aspire for alternative 
democratic systems has been so significant. He argues that, not only did his channel 
reshape the Arab media landscape and created a new political awareness in the region, 
but has also accelerated history: 
Hadn't Al Jazeera been in the scene since 1996, the present upheaval in the Arab 
world would have been delayed until, say fifteen years from now. Al Jazeera created 
a sort of public awareness all these people now share the same principles, the same 
goals, the same understanding. So, Al Jazeera expedited the cycle of change in the 
Arab world.
9
 
The same opinion is expressed by Senior Producer Samir Hijjawy, albeit in different 
terms. To him, Al Jazeera plays a dual role when it covers political developments in 
the region; it reports them and it shapes them. The Arab spring is certainly not a 
byproduct of Al Jazeera; however it is difficult to explain it without reference to the 
sea changes in the media landscape for the last fifteen years. The steady buildup of 
discontent and frustration created by the media coverage between 1996 and 2010 is at 
the roots of the Arab revolutions, emphasizes Hijjawy:  
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Al Jazeera offered the Arab publics the freedom to express their views on issues such 
as corruption, poverty, inequality etc. Moreover, it humanized the media coverage by 
placing the human being at the center of its reporting. By doing so, the channel raised 
the public awareness and created some sort of self-esteem among its viewers. Its 
contribution towards shaping a new self-perception of Arab identity was immense. 
With Al Jazeera, the Arab viewer started to re-affirm his identity by saying: I exist, I 
want my right; so, I will revolt.”10   
It is clear from these testimonies that the role of Al Jazeera goes far beyond news-
reporting. It has been paving the way for change through raising awareness and 
shaping public opinion. Change has become a salient demand through increased 
media exposure of such issues as mentioned by Hijjawy. This is the result of a 
continuous media coverage that spans over fifteen years and includes reporting of 
events close to the hearts and minds of Arabs across the region.   
The strategic location of Al Jazeera at the heart of the Middle East, a continuously 
troubled region, enabled the channel to cover most of the hotspots from a relatively 
close proximity. This advantage gave it primacy over its competitors and made of it 
the preferred, and in a number of cases, the only broadcaster to refer to. This has 
become visible since 1998 with its live coverage of Operation Desert Fox
11
 in Iraq. 
Following Operation Desert Fox, the region witnessed a series of successive events 
that consolidated the channel’s position and gradually built its reputation as a leading 
global broadcaster: the Palestinian intifada (2000), the war in Afghanistan (2001), the 
war in Iraq (2003), the Israel-Hezbollah war (2006), the Gaza war (2008-2009). 
Televising the Palestinian intifada, which began in late September 2000 and lasted for 
over five years, was the longest regional event Al Jazeera had covered since it was 
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 Researcher’s interview with Senior Producer and responsible for special coverage, Samir Hijjawy, 
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 Operation Desert Fox is the code-name for the four-day series of air strikes on Iraqi targets initiated 
by the US and UK on December 16, 1998. 
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launched in 1996. Uncovered events, regardless of how important they might be, 
cannot acquire the same weight or significance as those which get covered. If we are 
to contextualize George Berkley's principle about visual perception "to be is to be 
perceived" in the current debate, we would rather say "to be is to be seen on 
television". In fact, the Palestinians did rise up against the Israeli occupation from 
December 1987 through to 1993, in what was known as the first intifada, but in the 
absence of extensive media coverage, little has been known about it to the outside 
world. The term intifada itself became commonplace thanks to the monotonous usage 
and the wide circulation of it by the media. 
Having established itself as the main source of news in the Arab world after the 
Palestinian intifada, Al Jazeera continued its groundbreaking coverage of regional 
events throughout the years to consolidate its position at the global stage. With its 
wide network of correspondents and field reporters, Al Jazeera was able to televise 
events taking place almost everywhere in the Arab world and the Middle East. 
What characterized Al-Jazeera's coverage of this series of events from Operation 
Desert Fox in 1998 through to Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9
12
, not only the amount 
of pictures and information it delivered to viewers, but also its ability to capture the 
mood of mounting anger in the Arab world during and following each of these events. 
Add to this, the deteriorating social conditions, the widespread of corruption and 
human rights abuses, and the absence of freedom of expression in most of the Arab 
countries. Combined together, these factors contributed to the increased demands for 
change and caused the frustration in the Arab street to build up and gradually turn into 
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2008–2009. The conflict started on December 27, when Israeli forces launched a major air attack on 
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a political opposition. This is the context in which the Arab spring materialized. It 
came as a condensation and culmination of a long process of anger and resentment 
among Arab masses that are constantly exposed to the media and to Al Jazeera in 
particular. As was mentioned above, Al Jazeera did not only report those events 
because of their newsworthiness, it also acted as an agent for change. The editorial 
policy through which clear connections are made between ‘foreign occupation’ 
(Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq), recurrent ‘aggression’ (Israel-Hezbollah war, Gaza 
war) and internal conditions (dictatorship, injustice, humiliation etc.) provided a 
convenient recipe for revolution. Revolutions happen when people are prepared for 
them, says Souag:  
They happen as a result of certain historical experiences usually marked with 
injustice, suffering and humiliation. When people go through that kind of experience 
and succeed in constructing a particular narrative that favors change, then the 
conditions for the revolution are there.
13
 
Here, it was Al Jazeera that helped construct the narrative by linking together separate 
events and giving them meaning and orientation. While angry protestors were taking 
the streets in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco and a number of other Arab countries, 
this narrative was being shaped on the screens of Al Jazeera which provided its 
viewers with the historical background, the political context and the analytical 
framework. In the absence of this narrative which has constantly stressed the need for 
change, it would be hard to understand and explain the processes leading to the Arab 
spring. 
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The following section tries to unpack Al Jazeera’s narrative of the Arab spring and 
understand how, editorially, this turning point in modern Arab history was framed and 
reported. 
2. Framing the Arab spring: the vision and the editorial policy 
As was developed in the theoretical part of this research regarding the relationship 
between media and politics (chapter 4), the Arab spring presents us with a unique 
empirical case where the dynamics of this relationship are displayed markedly. The 
role played by Al Jazeera in framing and reporting this political development could be 
clearly noticed. The relatively long and rich experience the channel has gained from 
covering regional and global events throughout the last fifteen years made it stand out 
of its many competitors and position itself as one of the leading news channels in the 
world. Covering a story as big and complex as the Arab spring required the 
management to be more careful in shaping their editorial strategy as the Arab spring 
unfolds and moves on from one country to another. Head of news M. Souag, explains 
how editorial decisions were made inside the newsroom to frame and present this 
event to the outside world: 
First of all, we have to evaluate the situation in each country. For many years we have 
been covering protests all over the Arab world, why didn't we call them revolutions? 
In Tunisia for example, we started by talking about 'protests', then we moved into 
calling it 'uprising' and then 'revolution'. Each phase has its own characteristics and 
we have to ensure that we do not impose our own views onto the situation.
14
 
This gradual progress in qualifying the events may seem unbiased and reflects a 
professionally neutral stance in covering the Arab spring as a news story. However, as 
M. O. Lemine., reminds us, Al Jazeera has always sided with the people against the 
                                                           
14
 Researcher's interview with M. Souag, April 2011. 
247 
 
dictatorial regimes and its coverage of the Arab revolutions should be seen in this 
light. What he calls 'traditional professionalism' and 'formal objectivity' are not always 
in line with the ethical obligation which Al Jazeera has been advocating since it came 
on air. Siding with the people and presenting the alternative account sometimes 
entails "twisting the neck of traditional professionalism to open up new possibilities 
for a different coverage that is able to grasp the complexities of the reality."
15
    
To cope with the complexities of the developing story in the streets of the revolting 
countries, the editorial decision inside the newsroom needs also to be complex, but 
flexible and responsive to changes. As demonstrations on the ground increased and 
reached a new turning point to become full-scale revolutions, the channel had also 
reached a decision to drop its regular scheduling and opted for an open news cycle. 
There was no room left for 'ordinary news' which have become insignificant 
compared to the ‘big news' of the revolution, says Souag, explaining the degree to 
which his channel was responsive to the demands of the viewers. To him, the decision 
to open up the screen for a nonstop reporting was justified by the fact that the people 
in the streets were asking for a radical change and that viewers were no longer 
interested in regular programming. The demands for a radical change in politics 
would then be reflected in a radical change on the screen and in the running order of 
news. Here, we are not talking about how the media frames news stories according to 
a preset agenda as we learn in framing theory, but how news stories set the agenda of 
the media in an interactive way. It is true, says Mohamed Dahou that:  
Al Jazeera paved the way for change through the empowerment of the people. It 
provided them with revolutionary contentment and revolutionized their culture. The 
Arab scene too, with the dynamics of change it showed and the resistance in the face 
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of dictatorships, gave Al Jazeera and other media outlets the opportunity to present 
their audiences with a different and unique content.
16
 
It is no longer a one way exercise; it is rather a dual framing game. The editorial 
decision to restructure the channel’s programming in response to the demands from 
the audiences and the developing stories on the ground reflects this dynamically 
generated duality. But, how can a channel, known best for its popular talk shows, drop 
its programmes for months and rely only on live news reporting? This move was 
necessary, thinks Ahmed Val Ould Eddine
17
. Al Jazeera’s flagship programmes 
disappeared and the channel provided 24 hour coverage of the Arab spring 
revolutions, he says. It was never easy to go that way: “if a channel chooses to devote 
its screen for continuous news coverage of one particular event for a whole year, this 
means that, it has automatically become part of the scene, an essential part of that 
scene.”18  
Continuous live reporting of protests demanding regime change in several countries 
created new dynamics similar to the ‘domino effect’. Protestors in the streets of 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen discovered, through the chants and slogans they 
raised, more unifying factors than they ever thought. The political divides separating 
Arab countries at the state level, seemed insignificant at the popular level.  The “Arab 
spring”, a term umbrella under which the coverage of individual revolutions was 
carried out, reflects this collective feeling and provides Arab masses with additional 
meaning for their “Arabness”. Reviving the sense of belonging to one “Arab ummah 
(nation) has been one of the pillars of Al Jazeera’s discourse in which the Arab world 
started to see itself through a different lens. Amidst a wide range of competing 
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 Ahmed Val Ould Eddine, field reporter. He covered the Libyan revolution before he was captured for 
a month by Gaddafi’s forces. 
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narratives about the Arabs and their position in history and in this changing world, Al 
Jazeera has been providing a platform for different elements of this narrative to come 
together and project a new image and construct a new social reality.  
The image Al Jazeera has been painting of Arab societies and their unfavorable reality 
relied on a particular interpretation of Arab history, culture and identity. It is an 
image-remaking exercise that unleashed a revival process through which Arabs re-
discovered themselves and started comparing their sociopolitical conditions to those 
of other peoples and nations. Decades after independence, there is no reason why their 
umma should be still lagging behind the rest of the world in almost every regard. They 
cannot justify why free elections are taking place, not only in Europe and America, 
but also in Latin America, Africa and Asia while the majority of their political 
systems are still confined to family rule and military dictatorships. Under these types 
of rule, it is hard to imagine that peoples’ conditions would improve or the gap 
between their existing reality and their imagined future would narrow down. With the 
amount of information Al Jazeera has been providing and the ability to openly discuss 
and criticize those conditions, changing the political systems has become inevitable to 
changing the overall situation in the region. This sweeping change is “the season of 
the harvest” says Laila Chaieb. She believes that:  
Among the chief factors leading to the Arab revolutions was the emergence of an 
informed public opinion. People have become aware of their condition and they are 
no longer prepared to accept it as it is. They want to change it and move from the 
position of subjects to that of active players.
19
  
The Arab spring demonstrated that this move has happened and that the Arab 
societies ceased to be passive subjects of political authorities. They turned into active 
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players leading change in a number of countries. Since the first revolution erupted in 
Tunisia and shortly followed by the Egyptian revolution the scope of this regional 
movement started to unfold. It is an Arab movement that clearly goes beyond the 
limits of regime change in one small country in North Africa. Through its live, 
continuous and simultaneous coverage of protests in different cities, Al Jazeera 
succeeded not only in bringing together revolutionaries of the same country, but also 
in connecting revolutions in all five countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and 
Syria). Presenting these different revolutions as parts of one encompassing event that 
is the Arab spring, cannot be understood away from Al Jazeera’s vision and editorial 
policy. It is a policy that always tends to understand developments in individual Arab 
countries from an overall Arab perspective. The discourse and political analysis 
provided by guest commentators focusing on shared elements and drawing parallels 
between revolutions lay the ground for this understanding and frame the message Al 
Jazeera delivers to its viewers. Based on interviews with field reporters who covered 
the Arab spring, the following section explains how this editorial policy was 
implemented in the coverage of each of the revolting countries.    
3. Covering the Arab spring: differences and similarities  
In Tunisia, as events erupted unexpectedly and spread so quickly from one place to 
another, new media took the lead over traditional media in initiating the coverage of 
what has become known as the first revolution of the Arab spring. The images of 
Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire, inciting 
demonstrations throughout the country, were first circulated through social media 
networks, but only captured the attention of the wider public after they have been 
televised and repeatedly shown on Al Jazeera. Bouazizi's act and the effect of these 
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pictures became a catalyst for a series of mass demonstrations that eventually led 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to step down after 23 years in power.  
The significant role Al Jazeera has played in preparing the ground for change before 
the Arab spring has not diminished during the revolutions. In each case, the media 
proved to be a prime condition for success. If change in the Arab world was 
inevitable, Al Jazeera was the facilitator says Nabil Raihani, news producer and field 
reporter who covered the Tunisian revolution. He explains this function with 
reference to the Marxist concept of determinism: 
Let me borrow Marx’s concept of determinism when he was asked about the role of 
human being in history. He said history is like a pregnant woman who has to give 
birth anyhow, but the presence of a midwife helps her. Human beings act like a 
midwife who facilitates birth through revolutionary means. Similarly, the Arab world 
had the potential of a radical, profound and revolutionary change. There are always 
factors which impede change and others which facilitate it. Al Jazeera and the media 
in general were the factors that facilitated and accelerated change.
20
 
If this was the case for the media and the Arab spring in general, what characterizes 
Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Tunisian revolution in particular? Contrary to the rest of 
the Arab world, Tunisia was the only country where Al Jazeera has been banned from 
reporting until the fall of the regime. According to Raihani, who himself is Tunisian; 
the first Al Jazeera reporters entered Tunisia on January 15
th
, 2011. That was the day 
after Ben Ali left the country. Even though the channel did not manage to cover the 
revolution from within, viewers still followed its news bulletins to find out about what 
was happening in their country. In the absence of independent, credible local media, 
which people could rely on to keep abreast with the daily developments of the 
revolution, Al Jazeera remained the main source of information. With all the technical 
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difficulties it was facing, it succeeded in showing pictures and videos of 
demonstrations taking place in remote cities and villages. Through the connections it 
had established at a very early stage with a wide network of activists and 'citizen 
journalists', the channel kept the news of the revolution pouring into the newsroom 
from across the country. To understand this operation and how the coverage was 
handled by editors, Raihani puts us in the newsroom atmosphere: 
At the beginning of the revolution, when we receive materials, we check the time and 
place and contact the source for verification reasons. We then talk to our trusted 
sources to make sure of the credibility of the news. When we put them on air, and to 
be on the safe side, we usually mention to our viewers that these materials could not 
be verified from independent sources. At a later stage, the same news started to come 
from different sources, which means no more verification was needed.
21
 
Back in Tunisia, where protests were gaining ground and spreading from one city into 
another, there emerged an unprecedented news-making phenomenon. As Lemine 
explains, activists in different parts of the country got together and organized 
themselves into groups with well-defined tasks for each member. "Some were 
assigned the task of taking pictures and videos with their cellphones, others had to 
write up and edit the news while other members contacted news networks to get their 
stories out."
22
 
It was this non-stop flow of information coming from ordinary activists reporting 
events from various locations across the country that helped the channel cover the 
Tunisian revolution. In the absence of its professional crew, which then still had no 
access, cellphones and personal cameras replaced professional equipment and were 
capable of conveying the real picture of what was happening. This means, not only Al 
                                                           
21
 Researcher’s interview with N. Raihani. May 2011. 
22
 Researcher's interview with M. Lemine, May 2011. 
253 
 
Jazeera did succeed in reaching out to these activists to use their materials, they too 
succeeded in reaching out to Al Jazeera and made their stories heard. It is a two- way 
operation where new media meet and complement traditional media in order to 
present us with a coordinated coverage. 
In addition to helping Al Jazeera overcome the problems of access during the three 
weeks of the Tunisian revolution, this interactive process of news-making, also made 
the editors in the newsroom change their assessment of the situation. Raihani recalls 
his personal experience with this editorial change: 
Personally, when I was producing my reports I thought this event was no more than 
just a limited uprising that would push the regime to make some concessions. But, 
day after day, the materials we were receiving from activists via their cellphones, 
websites and facebook pages, convinced us that this time, things were different. This 
time people in the street were not drawing back and the authorities looked weaker.
23
  
As mass demonstrations expanded all over the country and involved more political 
and social groups, the balance of power in the street started to change radically, 
especially after the army refused orders to fire on demonstrators. At the media level, 
while Al Jazeera and social media networks continued to cover these protests and 
inform the outside world of an event of an unprecedented magnitude, the state 
television continued to ignore the facts and described this mass movement as 
“separate violent incidents and “insignificant riots”. The more the days go by the 
more the people discover their strength and the regime discover its weakness until the 
situation reached the point of no return, remarks Raihani. Al Jazeera on its part 
discovered how important and influential it was and decided to upgrade its coverage. 
It was no longer a matter of ordinary coverage, he says; “we had to give it more time 
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and focus.” At that stage, the Tunisian news extended beyond the limits of the 
traditional “Maghreb bulletin”24 with accompanying interviews and analyses throughout 
the day. 
The coverage of the Egyptian revolution was more extensive and different from that 
of Tunisia for various reasons. Al Jazeera had its reporters deployed on the ground 
even before the first demonstration took place. Unlike in the Tunisian case, the 
channel was covering Egypt with quite a large number of reporters forming one of the 
network's largest bureaus in the region. In addition to Al Jazeera news channel, there 
was also Al Jazeera English and A Jazeera Mubasher (live)
25
, which provided a non-
stop coverage of events especially in the Tahrir Square. 
With demonstrations flooding the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and many other 
cities in a country as big as Egypt, it was almost impossible for any news network to 
provide its viewers with the full picture of what was happening. However, Al Jazeera 
not only did it mobilize the relatively large number of its reporters already existing in 
Egypt, but also reinforced its presence in the country with more journalists and 
support staff from its headquarters in Doha. In doing so, Al Jazeera was the largest 
international broadcaster to cover the Egyptian revolution. Besides its ability to cover 
simultaneously events taking place over extended geographical areas, the network 
also succeeded in keeping with its policy of assigning coverage to local reporters 
rather than sending foreigners with little or no experience and knowledge. The 
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network relied in its coverage of the Egyptian revolution on Egyptian reporters only. 
Jamal Shayyal, who was part of the team, explains the significance of this policy: 
The core thing in our work is local knowledge, understanding and language. I myself 
am Egyptian. I knew the significance of this street, of this building, of that person. I 
could compare how things were that day compared to a couple of months ago, 
because I also covered the parliamentary elections under Mubarak in November. That 
local knowledge obviously helped a lot in our coverage.
26
 
This policy was implemented across the network. Al Jazeera English too, covered the 
Egyptian revolution with local reporters. In addition to Jamal Shayyal, there were 
Ayman Mohyeddine (Egyptian), Rawyah Rageh (Egyptian), Shireen Tadros 
(Egyptian) etc. Reporters from other companies who didn’t know the language had to 
rely on translators who are not necessarily journalists, notes Shayyal.  
Having said this, a comprehensive and detailed coverage of the Egyptian revolution 
remains far beyond the capabilities of any traditional broadcaster. Regardless of the 
number of reporters Al Jazeera deployed in Cairo and other cities, the scope of its 
coverage would have been much more limited without the help of new media.  
Like in Tunisia, we have seen a coordinated work between professional television 
reporting and citizen journalism. However, in the case of Egypt this coordination was 
carried out in a more organized way. For, contrary to Tunisia where events started 
almost spontaneously and took everyone by surprise, the preparations for the Cairo 
January 25
th
 demonstration took place in advance. Activist groups like "We are all 
Khalid Said", "the April 6
th
 Youth Movement", "the Kefaya Movement", in addition 
to the supporters of Mohamed El-Baradei coordinated their action online using social 
networks before taking to the streets. Operating in the same field, and reporting events 
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side-by-side, the coordination between Al Jazeera and social network operatives was 
constant. When the Egyptian authorities decided on January 28 to cut off all mobile 
and internet connections in a desperate move to prevent demonstrators from 
communicating, Al Jazeera offices became the destination for dozens of activists who 
rushed in with materials covering protests in various squares. From the Cairo bureau, 
those materials find their way to the channel’s headquarters in Doha where they get 
checked, processed and transmitted. 
When, on the other hand, the Egyptian Ministry of Information decided, on January 
30
th
 to take the channel's signal off the NileSat, suspending its field operations and 
withdrawing accreditation from all its staff members, the news spread so quickly on 
mobile devices through SMS and other new media tools. Messages that circulated 
among thousands of users informed recipients of the new frequencies Al Jazeera was 
broadcasting on, especially on ArabSat and HotBird satellites. Equally, during this 
short interruption, social media networks such as Facebook and Youtube were 
distributing selections of the channel's materials that were inaccessible to Egyptian 
viewers via satellite television. In fact, there was another significant reason why the 
government decision to shut down Al Jazeera's broadcasting was ineffective. To 
circumvent this decision and counter its effects, a number of Arab satellite 
broadcasters in the region replaced their own programming with Al Jazeera's feed. 
This move foiled the regime's efforts to prevent Egyptians from watching the channel 
and instead, gave them more alternatives to continue following its coverage.
27
 
The way Al Jazeera reacted to the Egyptian authorities' decision confirms what the 
channel has set in its mission and vision statement since 2004 regarding its 
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commitment to and support for democratic change. In a challenging statement issued 
in Doha the day after the closure of its Cairo office and the revocation of its staff 
licenses, we read: "clearly, there are powers that do not want our important images 
pushing for democracy and reform to be seen by the public."
28
  
At the practical level, the channel did not submit to the decision and refused to 
withdraw its reporters. Instead, it chose to change its coverage strategies in different 
ways. Technically, we have seen the introduction of handy and small flip camcorders 
that replaced portable professional cameras which usually require authorization and 
are easily traceable. Logistically, Al Jazeera’s reporters were equipped with small 
transmission systems the size of a laptop each, through which they can send their 
materials over to the newsroom. These systems were used instead of OB vans (outside 
broadcasting) carrying huge satellite dishes. Editorially, the channel opted for 
alternative sources and diversified its methods of newsgathering. As reporter Ghassan 
Abuhsein observes “sticking to the rigid professional standards of only relying on 
commonly trusted sources was no longer an option. Eyewitnesses and citizen 
journalists started to become an essential part of our newsgathering processes.”29 
Changing those processes lead to another change at the output level. On the screen, 
restrictions on the quality of pictures and videos loosened and low resolution 
materials have become acceptable.  
Here again, the Arab spring teaches us that the content which the media delivers to the 
public is not always what the editors pre-plan in the newsroom according to a pre-set 
news agenda. It is the final product of an ongoing interactive dialectical relationship 
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between the newsroom and the developing story on the ground. The dual framing 
game that I have mentioned above is clearly at play. 
This mutually produced content kept Al Jazeera close to the hearts and minds of the 
Arab public and distinguished its coverage from the rest of the broadcasters. Through 
this extraordinary coverage of the Egyptian revolution in which the public informally 
took part in the process of news production process, Al Jazeera was shaping events 
rather than just reporting them. For, those who spend days and nights protesting in the 
Tahrir square and at the same time see their mass movement recorded and transmitted 
live to millions of viewers across the globe are likely to keep protesting. Not only do 
they believe in the rightfulness of their action, but also know that the more their 
movement gets exposed to the outside world, the more impact it would have. Those 
among them, who take pictures, shoot videos, compose text messages and send them 
over to the media, actively participate in maximizing this impact. For the duration of 
the Egyptian revolution, Al Jazeera has been the default news channel people go to in 
order to post their materials and contribute to this collectively produced coverage.   
This close relationship between Al Jazeera and its audiences was manifest in different 
ways during this period. The most significant example was seen in the Cairo Tahrir 
Square when protestors installed huge screens and started broadcasting Al Jazeera’s 
content continuously. In Alexandria, where Jamal Shayyal was stationed, “there were 
banners in all the protests with the new frequencies of the channel showing on 
placards to help people find the signal.”30 The popular support for Al Jazeera and the 
undeniable appreciation of its coverage is also confirmed by Abuhsein, who firmly 
believes that “there was a consensus among Egyptians about our coverage. We have 
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repeatedly heard revolutionaries in the square saying: in the absence of Al Jazeera, the 
revolution would have failed. It would have gone unnoticed.”31 According to this 
analysis, it would be difficult to understand the real effect of Al Jazeera’s coverage 
and the role it played in the Egyptian revolution without unpacking the special 
relationship it has built with its audiences over the years. 
The coverage of the Libyan revolution was different from that of Egypt and Tunisia. 
The course of events in Gaddafi’s Libya required the channel to change its strategies 
and take extra precautions especially after the peaceful protests turned into an armed 
struggle. However, the price was high and the network lost one of its cameramen in 
Benghazi. Four other reporters were arrested for weeks before they were released. 
Among them was Ahmed Val Ould Eddine, who spent thirty days “In the hands of the 
Katayeb”32 (Gaddafi’s Brigades) when he tried to enter Libya with his colleagues 
through the Tunisian borders.  
The need for Al Jazeera’s coverage was probably more obvious in the Libyan 
revolution than it was in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases. Three factors may explain 
why satellite television was crucial in the Libyan context. First, the markedly reduced 
role played by cyber activists prior to and during the protest movements. Second, the 
absence of political parties and the weakness of civil society organizations that could 
connect, mobilize and organize people. Third, the state of the Libyan media, which 
was completely dominated and controlled either directly by the government or by Seif 
Al Islam, (Gaddafi’s son) who was trying to paint an image of himself as liberal 
future leader for Libya. These three factors made it essential for the international 
media to provide an alternative platform for the revolution. Ould Eddine thinks that: 
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Not only did the Libyans need Al Jazeera, they also believed that their action was 
incomplete if Al Jazeera was not part of it. Whenever they want to plan for a press 
conference they always come to us to check if Al Jazeera was coming to cover it. If 
not, the conference would be cancelled. For, they know for sure their action would be 
futile without having the chance of being shown on television.
33
 
The need to be televised as expressed here by the masses in the streets of Libya is 
simply a popular translation of George Berkeley’s statement on visualization (to be is 
to be perceived). When the reporter whose prime job is to provide the means for these 
masses to be perceived, turns himself into a story that needs exposure, the media 
coverage that he offers acquires an extra dimension: the human dimension. This is 
what happened to Al Jazeera’s reporter who was sent to cover the Libyan revolution 
but ended up locked in jail. Based on his personal experience, Ould Eddine tells us 
how vital it is for the media to be on your side. When he was in prison, “thrown 
somewhere inside a dark room, my only dream was to find someone who knows 
where I was and that I was still alive so he could bring my story out to the media”, he 
recalls. This human dimension made him, as a journalist, understands better “the 
psychology of revolutionaries and the secret behind their deep appreciation of the 
media.”  
The shooting of cameraman Ali Hasan Al Jabir in Benghazi on March 12th, 2011 
strengthened the relationship between the revolutionaries and Al Jazeera. After this 
incident, Al Jazeera for the Libyans has become more than just a television station 
reporting events as they happen. Its commitment to the success of the revolution went 
far beyond its traditional function as a balanced media organization to become more 
involved in the political game. This involvement could be clearly noticed from the 
discourse it was transmitting as well as from what could be described as “embedded 
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261 
 
journalism” it has introduced. This change, which provoked controversy over Al 
Jazeera’s editorial line during the Arab spring revolutions, will be discussed later in 
the next chapter along with other editorial policies. 
Having sad this, the central role played by Al Jazeera in the Arab spring remains 
undisputable. Its unparalleled coverage of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan and Yemeni 
revolutions made it difficult for many to perceive what happened distinctly from the 
lens of this pan-Arab news network. Some media scholars have gone so far as to call 
it 'the Al Jazeera revolution', suggesting that the Arab Spring cannot be understood 
separately from the concerted efforts by this channel, which advocated and promoted 
change since it was launched in the mid-1990s. But, is it really Al Jazeera's 
revolution? How does the channel itself assess the nature and scope of its role in this 
historic regional change? 
4. Al Jazeera's revolution? 
It is not hard to notice a common understanding among Al Jazeera’s staff about the 
nature of the role played by their channel in the Arab spring. They all distinguish 
between its long term effects through raising political awareness among the Arab 
publics, which eventually translated into popularizing the demand for change. And the 
immediate effect through its exceptional coverage of the Arab revolutions. As was 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the political awareness Al Jazeera has been 
building for almost fifteen years created a new generation full of anger, frustration 
and refusal of their social and political conditions. It may not be Al Jazeera’s 
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revolution, says Abuhsein, “but the generation which led revolution is certainly the Al 
Jazeera generation.”34 
Does this mean that in the absence of Al Jazeera, there would be no Arab spring? 
Former Director General Wadah Khanfar categorically opposes this view and presents 
the role of the channel in a more realistic term: "Al Jazeera is not a tool of revolution, 
we do not create revolutions. However, when something of that magnitude happened, 
we were at the center of the events."
35
 Khanfar's view is also shared by Head of News 
M. Souag who thinks that, Although Al Jazeera played a leading role in the media 
coverage of the Arab spring through its comprehensive reporting of events, it did not 
make the revolution, it never called for revolution and that is not part of its mission: 
Al Jazeera did not incite the revolution in a direct manner or pushed people to revolt. 
Those who try to claim the credit for these revolutions are in fact trying to rob the real 
people who revolted of their own glory, and that is not fair. So, it is not Al Jazeera or 
anybody else that made the revolution, it is the people themselves.
36
 
However, the channel’s “comprehensive, accurate and in-depth coverage” of the 
revolutions made people feel that their voice was being heard across the world and 
gave them the courage to carry on their protests until the change happened.  
Similarly, for Krichen, Al Jazeera cannot claim the credit for the instigation of the 
Arab revolutions, but its coverage contributed immensely to their success. When the 
masses take to the street and realize that their action gets covered, this creates a sort of 
psychological effect among them. This effect is explained in krichen’s terms as 
follows: 
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 Researcher’s interview with Gh. Abusein, May 2011. 
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 Wadah Khanfar's address at TED2011, March, 2011. 
(http://www.ted.com/talks/wadah_khanfar_a_historic_moment_in_the_arab_world.html).   
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They feel that what they did was so important that Al Jazeera reported it. Those who 
participated in the protests and saw themselves on television would certainly go back 
to the street. Those who did not participate but saw others participate would ask 
themselves: why not us?
37
 
The Arab spring has been and will be remembered for so long as the event in which 
the media played a central role. By changing the Arab media landscape Al Jazeera has 
certainly contributed to the current political changes. Its coverage should be seen as 
one of the main factors of success of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan and Yemeni 
revolutions. Any democratic advancement in the Arab region that results from these 
revolutions is partly owed to the involvement of the media at various levels.  
If we look at Al Jazeera’s contribution from a critical perspective, we find that the 
picture is slightly different. For, the Arab spring effect is not limited to the political 
sphere; it has also shaken the media and raised a number of issues that should be 
considered. The following chapter presents us with a critical assessment of Al 
Jazeera’s democratizing role in general and questions its editorial line in a number of 
particular cases.   
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Chapter 9: 
Al Jazeera’s democratizing effect:  
a critical assessment of a success story 
 
Since Al Jazeera came on air in 1966, the Arab media landscape has undergone 
profound changes that affected the politics of the region in different noticeable ways. 
The channel’s unparalleled coverage of major events in the last fifteen years made of 
it the number one regional broadcaster and one of the most influential brands at the 
global level.
1
 When the Arab spring started in Tunisia in December 2010, viewers 
across the region turned to Al Jazeera to see what was happening. Its open and non-
stop coverage of simultaneous protest movements taking place in various cities of the 
revolting countries was seen an extremely successful experience that further 
consolidated its position as a leading news network in the world media. 
The remarkable effect it has had in shaping events leading up to regime change in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen made it look to many observers as an agent for 
political change rather than just a powerful media channel covering events and 
reporting them regardless of their outcome. As a result, Al Jazeera’s coverage of the 
Arab spring was appreciated and widely hailed not only by ordinary people, but also 
by activists, scholars, and even politicians who, until very recently had been fiercely 
criticizing the channel and the quality of its journalism. 
 
                                                           
1
 In the 2004 Brandchannel.com ranking, Al Jazeera was voted as the fifth most influential global 
brand behind Apple, Google, Ikea and Starbucks.  In the media category, Al Jazeera was number 1 
while BBC came 27
th
. See: http://www.brandchannel.com/boty_results/global_2004.html  (information 
retrieved on 24 May 2011).  
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Reporting on the quality of the channel's coverage of the Arab spring and the impact it 
has had since these phenomenal developments started, The New York Times observed 
that the protests sweeping the Arab world "have one thread uniting them: Al Jazeera, 
the Qatar-based satellite channel whose aggressive coverage helped propel insurgent 
emotions from one capital to the next"
2
. This uniting yet mobilizing role proved to be 
so important to the extent that it has radically changed the position of high profile 
Western politicians with regard to its journalism. Speaking before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 2, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
enthusiastically stated that Al Jazeera is "changing peoples' minds and attitudes. Like 
it or hate it, it is really effective. In fact, viewership of Al-Jazeera is going up in the 
United States because it is real news."
3
 
It is real news, probably because of its proximity to the reality it is reporting on, 
unlike other international news networks headquartered outside the region. Or, maybe 
because of its active contribution to the making of a new Arab reality, through the 
construction of a specific narrative different from the existing ones. In many ways, 
say Robert Worth and David Kirkpatrick, "it is Al Jazeera’s moment — not only 
because of the role it has played, but also because the channel has helped to shape a 
narrative of popular rage against oppressive American-backed Arab governments."
4
 
Referring to the background of this success, Philip Seib wrote: "in January 2009, it 
was Al Jazeera that fueled public anger throughout the region about Arab 
governments' failure to respond to the war in Gaza. People took to the streets in places 
                                                           
2
 Worth, Robert F. and Kirkpatrick David D. "Seizing a Moment, Al Jazeera Galvanizes Arab 
Frustration", The New York Times, 27 January 2011. 
3
 Kirit, Radia. "Sec. of State Hillary Clinton: Al Jazeera is ‘Real News’, U.S. Losing ‘Information 
War", ABC News, (March 2, 2011), information retrieved on 12/06/12 
(http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/03/sec-of-state-hillary-clinton-al-jazeera-is-real-news-us-
losing-information-war) 
4
 Worth, and Kirkpatrick, "Seizing a Moment", The New York Times, 27 January 2011. 
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like Dubai, where political demonstrations – other than those sanctioned by 
government – were rare. The target of the protests was not Israel but rather the leaders 
of Egypt and other Arab states."
5
 Characterized by Olfa Lamloum as a 'rebellious' 
mirror of the Arab world, Al Jazeera has, since the beginning, "given a voice to the 
popular rejection of repressive policies adopted by the powers in place, as well as to 
the confiscated democratic demand. In doing so, it has offered even to the younger 
generations, in a region famous for drawn-out authoritarian regimes, access to spaces 
of freedom of speech, reflection and public contestation."
6
 
Other media scholars like Lawrence Pintak, who did not hesitate to call the Arab 
spring “the Al Jazeera revolution”, argues that "change was Al Jazeera's raison d'être 
from the day, fifteen years ago, when the upstart ruler of the tiny emirate of Qatar 
founded the channel."
7
 He then points out to the special link between what happened 
in the concerned four countries and the channel that grabbed the message away from 
the plain propaganda of Arab dictators. Arno Tausch too, thinks that “the 2011 Arab 
revolutions should be called “the Al Jazeera revolution” in view of the enormous and 
still growing importance of the TV channel for the current, evolving events.”8      
In the face of this prevalent commendation and appreciative discourse that fits well 
and goes along with Al Jazeera’s own narrative, it is not easy to provide a different 
account. Indeed, it is hard to argue otherwise, while the channel is at the peak of its 
success, giving the world a fantastic coverage of "the biggest story the channel has 
ever covered, the story of the birth of a new era in the Arab world", as thinks former 
                                                           
5
 Seib, Philip. "Conclusion: AJE in the World" in Philip Seib (eds.) Al Jazeera English: Global News in 
a Changing World (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 189 
6
 Lamloum, Olfa. A Jazeera: A Rebellious and Ambiguous Mirror of the Arab World" (La Découverte, 
2004), p. 11 
7
 Pintak, Lawrence. “The Al Jazeera Revolution", Foreign Policy, February 2, 2011. 
8
 Tausch, Arno. “On the global political and economic environment of the current Al Jazeera 
revolution” Middle East Studies Online Journal, (Vol. 2, No5, 2011). 
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director general Wadah Khanfar.
9
 However, in what follows, I will try to unpack this 
dominating narrative of success and look at the Al Jazeera story from a critical 
perspective. I will start with questioning what some see as inconsistent coverage of 
the Arab spring with a special emphasis on the Bahrain case. Secondly, I will 
critically assess the credibility of the channel's motto: "the opinion and the other 
opinion" when it comes to covering revolutions. Finally, I will conclude with the 
structural transformation of the Arab public sphere and its implications on the Al 
Jazeera democratizing effect.   
1. Why has Al Jazeera covered Bahrain differently? 
As we have learned earlier in the previous chapter, the media coverage does not 
operate in vacuum. What we see on television as a final news product does not 
necessarily reflect the editors’ agenda as pre-planned in the newsroom, especially in 
live coverage environments. The dialectical relationship between the luxury of the 
newsroom and the toughness of changing reality in the field provide us with a more 
refined news product. In news production, there is always an interactive process 
where the effect between the newsmakers and the story they report on is mutual. In 
the context of the Arab spring, this mutual effect is probably more visible than it has 
been in any previous experience of media coverage.  
Most of the literature about the media coverage of the Arab spring focuses on the 
media effect, which is undeniable. As I demonstrated in chapter 8, the media was 
heavily involved in the Arab revolutions and played a crucial role in their success. 
What has been ignored or marginalized in this literature is the Arab spring effect on 
the media. What might explain this gap is the over emphasis on the political 
                                                           
9
 Wadah Khanfar's address at TED2011, March, 2011, 
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implications of these popular uprisings which succeeded in toppling a number of 
authoritarian regimes and promised to replace them with democratic systems. For 
media scholars though, the implications of the Arab spring on the media require more 
attention. If the media effect was generally seen as a positive one, the Arab spring 
effect, on the contrary, is so far negative. The following section presents a critical 
assessment of Al Jazeera’s coverage of Bahrain, where this negative effect can be 
clearly argued. 
The Arab spring "has shaken Arab TV's credibility" says Ali Hashem, a former Al 
Jazeera correspondent.
10
 The commitment Arab media showed towards presenting the 
people's story versus the official line in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria 
simmered when it came to Bahrain, for instance. While Al Jazeera dropped its regular 
scheduling to provide its viewers with live coverage of events from the streets of 
Tunis, Cairo, Benghazi, Sana'a and many other cities of the Arab spring countries, 
Bahrain received a very thin coverage under the pretext of sectarian arguments. 
During the duration of 9 months (13/09/2011 to 12/06/2012), the Al Jazeera most 
popular talk show al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis (the opposite direction) aired only one episode 
on the situation in Bahrain, while 19 episodes were dedicated to the Syrian revolution 
for the same period. There are different ways in which we can justify this unequal 
coverage of the two cases. The most obvious argument that the channel uses 
repeatedly is that Bahrain is not undergoing a revolution; it is an internal political 
struggle or an uprising at its best. Al Jazeera’s reporter in Bahrain, Ghassan Abuhsein, 
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 Ali Hashem, "The Arab spring has shaken Arab TV's credibility", The Guardian, 3 April 2012. 
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was clear in explaining this: “What happens in Bahrain is not a revelation. The 
opposition there tries to benefit from this historic moment.”11 
The perplexity and confusion in finding the right name for what happens in Bahrain is 
reflected in the title of the one and single episode of al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis on 
Bahrain.
12
 The confusion about Syria is rather between Al Jazeera Arabic and Al 
Jazeera English. While the Arabic channel calls it revolution, its English sister seems 
more hesitant and presents its viewers with coverage under the label "Syria: the war 
within". The table below shows in detail this unequal coverage. 
Al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis (the opposite direction): discussion of Syria and Bahrain 
(from 13/09/2011 to 12/06/2012) 
Date Syria Bahrain 
13/09/2011 The myth of the armed 
groups 
 
20/09/2011 Is the Syrian regime still fit 
to rule? 
 
11/10/2011 The Syrian National 
Council 
 
25/10/2011  Bahrain: a popular uprising 
or a political struggle? 
                                                           
11
 Researcher’s interview with Gh. Abuhsein, May 2011. 
12
 As the table shows, Al Jazeera's  al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis aired discussed the Bahrain situation in one 
episode aired on 25 October 2011. The title was: "Bahrain: a popular uprising or a political struggle?" 
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08/11/2011 Lebanon and the Syrian 
revolution 
 
15/11/2011 The Arab League and Syria  
10/01/2012 Arab in observers in Syria: 
a witness who saw nothing 
 
31/01/2012 The future of the Syrian 
regime 
 
07/02/2012 Russia's interest comes 
before that of the Syrian 
people 
 
14/02/2012 The Syrian Army: a 
national army or an army 
of occupation? 
 
21/02/2012 The Syrian constitution: a 
real change or a joke? 
 
28/02/2012 Has foreign intervention in 
Syria become necessary? 
 
13/03/2012 The Syrian revolution: one 
year on 
 
20/03/2012 Arming the Syrian rebels  
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27/03/2012 The Arab split over the 
Syrian crisis 
 
10/04/2012 Who trusts the Syrian 
media? 
 
17/04/2012 Why does the Iraqi regime 
conspire against Syria? 
 
15/05/2012 Does the Syrian regime 
really want reform? 
 
29/05/2012 Who stands behind the 
explosions in Syria? 
 
12/06/2012 Who are the mercenaries: 
the rebels or the 
"shabbih'a? 
 
Source: Al Jazeera programme archives: www.aljazeera.net/programsarchive/ 
The second argument, which is to some extent an extension of the first one, is the 
sectarian argument. Given the demographic structure of Bahrain and the widening 
divide between the Shi'a (mostly on the opposition side) and the Sunnis (mostly on 
the government side), Al Jazeera's coverage was kept to the minimum. The fact that, 
since the beginning of the uprising in mid-February 2011, protests have been 
exclusively organized by Shi'a and failed to involve Sunnis at any level, reinforced 
the sectarian aspect and made it more difficult for the media to play a more substantial 
role. In order not to be seen as fueling a sectarian conflict or siding with one particular 
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party against another on a sectarian basis, the channel chose to reduce its coverage to 
a handful of reports and keep a distance from all sides, especially after it has been 
ordered to leave the country.
13
 The sectarian argument is undeniably valid, 
particularly in a region fraught with sectarian conflicts. However, this should not go 
unchallenged if we know that Syria is in quite a similar situation but receives a non-
stop coverage. The increasingly visible divide between the Alawites (mostly in 
power) and the Sunnis (mostly in the opposition) may not be as apparent as in the case 
of Bahrain, but it is deeply affecting the course of events both at the political and 
operational levels. Covering Syria without being perceived as unbiased means to treat 
both sides on an equal footing, and stop showing unqualified support for the 
revolutionaries as we see on Al Jazeera and many other Arab media. Supporting the 
revolution, on the other hand, means "twisting the rules of traditional 
professionalism" to keep in line with the channel's editorial policy: being with the 
people and challenging power holders. Unlike in the case of Bahrain, there is a silence 
about the sectarian element in the coverage of Syria. The relationship between this 
silence and the fact that the revolutionaries belong to the majority Sunnis, remains 
unclear. 
This quick comparison between the Syrian and Bahraini cases shows that the sectarian 
argument cannot in itself explain the unequal coverage of both cases. What might 
explain the exceptionally little attention given to the uprising in Bahrain on the media 
level comparing to rest of the Arab spring countries is probably the much attention 
given to the country at the geopolitical level. On March 13, 2011, armed forces from 
the GCC Peninsula Shield arrived in Bahrain to help authorities maintain security and 
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 On Sunday 7 August 2011 the Bahraini authorities decided to ban Al Jazeera staff from entering the 
country accusing the channel of violating the rules of professionalism and providing a biased coverage 
of the events in Bahrain.  
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order after unprecedented violence erupted between protesters and government forces. 
This intervention comes one month after the start of what was thought as the Arab 
spring in Bahrain. It also comes in the context of implementing the principle of "unity 
of fate and security interdependence among GCC states, it is the joint responsibility of 
the GCC in maintaining security and stability."
14
  
Compared to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, only Bahrain has been subject 
to an Arab military intervention. Based on purely geopolitical considerations, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council states decided to take this joint move and help the royal family 
in Manama remain in power. They realized Bahrain stability was under serious threat 
and that its forces were unable to resist the increasing protest movement and restore 
security on their own. The destabilization of Bahrain, which could ultimately bring 
the Al Khalifa reign to an end and therefore lead to a strategic change in the region, 
was a disturbing scenario that should be aborted before transforming into a reality. 
The Peninsula Shield forces intervened not only to keep regional order from 
collapsing, but also to maintain internal stability in other GCC countries, especially 
those with sizable Shi'ite minorities such as Saudi Arabia (over 15%) and Kuwait 
(over 25%). 
As was demonstrated earlier, the role of the media has been so influential in the 
shaping the events of Arab spring and cannot be dissociated from the unfolding story 
of this historic turning point. For the Bahraini authorities, changing the course of 
events meant, to some extent, changing or limiting the role of the media. Various 
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 The deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force into Bahraini territories on Sunday 13 March 2011 
following a request from Manama was based on the GCC Joint Defense Agreement. 
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measures to crack down on local and international media were taken
15
 and many of 
the reporters were forced to leave the country and leave the Bahraini protesters 
"shouting in the dark".
16
 
But, the fact that Al Jazeera's reporters were not allowed to continue reporting events 
from within the country cannot in itself explain this noticeably minimal coverage. 
During the three weeks of the Tunisian revolution, the channel was covering the 
protests from its headquarters in Doha relying primarily on materials posted by social 
media activists. When the Egyptian authorities interrupted its signal and closed its 
office in Cairo, the channel did not stop its operation in Egypt. Both cases were 
framed as 'revolutions' so the editorial decision was to continue coverage despite the 
technical and operational difficulties. What happened in the case of Bahrain was a 
different framing of the protest movement based on a different assessment of its 
nature and magnitude. Many factors inform the decision making process in any news 
coverage and therefore determine the way stories get framed. The facts on the ground 
cannot on their own set the rules for this complex framing game. Other elements 
come into play, especially in cases where the media become an important player 
affecting sensitive regional settings. Bahrain seems to fall within this category where 
the media have to take into consideration, in addition to the controversy surrounding 
the facts on the ground, the geopolitics of the country. Framing the events as an 
'uprising' or just a 'protest movement' as opposed to 'revolution' is therefore not 
accidental. When the coverage of Bahrain differs in tone, scale and perspective from 
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 Reporters Without Borders reported that correspondents from a number of foreign media were 
denied visa to enter the country. The list includes: the BBC, The New York Times, The Wall Street 
Journal, The Christian Science Monitor, NHK. (see press release, 10 Feb. 2012).  
16
 "Shouting in the Dark" is the title of May Ying Welsh's documentary film produced for and aired by 
Al Jazeera English. The film, which caused diplomatic tensions between Doha and Manama,  tells the 
story of "the Arab revolution that was abandoned by the Arabs, forsaken by the West and forgotten by 
the world", as described by the producer. The film won many international awards the latest of which 
was the a golden nymph at the Monte Carlo TV festival in June 2012.  
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that of the rest of the Arab spring countries, we understand that what Shawn Powers 
calls "geopolitics of the news" is at play.
17
     
The geopolitical argument which I used in the third chapter to explain the emergence 
of Al Jazeera as a "non-systemic approach", explains by the same token the channel's 
approach to the Bahraini case although in a different way. The conditions that 
facilitated the rise of Al Jazeera in the mid-1990s as a soft power in the emerging 
Qatari public diplomacy may have changed but the role of the channel in setting the 
news agenda and influencing regional politics remains active. Reduced coverage in 
the case of Bahrain does not necessarily mean that the media has played a less 
significant role. On the contrary, by reducing the airtime and minimizing the space 
where the Bahrain story could be seen or 'perceived', to refer to Berkeley's metaphor, 
the media are certainly playing a major role in determining its fate. In this regard, the 
political stance of the GCC countries, which translated into moving the Peninsula 
Shield forces into the Bahraini capital, and the way the media covered the story 
should be understood from the same geopolitical perspective.  
The geopolitics of news may explain why Al Jazeera has covered Bahrain in this 
particular way, but it cannot justify what might be considered as inconsistency that 
characterized its coverage of the Arab spring in general. In Libya, another aspect of 
this inconsistency can be outlined: the use of “embedded journalism”.  
2. Covering Libya: the danger in using embedded journalism 
Although embedded journalism could be applied to many historical cases where news 
reporters were attached to military forces, the term first came to be used in the media 
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 See: Powers, Shawn. "Chapter 6: Qatar and the Geopolitics of the News", The Geopolitics of the 
News: the Case of Al Jazeera Network, PhD thesis, Faculty of the USC Graduate School, University of 
South California, 2009.    
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coverage of the Iraq war in 2003. As reports Bonnie Azab Powell, at the start of the 
war, “as many as 775 reporters and photographers were traveling as "embedded 
journalists" with U.S. forces.”18 Although Al Jazeera agreed at a certain point in time 
to embed a couple of its journalists, the official line was critical of embedded 
journalism on ethical grounds. Those who opposed the idea argued that this practice 
contradicts the long established tradition of balanced and impartial news reporting. 
Although in conflict situations, accompanying armies is sometimes the only way to 
find out what they are doing, embedded journalism remains a controversial practice. It 
has been harshly criticized by journalists themselves as being part of propaganda 
campaigns for the dominant party. News reporters who drive around in tanks and 
armored personnel carriers," said journalist Gay Talese, "are spoon-fed what the 
military gives them and they become mascots for the military.”19 
In most cases, embedded journalists have to cover the story from the military forces’ 
angle and therefore lose their independent perspective on events. The danger in this 
practice is that the story they get us from the army is not necessarily how things are 
happening in the field, but how the army think they are happening. Trying to escape 
this danger, Al Jazeera deployed a large number of reporters in different positions 
across the Iraqi territories. As many comparative studies showed, the channel’s 
coverage of the Iraq war was considerably different from that of the western media, 
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 See Bonnie Azab Powell, “Reporters, commentators visit Berkeley to conduct in-depth postmortem 
of Iraq war coverage”, UCBerkeleyNews. 
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which relied heavily on American sources.
20
 Al Jazeera’s independent coverage 
clashed with the American forces’ policy and did not please the Pentagon which saw 
in it a serious challenge to its military operations.
21
 But, on the other hand, it won the 
channel respect and credibility and provided audiences with a reliable alternative 
source of information. 
During the Libyan revolution however, we have seen Al Jazeera’s changing its 
position vis-à-vis embedded journalism. A number of its reporters were embedded 
with the opposition fighters so they can gain access to the latest information and 
report from the frontline. They followed and accompanied the rebel forces along the 
war zone extending from Al Bayda in the East through Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Brega, 
Ras Lanuf and Misratah, all the way to Tripoli in the West. The coverage viewers 
have been receiving from the battlefield reflected one side of the story and gave the 
opposition perspective only. The other side was almost absent for obvious reasons. 
Among these reasons was the hostility with which Gaddafi’s regime treated the 
network which they see as “conspiring against Libya”.22 The tension between the 
Libyan authorities and the channel reached its highest level with the assassination of 
cameraman Ali Hassan Al Jaber, who was killed after a reporting team was ambushed 
by government forces near Benghazi. Prior to that, when the revolution has just 
started, the government placed all accredited journalists in one hotel and only allowed 
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 See for example: Aday, Sean. Livingston Steven and Hebert, Maeve. “Embedding the Truth: A 
Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War”, The Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics 2005; 10; 3. 
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 Among the Libyan officials who repeatedly attacked Al Jazeera was Gaddafi’s son Seiful Islam. See 
for example his telephone interview with Al Sharq Alawsat, 3 March 2011. See also his speech on the 
Libyan national television station on 20 February 2011.  
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them to convey the official line. After refusing to comply with this policy, it has 
become almost impossible for Al Jazeera to get the Libyan authorities’ opinion on 
what was happening, which eventually resulted in imbalanced coverage. 
However, even with embedding journalists with one side of the conflict, the channel 
could have overcome this editorial issue by balancing its studio coverage. Instead of 
rallying opposition figures in reports, newscasts and interviews, the editors could have 
diversified their guests by giving platform to government supporters whether in the 
studio or over the phone. 
This obvious bias in media coverage cannot be separated from the political bias and 
the clear agenda the channel is promoting. Since the Tunisian revolution erupted in 
December 2010, it was clear that Al Jazeera is supporting these popular uprisings 
which have become known as the Arab spring. The remarkable success in covering 
this unprecedented event brought with it a number of challenges to some of Al 
Jazeera’s strengths, including its policy of bringing “the opinion and other opinion”.       
3. A shrinking space for 'the opinion and the other opinion' 
Until before the start of the Arab spring, 'the opinion and the opinion' policy of Al 
Jazeera has not been seriously challenged, even during the most difficult times when 
the channel's war correspondents were under fire. The Arab spring however, proved 
to be more challenging and led observers to question this long celebrated motto. It 
may not always be possible to show all sides of the story, especially when the other 
opinion is inaccessible or refuse, for whatever reason, to be shown. But, when the 
editorial policy deliberately chooses to take side in covering certain events, showing 
one side of the story becomes the norm not the exception. This seems to be the case in 
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much of Al Jazeera's coverage of the Arab revolutions and goes in line with its 
commitment to 'siding with the people'. To be on the people's side when reporting a 
popular uprising raises questions not only about how far the media could go in 
pursuing a particular political agenda without compromising their professional 
standards, but also about the danger of losing credibility when they fail to bring in the 
other opinion and account for the other side of the story. 
A close examination of Al Jazeera's coverage of the Arab spring shows that the 'other 
opinion' has been almost inexistent, especially during the Tunisian, Egyptian and 
Libyan revolutions. The following examples try to bring to light some aspects of this 
coverage and illustrate what could be considered as an editorial shift: 
The first example concerns the 'open coverage' policy that the channel opt for 
whenever it chooses to give maximum exposure to a particular news story. Although 
this policy has been adopted before the Arab spring, and was used during other major 
events such as the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 and the Gaza war in 2008-9, there 
was always room for different opinions to be expressed. Suspending the regular 
scheduling and opening the screen for continuous live reporting from the streets and 
squares restricts coverage to demonstrations and only gives voice to the revolutionary 
discourse. Protestors, eyewitnesses, analysts, studio and video-linked commentators, 
all speak the same language and collectively contribute to the formation of one 
narrative, that is the revolution narrative. The counter-discourse is rarely aired, not 
only because of the channel's bias towards the "people", but also because of the 
normative dimension to the revolutionary discourse that makes it extremely difficult 
for anti-revolution discourses to express themselves.     
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The suspension of talk shows, which are mostly known as the Al Jazeera platform that 
regularly feature 'the opinion and the other opinion', contributed a great deal to the 
shaping of this narrative. While the channel dedicated one episode of the 'opposite 
direction' to discuss the Tunisian revolution
23
, during the Libyan and Yemeni 
revolutions in particular, the other opinion disappeared almost completely since none 
of the talk shows or the debate programmes was running for over six months.
24
 
Instead, we have seen the emergence of a new form of news reports which, to a large 
extent, consolidate the same narrative by promoting the one opinion that goes with 
channel's editorial line.   
The introduction of a new style of news reports is the second example illustrating this 
editorial shift. Contrary to the long established journalistic tradition of separating the 
news and the reporter's opinion, these new Al Jazeera reports combine the two 
elements within their structure. In these reports which I prefer to call 'opinion-news 
reports', journalists not only report facts but also incorporate those facts into their own 
personal interpretation. The way these reports are structured has nothing to do with 
framing techniques or hidden bias, they are overtly politicized and show unqualified 
support for the protest movements while criticizing governments unreservedly. The 
content analysis of these reports clearly confirms this tendency and shows the degree 
of bias they incorporate. 
When Hosni Mubarak decided on 11 February 2011 to step down under the mounting 
popular pressure in the Tahrir Square, Al Jazeera aired a report by Fawzi Bushra 
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 This episode was aired on 11 January 2011 and featured the pro-government Borhan Bsaies and the 
Algerian opposition figure Mohamed Larbi Zitout. 
24
 From the last week of February 2011 to the first week of September 2011 Al Jazeera stopped running 
all these programmes (the opposite direction, open dialogue, without borders, behind the news, in-
depth) due the open coverage policy which relied on live reporting from the streets where the uprisings 
were taking place. 
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starting with a very symbolic Quranic verse about the drowned Faro of Egypt: "today 
we will save you in body that you may be to those who succeed you a sign"
25
. The 
report goes on to remind viewers of the tragic fall of Ben Ali of Tunisia the previous 
month who also managed to 'save his body' by fleeing the country. Against this 
similar linear fate of dictators, the report emphasizes the fact that the peoples are 
"stronger and more enduring than their oppressors". To show that Al Jazeera is the 
voice of the people, Bushra's report tries to express their views and speak on their 
behalf: 
The example of Mubarak in his relationship with the Egyptian people is similar to that of Ben 
Ali when the Tunisians asked him to initiate reform he refused to be among the reformers; 
then away with Mubarak and away with Zin el-Abidin, said the two revolting peoples.
26
       
Other examples of these opinion-news reports are produced by Majed Abdulhadi. On 
the first anniversary of the Syrian revolution that erupted mid-March 2011, Abdulhadi 
tried to rewrite the story in his own way. His reports starts with pictures of 
demonstrators calling for 'freedom for Syria' before he moves on with a quick 
flashback to a small incident that took place on 17 March 2011. In this incident, to 
which the authorities responded very aggressively, school children wrote on the wall 
of their school slogans calling for the fall of Assad's regime. Trying to contextualize 
the protest movement that spread over much of the Syrian territories, Abdulhadi's 
report links the different events to the government overreaction to that school 
incident: 
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 News report by Fawzi Bushra, aired on Al Jazeera satellite channel on 11 February 2011 and was 
replayed repeatedly during the following days. 
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As soon as the news reached the ruling Generals, they lost their temper. They arrested, 
tortured and harassed all those who have connections with that incident. One of them, the 
President Bashar Al Assad's nephew, and director of political security, Atef Najib, did not 
hesitate to insult the notables of the area with the worst of words when they requested him to 
release their sons who have been incarcerated for twenty five days or they will take action.
27
 
The report presents the different facts in the form of an interconnected chain of 
reactions. As the warning of the notables expired without any response from the 
government, "the spark of the revolution started on 18 March". Starting as a limited 
protest movement in the southern city of Daraa, the "revolution now extends to 
farthest point in the north, the city of Idlib, after it has travelled through Banias, 
Rasten, Talbisa, Homs, Hama, Deir Alzor, Duma, Zabadani, Damascus and Aleppo". 
Choosing to deliberately mention the names of individual cities across Syria is part of 
the message that the report tries to convey and therefore justify the reason why the 
channel opted for the open coverage policy: it is a revolution because the whole 
country is rising.                   
The airing of these controversial opinionated reports provoked a heated debate among 
media professionals, casting doubt over the degree of professionalism in combining 
news and opinion in news reporting, and therefore questioning the objectivity of Al 
Jazeera's coverage of the Arab spring. 
4. The Arab spring and the transformation of the Arab public sphere 
The Arab revolutions that succeeded in toppling five regimes and setting in motion 
what looks a genuine democratic transition processes in a number of countries, have 
also had a profound impact on social relations, modes of communications, public 
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spaces and their cultural, social and political significance. In this context, the Arab 
public sphere which has emerged in close relationship with the new media 
environment seems to be undergoing a structural transformation. This section looks at 
the different aspects of this transformation with special emphasis on the role of Al 
Jazeera as a leading media outlet that provided the nascent public sphere with an open 
space for free discussion and gave it much of its key characteristics. 
Unlike the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere that emerged with the rise of the 
aristocracy of the European seventeenth century and started to disintegrate with the 
decline of the eighteenth century bourgeois society, the new Arab public sphere's 
relationship with the social and political structures is superficial and its fate will only 
be determined by the factors which facilitated its emergence in the first place. It 
emerged predominantly in the virtual space and remains to a large extent subject to 
transformations occurring within that space. The second line of disagreement with 
Habermas's account of the decline of the public sphere is the role of the media in this 
transformational process. If the liberal media played a negative role towards the mid-
nineteenth century and contributed to the decline of the bourgeois public sphere
28
, the 
Arab media and Al Jazeera in particular, played an entirely different role especially in 
the absence of sociopolitical structures favorable for the emergence of the public 
sphere. But, as the Arab spring has shaken the media and revealed a number of 
weaknesses in their coverage, it has also showed how vulnerable the Arab public 
sphere was. Following are the main aspects of this vulnerability followed by a 
discussion of how the whole concept of an Arab public sphere is undergoing a 
structural transformation. 
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 According to Habermas, there was a significant shift in the role of the media which changed from 
mediating rational public discussion to shaping the public discourse and defining its main themes 
according to preset agendas validated by big media corporations. 
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The virtual aspect of the Arab public sphere and its detachment from the real society 
makes it difficult for the virtual spaces created by the media throughout the last 
decade to sustain the wave of profound transformations the Arab societies are 
confronted with. The coverage of Bahrain showed that the media, even the most 
liberal among them, can shy away from covering certain events for geopolitical 
considerations which leads in turn to restricting the previously open spaces for public 
deliberation. Choosing to take the side of the people in their struggle against 
dictatorship and openly adopt their narrative in the absence of 'the other opinion' has 
also lead to narrowing down the scope of debate and limiting the range of diversity of 
opinions which has been one of the key characteristics of the new Arab public sphere 
since it has emerged. The disappearance of the talk shows, the main platform for 
public discussion, and the reliance instead on live reporting backed with 
commentaries that mostly embrace and support the revolutionary line has significantly 
reduced the vivacity and dynamism of the public sphere. It is not erroneous therefore 
to assert that, as the media played a central role in the creation of the Arab public 
sphere, they have also played an equally important role in the current transformation it 
is going through. 
The second aspect of the vulnerability of the new Arab public sphere is the growing 
overlap between the private and public realms. Al though not confined to the Arab 
setting, the blurred boundaries between what the Greeks called 'idion' and 'koinon' 
does not seem to be the case in our increasingly interconnected society. The  role the 
media and social media networks play in bringing together the two realms has almost 
eroded any degree of distinction between them. Unlike the clear separation that 
Hannah Arendt describes regarding life in the Greek city-state: "every citizen belongs 
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to two orders of existence; and there is a sharp distinction in his life between what is 
his own and what is communal"
29
, the citizen in the age of new media incorporates 
both types of existence in his daily life. There is no opposition in the virtual city 
between the sphere of 'home, family and intimate friends' and the sphere of the 'public 
use of reason, the critique of public authority and the collective action for the 
common good'. What gives the role of new media even more prominence in the 
current transformation process of the Arab public sphere is the Arab social fabric 
itself where the private and the public are often inseparable.  
The third aspect of this transformation concerns the pan-Arab discourse that Al 
Jazeera has been promoting and constitutes one of the main themes of the Arab public 
sphere. Although the Arab spring has been accompanied by a strong feeling that 
united all Arabs in different Arab countries and revived among them the sense of 
belonging to one ummah, the aftermath of the revolutions seems to have shifted the 
public debate towards more national (vs. pan-Arab) issues. Tunisians have become 
more concerned with their own affairs debating the various issues facing the 
democratic transition and the establishing of a new political system in their country. 
All types of Tunisian media (state owned radio and television, private outlets, social 
media networks) are continuously discussing domestic politics, giving little space for 
Arab and international affairs. The focus of public debates in Egypt, Yemen and 
Libya is also predominantly on domestic issues, not only in the media but also in the 
squares and public spaces such as cafes civil gatherings and university courts. The 
most significant indication that domestic issues have taken precedence over pan-Arab 
issues in the post-revolution public discourse is the re-positioning of the Palestinian 
'cause' within this discourse. Prior to the Arab spring the Arab-Israeli conflict was the 
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center around which all other issues revolve. After the revolutions, this issue is no 
longer at the heart of the public debates which deeply affects one of the core 
characteristics of the Arab public sphere.     
The last aspect of the structural transformation of the Arab public sphere is linked to 
both the changing role of the media and the emergence of new social and political 
structures within the Arab societies after the revolutions. As the relevance of the pan-
Arab issues is diminishing so too is the relevance of the virtual dimension of the 
public sphere. The increasing focus on local and domestic issues in the public debate 
is not only related to the rise of free media in the Arab spring countries, but also 
because new structures have emerged as part of the changing political system. As 
those structures gain more ground and become more inclusive of various groups of 
the society, the public debate will shift gradually from the virtual spaces to the real 
ones. The freedom that enabled Al Jazeera to become the main and sometimes the 
only platform available for uncensored and unrestricted discussion of wide ranging 
issues of public concern has now set foot in a number of Arab societies and will have 
enormous consequences on the agenda and structures of the Arab public sphere. The 
media is no longer the sole initiator of free and open debate, and the relationship 
between the Arab public sphere and the sociopolitical structures on the ground is no 
longer superficial as it used to be. It is like we are witnessing the "rebirth of the Arab 
public sphere", and this is unquestionably one of the major transformations the Arab 
spring has brought with it. 
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Conclusions 
Since this research has started in October 2008, significant changes have taken place 
in Arab media and politics and most importantly, in the relationship between these 
two spheres. The Arab spring presented us with an extraordinary empirical case study 
showing how interlinked media and politics have become. The undergoing 
democratization processes in the four countries where televised mass movements 
resulted in toppling dictators who have been in power for decades, need fresh thinking 
on democratization theory. It is time to critically assess our existing knowledge to fill 
the gap in the traditional orthodoxy and grasp the complexities of the current political 
changes in the Arab world. As I have argued in this research, among the obvious gaps 
in the literature on democratization is the increasing influence of the media in 
facilitating and accelerating the pace of these changes. 
In this conclusion, I will first reflect on the key questions I tried to answer in my 
thesis and then present the main findings which I hope represent an original 
contribution to developing a theoretical approach to understanding Arab 
democratization and the emergence of a new Arab public sphere. At the heart of this 
approach is the impact of Al Jazeera's paradigmatic change in the media-politics 
relationship. 
Rethinking democratization theory and the role of the media in political change 
Considering the recurrent cycle of uprisings and social protests that have been taking 
place in various parts of the Arab world in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the Arab 
spring is the culminating point of this long sociopolitical process. In the same way as 
the earlier uprisings resulted in partial liberalization and led to some degrees of 
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political openings, the Arab spring carried with it similar political changes albeit on a 
larger scale and with far reaching consequences. Although the political response to 
those earlier uprisings varied from one country to another, the concerned Arab 
regimes generally reacted in the form of calculated steps towards democratization and 
controlled reforms. This can be clearly noticed in the measures taken by King Hassan 
II of Morocco (1984), President Bourguiba of Tunisia (1978 and 1984), Presidents 
Sadat and Mubarak of Egypt (1977 and 1986), and King Hussein of Jordan (1989 and 
1996).  
Scholars of democratization, especially those who always tend to find linkages 
between economic liberalization and political reforms failed to capture the 
complexities of the entire process and ended up with presenting us with perspectives 
on ‘the failure of Arab democratization’ versus the ‘survival of Arab 
authoritarianism’. The easiest way to explain this widely perceived enduring failure of 
Arab democratization is to emphasize what has become known as the ‘Arab 
exceptionalism’ with all the orientalist packaging that comes with it. It seems to me 
that, among the main casualties of the current wave of social uprisings that started in 
December 2010 and resulted in regime change in a number of countries and the 
introduction of major political and constitutional reforms is the concept of ‘Arab 
exceptionalism’ itself. Whether we consider it as a fourth wave of democratization or 
just a continuation and extension of the third wave, to borrow Huntington's concept, 
the Arab spring presents a challenging model to both the long established orthodoxy 
of democratization theory and those who seek to develop a new understanding of 
Arab democratization.  
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This current wave of political changes in the Arab region can only support and further 
substantiate the main argument this research has been elaborating both at the 
theoretical and empirical levels. Without the critical assessment of traditional theories 
of democratization which all converge in ignoring the role of two key factors in 
democratization processes, that are the media and the masses, it would have been 
difficult to develop alternative approaches in this research field. When the masses 
stop being passive consumers of media products and become actively involved in 
creating and distributing those products, this means that new social and political 
forces are in the making. The participatory and communicative aspects of using the 
media, especially new media and social media networks serve as a good starting point 
in any bottom-up process of political change towards democracy. Democratization 
from below is the alternative approach I adopted in this research as an explanatory 
model to understand and analyze the different routes Arab democratization has been 
following for decades. As traditional theories failed to capture and therefore account 
for these unconventional routes, I believe this thesis adds to our knowledge and 
understanding of different political processes and contributes to enriching the 
literature on democratization in general and Arab democratization in particular. 
So far, the Arab spring has been successful not only in toppling regimes and preparing 
the region for a new era of democratic governance; it has also succeeded in attracting 
the attention of scholars of democratization to rethink their approaches and consider 
the Arab world as a fertile ground for the study of democratization. Over twenty-five 
years since the publication of “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for 
Democracy”, and fifteen years after the publication of “Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
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Europe”, we started to see new literature on democratization theory with significant 
revisions and modifications to accommodate what looks as emerging Arab 
democratization. In their recent piece on Democratization theory and the Arab Spring, 
Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz introduced new theoretical elements to understand and 
analyze the complex routes of Arab democratization: the first element is the 
relationship between democracy and religion; the second is the character of what they 
called hybrid regimes that mix authoritarian and democratic elements; and the third 
element is the nature of “sultanism” and its implications for transitions to democracy.1  
In April last 2012, Alfred Stepan published a paper on democratic transition in 
Tunisia where he employs his concept of “twin tolerations” to discuss the role of 
“hard” secularism in democratization and analyze the relationship between religion 
and politics in a democratizing Muslim country.
2
 
With regard to the role of the Media in democratic change which I tried to emphasize 
in my research, we have also seen a new trend in the literature highlighting this 
dimension. Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Arab spring that resulted in political change 
bringing to power elected assemblies and governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
was instrumental in drawing both media and politics scholars’ attention to this 
phenomenon.   
This remarkably influential role that the media has played in the success of the 2011 
Arab revolutions is likely to continue until democratic systems have been established 
in those countries. The media that served as a leverage and indispensable platform for 
activists and political opposition groups to rally support for democratic change will 
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 Stepan, Alfred. “Tunisia’s transition and the twin tolerations”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 24, 
Number 2 April 2012. 
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transform into a watchdog during transition and consolidation phases. This 
increasingly visible interplay between media and political change validates my 
argument as to the democratizing role of the media. It is in this context that chose Al 
Jazeera as a new media paradigm that reshaped the Arab media scene and paved the 
way for much of the political transformations that took place under the name of the 
Arab spring. Before these developments became manifest and translated into a 
number of regime changes, Al Jazeera has been working closely with the grassroots, 
involving the masses in continuous debates over public issues. The new Arab public 
sphere, which developed amidst these debates, brought together Arab elites from 
various political and ideological backgrounds along with ordinary people from across 
the region to create a massive intellectual and social movement. It would be hard not 
to see the links between the recent transformations and this massive movement. It is 
this connection that makes the study of Al Jazeera's democratizing role and the rise of 
an Arab public sphere of great significance. 
Al Jazeera before and After the Arab spring 
As most of the literature on Al Jazeera tends to distinguish in the Arab media between 
two phases: before and after Al Jazeera, due to the profound impact the channel has 
had on the Arab media landscape, this research shows that the Arab spring has equally 
effected the performance of the Arab media including that of Al Jazeera to the extent 
that we can confidently distinguish between Al Jazeera before and after the Arab 
spring. Its coverage of Arab affairs for the last fourteen years, just before the eruption 
of the first protests in Tunisia in December 2010, has been characterized by near 
complete dominance over the Arab media scene. Even with the advent of international 
news channels broadcasting in Arabic and targeting the same audience, such as the 
292 
 
BBC, France 24, Russia Today, Al Hurrah etc. Al Jazeera remained beyond 
competition and its viewership continued to grow steadily. The open platform policy 
that Al Jazeera has been known for, contributed immensely to generate and manage 
debates over an unlimited number of issues that are of interest to the Arab public. This 
is what made the study of the channel's democratization effect an interesting endeavor 
this research has undertaken.  
The arrival of the Arab spring though, has somewhat shaken the image of Arab media 
in general and Al Jazeera particularly, because of its remarkably heavy involvement 
in what was perceived as shaping political agendas in certain countries rather than 
neutrally reporting events. This has led some observers to point out the seemingly 
difference between the channel's journalistic practice before and during the Arab 
revolutions. The demarcation between these two types of journalism and the lack of 
impartiality in covering the revolutions led in turn, to questioning the nature and 
limits of Al Jazeera's democratization role in certain countries of the Arab spring. 
This role is proving to be even more problematic in the transitional process, not only 
because of the rise of local media as new players in the field, but also because the 
individual situations in each of the transiting countries are considerably different.      
Although the Arab revolutions have occurred in quite similar sociopolitical 
circumstances, they do not seem to be following similar paths in their democratic 
transitional phase. While the Tunisian example looks to be moving fairly smooth due 
to the relatively wide consensus among the political elite who managed, at an early 
stage, to agree on the key steps of the transitional process, the Egyptian revolution is 
struggling to put together the building blocks of the new political system in an orderly 
way and limit the role of the Superior Military Council (SCAF) in the political life. 
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The transition in Yemen and Libya cannot be separated from the regional and 
international factors that were instrumental in bringing about the change in the first 
place. The GCC initiative which served as mediator between the revolutionaries and 
President Salah's regime has also set the agenda for the entire process. The first 
transitional phase of this process started with a power-sharing formula between 
representatives of the revolution and elites from the old regime in order to prepare for 
the next phase: parliamentary and presidential elections. For a number of reasons, the 
Libyan transition remains the most complicated case among the Arab spring 
countries. On top of the existing rivalry between tribalism and the newly formed 
political system, the militarization of the revolution brought with it an additional 
complication by creating another legitimacy that is of the armed groups. Besides this 
multidimensional clash of legitimacies, the Libyan transition is also confronted with 
wide ranging challenges of state-building. 
Despite the different processes of democratic transition in the Arab spring countries, 
they all share a number of common characteristics among which is the central role 
played by the youth as a new social movement in the Arab world. The second 
characteristic is the unprecedented media coverage that the revolutions received from 
all types of media, especially satellite television and social media networks. The 
combination of these two forces, the youth and the media will have a greater impact 
on the democratic transition during the consolidation phase as it has had in bringing 
about the change in the first place. However, the proliferation of local unprofessional 
and sometimes unregulated media outlets in these countries before the new political 
and legal systems are fully established could hinder the transitional process at 
different levels. As substantial parts of the old regimes are still in place and try to 
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regain control over power through various means, the struggle over the media is 
intensifying especially in the case of Tunisia and Egypt. The relative retreat of Arab 
satellite televisions such as Al Jazeera due to the fierce competition they face in 
covering domestic issues, adds to the potential danger of obstructing, if not reversing 
the democratic process. 
The post-Al Jazeera era 
The emergence of free and independent local media in the Arab spring countries is a 
new phenomenon that is reshaping the Arab media landscape. The rise of Al Jazeera 
in the 1990s, followed by a number of other Arab-speaking regional and international 
satellite television channels introduced a dramatic change to the Arab media scene, 
which in turn contributed to the political changes we have seen for the last two years. 
The current changes in the local media will not be limited to the countries where the 
revolutions took place. They are wide ranging and will have further political 
implications as the Al Jazeera phenomenon has previously had. Indeed, the region is 
experiencing another media phenomenon which we could call the post-Al Jazeera era. 
The new dynamics created by the rise of those media are increasingly visible in 
Tunisia and Egypt but to a lesser degree in Yemen and Libya. The most noticeable 
aspect of these dynamics is the mounting competition among national and privately 
owned television stations. Competition for viewership is not only confined to local 
media; Arab satellite televisions are also being affected to varying degrees. In Tunisia 
for instance, audience figures after the revolution show that, for the first time in 
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decades, local media attract more viewership than pan-Arab and international satellite 
stations including Al Jazeera.
3
 
To face up to these challenges that are reshaping the landscape of Arab media and 
redistributing power and influence among them, Al Jazeera is trying to reposition 
itself in the newly structured information market. In Egypt, it has launched a local 
version of its 24 hour 'Mubasher' station (Al Jazeera Live Egypt), whereas in Tunisia 
only a small team of journalists from this particular channel are sent occasionally 
from Doha to cover certain events. 
The political implications of the changes in the media field are of particular 
significance, especially with regard to the democratization process. As local media 
continue to consolidate their position within their respective markets and acquire 
more freedom and professional training, their role in advancing democracy will 
increase accordingly. They are better positioned to play this role than foreign media, 
since they are entrenched in their sociopolitical setting and able to engage with it 
openly and on a daily basis. 
As for Al Jazeera and other international media, it seems their political effect is 
diminishing in the Arab spring countries for the reasons mention above. They will 
however, continue to play a crucial role in countries where the political situation has 
not changed. Wherever there is need for free and independent media, Al Jazeera will 
always preserve its power and influence. Wherever the political situation changes and 
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allows for local media to play their natural role as the fourth estate, the role of Al 
Jazeera and its political effect will decrease. This has not been the case since it has 
come on air up until the Arab spring happened, and this is what justifies the claim that 
the Arab media and politics have now entered a post-Al Jazeera era. 
Expanding away from the Arab world: the scope and significance of this move 
If the Arab world, or at least parts of it, has really embarked on what I called the post-
Al Jazeera era, the rest of the world seems to be going in the opposite direction. 
Although plans to expand beyond the Arab region have been there before the Arab 
spring, Al Jazeera's initiatives to move into new markets and launch a number of non-
Arab speaking channels have now acquired more significance. 
If Al Jazeera wants to stay the course and retains its influence regionally and globally 
alike, it should adopt a twofold strategy: focus locally and expand globally. 
Competing with Arab local stations will not be easy unless the channel consolidates 
its presence in those countries and multiply its local operations to fully engage with 
the new sociopolitical realities created by the dynamics of the emerging democracies 
in the region. The journalistic strength of Al Jazeera should be redeployed to explore 
uncovered issues that the old regimes would not allow to cover. The collapse of major 
parts of the authoritarian state, particularly the security apparatuses, paves the way for 
a new journalistic practice to develop in the Arab world that is investigative 
journalism. Al Jazeera tried to get into this type of journalism and produced a series of 
investigative programmes but its efforts were obstructed by the endless difficulties it 
has faced regarding access to information and people in dictatorial regimes. The Arab 
spring brought with it great opportunities for the media to investigate and break the 
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silence on many issues such as corruption, torture, forged elections, clandestine 
immigration etc.      
At the global level, expanding to new markets with new languages will inevitably 
increase the audience of Al Jazeera. The English channel that has only been operating 
for less than six years, is now reaching more than half a billion households across the 
world. The Balkans channel which launched in November 2011 is making an inroad, 
not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the station is located, but also for the whole 
Balkans region. The two new channels, Al Jazeera Turk and Al Jazeera Swahili which 
are expected to go on air before the end 2013 will add to this global media network 
new dimensions and give it access to substantial numbers of viewers in both Asia and 
Africa.
4
 The network's online operation sharek is already functioning in five 
languages: Arabic, English, Serbo-Croat, Turkish, Swahili. 
This fast moving horizontal expansion, it should be noted, carries with it the danger 
affecting the quality of journalism Al Jazeera has been providing. The noticeable 
difference in the coverage of Bahrain between the Arabic and the English channels is 
just an example. The way Al Jazeera Arabic framed the Syrian case (revolution) is 
also inconsistent with that of its English sister channel (the war within). With more 
channels to come, it may become more difficult to control these inconsistencies and 
develop a strong unified editorial policy. 
The Arab spring: the lessons we learned 
As has been explained above, the Arab spring cannot be dissociated from the way it 
has been portrayed in the media. It is certainly a sociopolitical event but it is also a 
                                                           
4
 On March 18
th
 2013, during the 9
th
 Al Jazeera Annual Forum, Director General Sheikh Ahmed bin 
Jasim Al Thani announced that the network is also planning to launch a French-speaking channel. 
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media phenomenon from which media students will draw endless lessons in the years 
to come. Following are a few lessons that summarize the findings of my research 
regarding Al Jazeera’s coverage and the role it has played in the Arab spring. These 
findings are based on the materials I gathered from my interviewees and consequently 
reflect the Al Jazeera thinking and perception of its own contribution to this historical 
change:    
- Contrary to the widespread perception that the Arab spring has come all of a 
sudden with no particular history that can explain it, there is a common 
understanding among Al Jazeera’s interviewees that provides a historic 
explanation. Although no one can claim to have planned the initial events that 
ignited the flame of the first revolution in Tunisia, what happened with the 
street vendor who set himself on fire in that remote city of Sidi Bouzid 
symbolizes the strained relationship between Arab governments and their 
citizens. The mounting resentment among impoverished and suppressed 
people over the years on the one hand, and the gradual emergence of a new 
political awareness to which Al Jazeera has significantly contributed, paved 
the way for this historic change. From this perspective, the Arab spring is the 
culmination of a long process of smaller changes. Therefore, it should be 
understood in this context of a changing landscape of Arab Media and politics 
and not as a separate decontextualized event. 
- Against the ongoing controversies around the nature and limits of the role 
played by Al Jazeera in this change that is likely to lead to the democratization 
of substantial parts of the Arab world, there is a general agreement among Al 
Jazeera’s interviewees on a particular interpretation. We should distinguish 
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between two types of effects Al Jazeera has had in this changing political 
environment. There is a long term effect in informing, educating and 
empowering the Arab publics that resulted in the emergence of a vibrant and 
dynamic Arab public sphere. And there is an immediate effect during the 
coverage of the Arab spring. Both effects contributed to the shaping of the 
current landscape at varying degrees. This interpretation of the channel’s 
democratizing role strongly supports the suggestion that Al Jazeera is more 
than a media outlet; it is indeed an agent for change.   
- The role the media coverage played in the success of the Arab spring 
revolutions was crucial and undeniable. However, it would be erroneous to 
claim that it was Al Jazeera that triggered these revolutions. Again, here we 
have a common perception among the interviewees that their channel acted as 
facilitator of change. The Arab spring is not Al Jazeera’s revolution as some 
would call it; it is “the people’s revolution” as strongly suggests the channel’s 
director. It is true that the channel’s logos were displayed in protests all over 
the squares in Egypt, Libya and Yemen but, this is an indication that Al 
Jazeera is behind these protests. It reflects the protestors’ understanding of Al 
Jazeera’s strength and influence. As observes Philip Seib “Media might not 
make revolutions, but they certainly can contribute to them.”5 In fact, it is the 
public's willingness to act that is the most crucial factor in political change.  
- Although Al Jazeera’s management and editors were closely monitoring the 
developing situation in the Arab world through their knowledge, accumulated 
expertise, and the wide network of correspondents almost everywhere in the 
                                                           
5
 Seib, Philip. "New Media and Prospects for Democratization" in Philip Seib (eds.) New Media and 
the New Middle East, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) p.10 
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region, the sudden eruption of the Arab spring took the channel by surprise. 
Like academics, intellectuals and politicians, the media also failed to 
anticipate the Arab revolutions. At least no one expected the events to be on 
that unprecedented scale. It is not common for small-sized protests to turn in 
no time to full revolutions in four countries with different social, political and 
historic experiences. These unfamiliar developments meant that the media 
would face serious challenges in performing consistent coverage. No matter 
how well Al Jazeera was prepared to cover big events, its coverage of the 
Arab spring showed some degrees of inconsistencies that, to some extent, 
damaged the channel’s image and caused observers to question its credibility, 
balance and professionalism.  
- Looking at this issue from a different angle, what appeared to some as 
inconsistency in the coverage of the Arab spring might look to others as a 
logical practice. Although the channel conducted its coverage from the same 
studio, by the same staff and according to the same agenda, the editorial policy 
of the coverage and the output on the screen differed from one country to 
another. These differences could be explained by the different paths 
revolutions were taking, the different inputs from field reporters, whose grasp 
and understanding of the developing stories varied greatly, and the amount and 
quality of materials the newsroom received from activists and social media. 
These new dynamics we have seen in this multi-dimensional media coverage 
of the Arab spring requires us to revisit some existing theoretical frameworks 
including agenda setting and framing theories.  
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- Among the new dynamics that characterized media coverage of the Arab 
spring was the remarkable interaction between traditional media and new 
media. With their limited resources, crews and equipment, it appeared that 
traditional media were unable on their own to cope with the expanding scope 
of this unprecedented mass movement. Covering a country as big as Egypt 
with demonstrations taking place simultaneously in dozens of cities is 
impossible for any news network regardless of how prepared it might be.  You 
cannot cover the whole picture relying only on your reporters using 
professional cameras and related equipment. On the other hand, the outreach 
of new or social media remains limited in the absence of television that uses 
their materials and rebroadcast them to the wider public. It was with the help 
of citizen journalists using social media networks that the media managed to 
present us with different sides of this big story that we now call the Arab 
spring. It was a mutually coordinated exercise where the traditional walls 
separating old and new media have become something of the past. 
To conclude, it remains to mention that, I was fortunate to be part of the Al Jazeera 
network while working on this thesis. That gave me flexibility and full access to the 
materials, the people and the working environment of the staff members from whom I 
acquired my primary data. That also equipped me with an in-depth and unequalled 
understanding of the organization; the way it functions and the real impact it having 
on the entire Arab region. However, being located away from the University has 
certainly ad its disadvantages.  For, it deprived me from the privilege of the academic 
environment which could have had a greater impact on my research in many ways. I 
missed many opportunity to meet and interact with students and scholars whose 
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company would have helped me expose my ideas and arguments to further discussion 
and probably present them in a better shape. Besides, I could have benefitted from the 
wealth of the University library and tap into more literature that could have definitely 
enriched my thesis and filled the gaps that I am sure are still there. This brings me to 
the last point of this conclusion that is the way forward. 
New research avenues: the way forward 
The Arab spring presents scholars of democratization with plenty of research 
opportunities, not only to expand the scope of existing literature, which to a large 
extent neglect the Arab region for a number of reasons I explained in this thesis, but 
also to explore new dynamics of political change in an area which has long been 
regarded as categorically different from the rest of the world, whether in terms of 
culture or social structures. The culture argument that has always been used to explain 
the absence or at least the delay of democratization in the Arab world should now be 
revisited and confronted with the new realities in the region. This would be a logical 
extension of some of the thoughts I tried to develop in this research.    
On the other hand, the remarkable difference in the transitional processes between the 
different countries of the Arab spring needs to be subject to academic investigation. 
What has happened in Tunisia is different from what we have seen in Egypt, and both 
processes are definitely different from that of Yemen or Libya. Studying those 
experiences from a comparative perspective would certainly add a great value to our 
present knowledge of democratization processes. It will equally deepen our 
understanding of the various forms of inter-Arab linkages beyond the dominating 
state-centric approaches. This is another research area where this thesis could be 
extended further. 
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Appendix: List of Interviews 
 
 
 Interviewee Position/job locatio
n 
Date Length 
1.  Jamil Azar Chief Language Monitor Doha April 2011 48:24 min 
2.  Ahmed Sheikh Chief Editor Doha April 2011 43:01 min 
3.  Laila Chaieb News Presenter Doha April 2011 28:03 min 
4.  Moeed Ahmed Head of New Media Doha April 2011 16:07 min 
5.  Mohamed Krichen News Presenter Doha April 2011 39:24 min 
6.  Aref Hijjawi Director of Programmes Doha April 2011 26:39 min 
7.  Ahmed Ashour Head of Al Jazeera Talk Doha April 2011 44:40 min 
8.  Mostefa Souag Director of News Doha April 2011 47:56 min 
9.  Nasreddine Louati News Producer Doha May 2011 19:12 min 
10.  Mohamed Lemine Journalist/Translator  Doha May 2011 32:01 min 
11.  Samir Hijjawi Senior journalist, Al 
Jazeera Mubasher 
Doha May 2011 51:27 min 
12.  Mohamed Dahou Presenter, Al Jazeera 
Mubasher 
Doha May 2011 24:45 min 
13.  Jamal Shayyal Senior producer and 
Field reporter, Egypt 
Doha May 2011 30:33 min 
14.  Nabil Raihani Field reporter, Tunisia Doha May 2011 50:20 min 
15.  Ahmed Vall 
Ouldeddine 
Field reporter, Libya Doha May 2011 53:47 min 
16.  Ghassan Abuhsein Field reporter, Bahrain Doha May 2011 76:13 min 
 
